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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Marco Polo was describing a bridge, stone by stone. "But, which is the stone 
that supports the bridge?" asked Kublai Khan. "The bridge is not held up by 
one or another stone," replied Marco, "but rather by the arch line that they 
form." Kublai remained silent, thoughtful. Then he added, "Why do you talk 
to me of the stones? It is only the arch that I'm interested in." Polo answered, 
"Without the stones there is no arch." (Calvino, 1974, p. 82) 
Background 
The challenges of development have created problems to agricultural extension in less 
developed countries (LDCs), resulting in a growing criticism about its efficiency (Bordenave, 
1980; Chaudry & Al-Haj, 1985; Higgs, 1976; Jiggins, 1978; Moore, 1984; Orivel, 1981; Rice, 
1971; Roling & de Zeeuw, 1984; Woods, 1983). The fact that societies want to obtain the 
highest value for the public resources in which they invest, because of the increasing difficulty 
for governments to finance their budgets, is leading to question whether or not there is a place 
for extension (Nitsch, 1988; Persons, 1992). The limited success of extension in LDCs can be 
attributed to a wide range of factors. A common problem to effective extension in these 
countries is extension's lack of evaluation (Howes, 1992; Lacroix, 1985; Miller & 
Maung,1990; Weddle, 1992). According to Poostchi (1986), extension needs evaluation to 
realize how effective the work has been. Evaluation provides a process for accountability and 
improvement of future extension projects; therefore, increasing efficiency. 
Summative evaluation, aimed at assessing the overall impact of a given project from 
the technical/ economical perspective, is sometimes implemented in LDCs. This is closely 
related to the issue that extension has been considered primarily as an instrument for transfer 
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of technology (TOT). TOT's model of extension has been dominant until the 1980s in LDCs 
(Hoare, 1986). Under this model, development was understood in terms of spreading new 
technology into a social system. In practice, because the emphasis was being put on material 
objectives, the use of evaluation when practiced, was largely limited to analyzing the tangible 
results of extension: technical or economic outputs (Murphy & Marchant, 1988). Whether or 
not sociological objectives were stated, evaluation procedures ignored them, in virtue that 
they cannot be properly quantified. However, as Robins (1987) stated, it is largely by social 
considerations that projects succeed or fail in LDCs. By-passing social considerations goes 
hand in hand with concentrating in cognitive components (TOT tradition) while ignoring 
affective ones. Mager (1972) commented that, "... [cognitive components] have to do with 
what a person can do, (but) the affective with what he will do" (p. 14). As a result, extension 
has failed to adequately evaluate the reasons of project failure and to use that evaluation to 
improve current projects. 
Overview of Uruguay 
The following overview is based on a book published in 1992 by the Federal Research 
Division of the Library of Congress. Uruguay, the smallest Spanish-speaking country in 
South America, lies in the southern part of the continent (Figure 1). It is bounded between 
two giants Brazil (on the north) and Argentina (on the west). The Atlantic Ocean forms the 
eastern boundary, while the broad estuary, Rio de la Plata (River Plate), forms the southern 
boundary. Its terrain is characterized by a smooth topography of plains and gently undulating 
hills. There are no mountains, deserts or jungles—features clearly favorable to communication 
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Figure 1. A map of Uruguay (Brannon, 1968) 
and transportation. Uruguay's climate is temperate, although the northwest can be considered 
subtropical. Rainfall nationally averages about 1,000 millimeters per year which is adequate 
for agricultural activities. Additionally, there are numerous lakes, lagoons and rivers. 
Uruguay became an independent nation in 1828, after being a Spanish colony for a 
long while. The system and structure of government is democratic with three separate 
branches of government: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. Uruguay is a presidential 
4 
republic whose constitution allows for a strong presidency which is subject to control from the 
other branches. Currently, the Colorado, National and Broad Front coalitions are the three 
major political entities. Uruguay's population is nearly three million and is basically derived 
from European countries, especially Spain and Italy. The small indigenous population was 
exterminated during the last century, after severely resisting Spanish colonization. 
Montevideo, the capital of the country, concentrates nearly 50% of the population and 
dominates the nation politically, economically and culturally. In this sense, Uruguay exhibits a 
pattern of extreme centralization, originating from colonial times. For administrative reasons, 
the national territory is divided into 19 departments which are subordinate to the central 
government located in the departmental capital. Nearly 90% of the population live in urban 
areas; the man-to-land ratio (inhabitants per square kilometer) is around one in rural areas, 
and 16 countrywide. The rate of population growth is very slow, just one per cent. This fact, 
and the heavy emigration of the last decades, explain the small population of the country. The 
long life expectancy, coupled with the rate of population growth and emigration, account for 
Uruguay's aging population. 
In terms of its economy, Uruguay's history can be divided into two periods. During 
the first one, which continued until 1950s, the country achieved a remarkable economic 
growth through livestock exports (meat and wool). This growth helped to build a welfare 
system that raised the standard of living by redistributing wealth. Due to this, Uruguay and 
Argentina were considered the most egalitarian societies of Latin America (Feres & Léon, 
1990). The second period began after the Korean war ended, and showed a decline of world 
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prices for Uruguay's principal exports, and growing protectionism of main external markets. 
Consequently, Uruguay's economy begun to unravel. Under these circumstances, the welfare 
system became an increasingly heavy burden for public sector. The growing external debt, 
very important if it is considered per capita, aggravated the situation after the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the country's Gross Domestic Product per capita is traditionally one of the 
highest in Latin America. Uruguay belongs to the group of upper middle income countries of 
Latin America, which also includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (Fujii, 1991). The 
primary sources of energy are imported petroleum and hydroelectricity. During the 1980s, the 
latter grew in importance. 
Agriculture, especially livestock production, has historically been the main economic 
activity of the country. This is due to the fact that soil availability is very high; 85% of its 
total area, which is 16 million hectares, can be cultivated or devoted to pasture. It accounts 
for just 13 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs relatively few people, 
but it is relevant in terms of exports. Annual rate of increase in total agricultural production 
and population growth are basically identical over the last decades, just one percent. This 
means that agricultural production has been stagnant. Large livestock farmers have relied on 
the bounties of the pastureland they owned, and have neglected to adopt or encourage new 
technologies that would have raised productivity. Although land tenure is highly concentrated 
in Uruguay, a trend which is expected to continue, land distribution was never a major 
political issue. In this sense, the central government played a great role by providing jobs to 
those who were expelled from rural areas. 
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Currently, reduction of public-sector deficit is constraining agricultural policies. 
Privatization of public services has become an issue open to heated debates. In order to 
reduce the national debt and the negative resource transfer, Uruguay has signed agreements 
with its creditor banks on a consensual basis. In addition to this, Uruguay has embarked on a 
policy of gradual openness of its internal market by eliminating excessive tariffs that have 
hindered exports for several decades. 
Another area receiving attention in Uruguay, is the creation of a common market, the 
Southern Cone Common Market/Mercado Comùn del Sur (MERCOSUR) among Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Currently, a transitional period is taking place which is 
formally expected to end in 1995, after which the integration process will be completed. The 
industrial and agricultural sectors of Uruguay consider that the benefits of MERCOSUR are 
limited because the conditions of competition with Brazil are seen as unfavorable. Uruguay 
expects to become the financial and banking services center within MERCOSUR because of 
the well developed infi-astructure in terms of facilities, communications and its position of 
political stability. 
Statement of the Problem 
Agricultural extension projects are formulated basically in Uruguay to increase 
agricultural production by using the TOT model and/or a modified TOT approach. These 
projects and their implementation methods lead to the use of high technology capital and 
intensive agricultural applications without really testing: a) which factors contributed or not 
to the successfial implementation of these projects; and b) whether or not these applications 
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would be better than indigenous alternatives. Current evaluation methods assume that the 
high tech solutions are correct, and focuses on the impact of the identified technologies in 
terms of cost/benefit and rate of return. Consideration of the consequences of high tech 
solutions have not been taken into account. Since the late 1960's, there has been growing 
evidence that this conceptual fi-amework failed in LDCs (Poostchi, 1986). 
A review of this approach leads to the conclusion that there is a need in Uruguay, for 
those who are involved in agricultural extension, to acquire knowledge, skill, and competence 
relating to designing, implementing, and evaluating programs/projects. Additionally, more 
emphasis is needed in the exploration of factors outside the economical-technical tradition of 
evaluation. Otherwise, project results will continue to be non sustainable due to a lack of 
understanding of how to face the complexities within the social constraints affecting the 
projects. 
According to Roling (1986a), extension has two main traditions: technical innovation 
(TI), and human resource development (HRD). Evaluation in extension has been highly 
influenced by the former. Robins (1987) recommended that, instead of achieving 
technological goals as the major objective, extension projects in LDCs should play an active 
role in relation to HRD. Human resource development is understood as a way to involve 
people in the process of identifying and solving their problems through the use of their own 
knowledge. In order to understand this approach, key words employed are capacity building, 
process-approach, and indigenous knowledge. 
Evaluation in extension has been influenced by the technological tradition. As a result. 
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it has been practiced as a summative activity in which the focus was to evaluate how well 
objectives have been met (Coldevin, 1986; Lee & Schute, 1991; Steele, 1975). A new 
framework emerged on evaluation in extension in the 1970s. Bennett (1975) developed a 
hierarchy of evidence that became a key point for understanding evaluation. Bennett's 
framework suggests that it is relatively easy to compare inputs and outputs and determine the 
efficiency of resource use. But evaluation, especially from a HRD perspective, implies 
considering outputs (capacity building activities) and their results, the HRD competencies 
(levels five to seven of Bennett's hierarchy). This necessitates a close look at the 
implementation of the extension projects. Stufflebeam (1983) developed a model that 
considers both formative and summative evaluation. This model was called CIPP, an acronym 
that includes the first letters of four kind of evaluations: Context, Input, Process and Product. 
The CIPP model relies on the premise that evaluating results is not enough if the goal is to 
improve the project while it is in progress. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of a 
sample of recent agricultural extension projects in Uruguay. The evaluation methodology 
used a conceptual framework that takes into account the four key factors considered relevant 
from an HRD perspective—management, capacity-building, planning approach and external 
factors (Elliot, 1989; Rondinelli, 1986). Evaluating the impact of agricultural extension 
projects from this perspective, will help to examine the overall effectiveness of the technology 
transfer system in Uruguay, and to determine which factors facilitated or constrained a 
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successful strategy of agricultural extension. The limited information available on these topics 
magnified the need for conducting this research. There had been no tradition of evaluating the 
impact of agricultural extension by placing an emphasis on the formative aspects of the 
program planning process. 
This evaluation was formative, not only because it assessed how projects were 
implemented, but also because it provided information for use in the orientation of Mure 
projects. In other words, evaluating probable past failures can provide information useful for 
fiiture improvements. As a result of this study, hopefully, the next efforts relating to 
agricultural extension and rural development in Uruguay will have a greater likelihood of 
success. The potential beneficiaries will be agricultural policy-makers, project development 
managers, extension agents, researchers, and agricultural development agencies, both public 
and private. 
Objectives 
The specific objectives of this research were to: 
1. design an evaluation fi-amework capable to serve the needs of this study; 
2. identify the degree of use of capacity building components in agricultural extension 
projects recently carried out in Uruguay; 
3. identify the practices that hinder or facilitate the program planning process of 
agricultural extension projects from the HRD perspective; and 
4. establish guidelines for future agricultural extension projects. 
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Assumptions 
This study assumed that the data collected reflects the true perceptions of the 
interviewees. 
Limitations 
1. The study was local in nature. As a result, conclusions cannot be generalized to other 
geographical areas. 
2. There was a limited amount of resources to conduct this research. 
Definitions 
Agricultural extension project: In this work, agricultural extension projects are viewed from 
a broader perspective, comprising not only those projects related to animal science or crops, 
but also those pursuing rural development, as health, nutrition, sanitation, education, etc. 
Project and program are used as synonymous. 
Blueprint approach. An approach to extension program planning having assumptions that the 
"present is known, the future knowable, and that one can control events sufficiently to achieve 
a knowable future" (Roling, 1986, p. 112). 
Capacity building: Refers to the activities aimed to increase capacity of individuals, groups, 
and organizations. Training and strengthening of existing local organizations are two basic 
activities of capacity building (Conyers, Warren, & van Tilburg, 1988). As a result of this 
process one should be able to identify sustained improvements of HRD components. The end 
result of capacity building, in terms of Bennett hierarchy of evidence, is sustained 
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improvements of HRD components. To reach this level, attitudinal change (level 5) is first 
required. 
Community development approach: Projects having three components: social, infi'astructure 
and productivity. In this context, social means provision of organization for the community; 
infi'astructure, the formation of physical capital; and productivity, the supply of services to 
increase agricultural production (Lacroix, 1985). In this research, community, integrated and 
local rural development projects are synonymous. 
Development: Since 1970, it became widely accepted, that development could not be reduced 
exclusively to economic growth and productivity. It has to take into account also, the 
distribution of this economic growth and the development of human resources. The latter is 
vital in order to achieve sustainability of the changes, and participation of the people 
(Poostchi, 1986). Due to this, development is regarded as a process of "increasing the 
capacity of the people to influence their future" (Bryant & White, 1982, p. 14). 
Evaluation: The process "to provide a basis for decision making and policy formation" 
(Worthen & Sanders, 1987, p. 36). It implies to specify criteria against which to compare 
evidence so as to make judgments. 
Formative evaluation: Evaluation that is performed before and during the implementation of 
the program in order to improve it (Worthen & Sanders, 1987). 
Human resource development (HRD): One of the two dimensions that forms agricultural 
extension. Its objective is to develop, in a sustainable way, rural people and the social systems 
in which they live, so as to make a better use of the natural resources (Roling, 1986). HRD 
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competencies (levels five to seven in Bennet's hierarchy) emerge as a consequence of capacity 
building activities (level two of Bennett's hierarchy). Examples of HRD competencies are the 
following: greater participation of rural people, greater awareness of rural people about their 
problems, greater empowerment of rural people to face their problems, greater 
self-determination and self-reliance of rural people to influence their own future (Oakley, 
1986). In Uruguay, HRD approach is called "extension" whereas the other dimension of 
extension is termed "technical assistance." 
Indigenous knowledge (IK): The "sum of experience and knowledge for a given group that 
forms their basis for decision-making" (Titilola, 1990, p.3). In Uruguay, due to the fact that 
there are no indigenous people, local knowledge is a term that better describes the concept. 
According to the definition, local knowledge is the practices generated by Uruguayan farmers, 
which descend basically from Spanish, Italian, and other European immigrants (Field, 1991). 
Management: The process of giving appropriate administrative procedures for managing 
resources so as to ensure that the tasks and objectives described in the project are efficiently 
accomplished (Rondinelli, 1986). It implies to organize and use the resources-administrative 
functions, and to evaluate the process and product—supervision functions. 
Process approach: In contrast to the blueprint approach to extension program planning, the 
process approach relies more on flexibility and allows people's participation in order to receive 
their feedback for project adjustments (Roling, 1986). 
Revolving credit system: A system in which the repayment of loan is to be made in a given 
number of physical units of products, regardless of market prices. The farmer knows in 
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advance how much must be given to the lender. The interest is low. In addition, all the target 
people are expected to get their loan because credit should be self-sustaining if well managed. 
This system combines credit with extension. It was introduced in Latin America during the 
1960s, to complement efforts of land reform projects. The latter focused on landless laborers, 
seasonal workers and subsistence small farmers while the former focused on small farmers 
with production sufficient for their own families' subsistence plus a marketable surplus 
contributing to other family needs. 
Summative evaluation: Evaluation that is carried out at the end of the program in order to 
certify its utility (Worthen & Sanders, 1987). 
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CHAPTER n. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This distinction between two different meanings of good and right (as having 
value in themselves or means to something else) is, it is clmmed, so crucial for 
the whole theory of valuation and values that failure to make the distinction 
destroys the validity of the conclusions that have been set forth. (Dewey, 1939, 
p. 24) 
Relevant literature was reviewed in order to provide a conceptual framework for this 
study. It has been divided into the following categories: 1) Rural Development; 2) 
Evaluation; 3) Human Resource Development; and 4) Extension in Uruguay. 
Rural Development 
Extension projects are aimed at helping bring about rural development (Antholt, 1992; 
Crouch & Chamala, 1980; Maalouf, Contado & Adhikarya, 1991; Molnar & Jolly, 1988 ). 
An evaluation of the implementation of rural development projects in LDCs and the 
constraints these projects faced has emerged lately, because of the failures detected during the 
1970s and 1980s (Coleman, 1992). Gow and Morss (1988) identified some critical problems 
in project implementation that seriously impeded progress and their respective solutions or 
feasible ways to avoid them. These bottlenecks were: 1) macro constraints; 2) institutional 
realities; 3) personnel constraints and technical assistance shortcomings; 4) decentralization 
and participation; 5) timing; 6) information systems; 7) differing agendas, and 8) sustainability. 
Macro constraints refers to the fact that projects are implemented in a broader context, 
part of which they form. This context imposes four categories of constraints: donor foreign 
policy, national politics, macroeconomic policy, and the local environment. Donor foreign 
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policy is often guided by potential conflicting interests; development assistance becomes a tool 
for political imperatives instead of being directed by developmental concerns. National 
politics may emphasize efiBciency to achieve greater production for exports. This affects the 
implementation of projects aimed at bringing about rural development. 
Macroeconomic policies in LDCs pay attention to reduce inflation and paying external 
debt; consequently, there is no room for concerns about small farmers' access to credit and 
extension. The local environment in which the project is carried out influences its 
implementation. For instance, historical patterns of collective action, demographic factors, 
natural resources may place severe constraints on the projects put into practice. These four 
macro constraints, often beyond management control, require their attention in order to cope 
with them. There are three options: a) accept the constraints and design the project 
accordingly; b) recognize the constraints and attempt to change them; and c) determine that 
constraints are not amenable to change and abandon the project. 
Institutional realities means the institutional context in which projects are 
implemented. Capacity building, especially at the local level, should be strengthened if the 
project is expected to be self-sustainable over the long run. Institutional development should 
not be relegated to a secondary position below technology transfer. Project design must give 
attention to the role of local institutions, not only production increases. Links between local 
institutions and government agencies are crucial to provide assistance, permanent or 
temporary, to project capacity-building activities. Creating ad-hoc autonomous units to 
projects put into practice ends up in projects that fail to become self-sustaining after the 
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withdrawal of donor agencies, or changes in governmental policies. 
Personnel constraints are related to shortages of personnel able to implement project 
activities. When this happens, there are four alternatives to consider: 1) make training a 
major project component; 2) simplify project activities; 3) do not initiate a new project; and 
4) use foreign advisers. Training can be achieved basically by on-the-job activities and more 
formal training (Conyers, Warren, & Tilburg, 1987). The former is usually neglected although 
it is an important component of capacity-building; formal training should emerge, if needed, 
from on-the-job training. Training (workshops) can be used also as a way of bringing 
together people that normally do not interact with each other. 
There is a growing criticism among donor agencies and governments of relying 
basically on foreign advisers to implement a project, because of the significant portion of the 
budget that is devoted to them, and dissatisfaction with the quality and/or roles performed by 
outside personnel. Too often, foreign advisers perform technical activities without attempting 
to build local capacity. Due to this, capacity building activities as training and strengthening 
local institutions have become an important part of project design. 
The recognition of the importance of decentralization and participation is not only 
philosophical but also pragmatic. Decentralization facilitates participation of the people 
involved in order to let them make decisions based upon their own knowledge. In addition, 
decentralization can be understood as a way to promote efficiency of public institutions, such 
as research and extension, which are currently being questioned in Latin America for their 
scarce impact. This is due to increased users' control of institutions and possibilities for cost 
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sharing; thereby enhancing sustainability. Taking into account current trends towards 
privatization of technology generation and transfer systems in Latin America, decentralization 
can be considered a better alternative, especially if small farmers development is a concern. 
The move towards privatization came after the 1970s, when problems created by foreign debt 
obliged states to reorientate their public spending. In the face of these problems, Latin 
American states have been redefining the role of the private sector, considered more efficient, 
and handing over tasks to it. 
National governments could promote some form of decentralization so as to promote 
people's participation at the grass-root level. But governments are reluctant to local 
empowerment, because they fear its consequences in terms of losing power. Therefore, 
instead of rhetoric, the real issue is to achieve some kind of mixture between central 
supervision and local autonomy. Participation is a concept not restricted to potential 
beneficiaries; it must include project staff, especially at local levels. This requires some kind 
of decentralized authority. In order to improve participation of rural people there are mainly 
three strategies: 1) strengthening existing organizations or creating new ones; 2) mobilizing 
local resources (using available local resources); and 3) using paraprofessionals (local people 
selected by local organizations and specially trained). Local organizations of producers can 
play a great role not only in lobbying local and national governments but also by providing 
links for research and extension. 
Time lags interfere with the implementation of projects and may hinder their success. 
There are three types of delays; 1) between project identification and start-up; 2) during 
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project implementation; and 3) inappropriate time phasing of project activities. The more 
complex a project is, the more probable these delays will be experienced (Kettner, Daley, & 
Nichols, 1985). Administrative problems, design deficiencies and procurement delays are 
common sources of timing problems. Better planning and improved management by using 
formative evaluations are tools against these problems. Good overlap between planners and 
implementers can help to minimize delays. 
Information systems are designed for improving planning and implementation of 
development projects. Nevertheless, project performance is generally not improved because 
the information generated by these systems is inadequate or not used. Common problems in 
this sense are: a) data are collected but never processed; b) results are made available to only 
a few persons; and c) information is too sophisticated. To develop an effective information 
system, it is important to identify the relevant information requirements of each group of 
decision makers involved in the project. Relevance and simplicity of information go hand in 
hand. Simple information systems have greater probabilities of being used by local 
management and people. 
The principal actors in rural development projects usually have differing agendas. It is 
normal that the individuals and institutions involved have agendas of their own. ' If these 
agendas are significantly divergent, project success and benefits sustainability are scarcely 
achieved. There are no magic recipes to alleviate this problem. Two useful guidelines are: 1) 
making the potential dangers explicit to the major players; and 2) recognizing that the 
implementation has strong political implications at both macro and micro levels. 
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Although development activities are aimed at generation of self-sustaining results, too 
often they end when assistance terminates. There are three main reasons why this happens; 
1) revenues are insufficient to cover costs; 2) political and economic context are not 
favorable; and 3) inadequate organizational capacity to carry on project activities. In order to 
deal with financial sustainability there are four alternatives: limiting costs; central government 
funding; user charges; and local government funding. There is agreement that the more the 
project gets people's participation, the better in terms of alleviating costs. Additionally, it is 
fair to introduce user charges taking into account different payment abilities. When viable, 
this alternative has positive effects on getting farmers' commitment to development activities. 
The cornerstone to understand development is sustainability. In reaction to the 
failures of development projects in LDCs, a new approach has emerged which was labeled 
"sustainable development." The conventional approach of development can be characterized 
as by-passing capacity building activities. As a result, the envisaged 'trickle down' effect never 
occurred as initially expected in LDCs. Benefits fi-om projects contributed to local inequities 
by enhancing rural societal stratification. The rich were able to make far more use of the 
projects than did the poor. An example were projects aimed at facilitating the development of 
cooperatives in the rural areas. The small farmers had little or no voice in the running of these 
organizations; they fell under the influence of the big farmers. Sustainable development is 
aimed at reconciling development projects with what is at stake for the intended beneficiaries, 
without compromising the rights of future generations. 
Uphofif (1990) listed some of the weaknesses that characterize 'conventional projects': 
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1) awkwardly large and complex; 2) unnecessarily costly; 3) time-bound; 4) blueprint 
planning; and 5) designing and implementing in a unilateral manner. Projects should be 
smaller, more cost-effective, more open-ended, more flexible, and more participatory. 
Coleman (1992) stated that projects fail to achieve results because they have: 1) unrealistic 
targets which depend on long procurement procedures; 2) unsupportive policy environments; 
and 3) very rigid planning—many bureaucratic structures are highly centralized with the 
decision-making process concentrated at the top level. 
Avoiding the appearance of these problems calls for a new approach in project 
planning. There is agreement that planning has been an important cause of the failures of 
numerous projects (Coleman, 1992; Roe, 1991). This leads nicely to the management of 
projects as a crucial factor to talce into account. According to Roling (1986), there are mainly 
two approaches in project planning: blueprint and process planning. Blueprint planning is 
associated with the modernization paradigm, in which LDCs through exogenous technology, 
loans and expertise coupled with new values, are supposed to take off and 'kick-start' the 
process of growth, which will later 'trickle down' to all the people involved (Howes, 1992). 
Projects are considered means to accomplish this vision. Features of this approach are these: 
environment is controlled; provision of inputs generates the intended outcomes; and 
evaluation is performed to determine if this has taken place. Assumptions for blueprint 
planning are similar to TI tradition in extension and hard systems methodology (HSM) of 
inquiring. 
New paradigms (community development, land reform, integrated rural development. 
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and local development projects) were developed in Latin America since the 1960s, basically 
because projects aimed at helping 'the poor' failed to achieve results. This resulted in a need 
to move towards a process planning approach to encompass the new realities. The objective 
was to provide an active role for the so-called beneficiaries during the planning and 
implementation of projects. This greater participation will, in turn, create conditions for 
taking advantage of the indigenous knowledge the target people possess. Local people know 
their problems better, and how best to solve them. Consequently, their expertise should be 
exploited throughout the program planning process. The assumptions that form the 
framework for process planning are similar to HRD tradition in extension and soft systems 
methodology (SSM) of inquiring. 
Planning should have pay-off in terms of evaluation. During the seventies, the 
International Development Agency (AID) development programs and donor agencies 
incorporated a planning instrument that helped to focus the evaluation. It was called logical 
framework or project framework (Cusworth & Franks, 1993). It is a tool highly oriented to 
management; this means it helps development managers make decisions regarding program 
monitoring and evaluation. The framework is mainly based on a four-link chain of stages: 1) 
inputs, which refers to whatever is required to make a project operational (financial resources, 
staff, supplies, etc.); 2) activities, which represent the transformation of inputs in outputs; 3) 
product, the direct results of input transformation in a project; and 4) effects, which means the 
results of a program's product on people. There are different variants of this model as well as 
names to call its components. 
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There are advantages in using this model. First, it helps to distinguish level of evidence 
to choose for evaluation purposes. Second, it helps to take into account the intervening 
linkages between the dififerent stages. Finally, it helps to consider external factors (conditional 
assumptions) that may interact on the different stages. Although today no one admits to being 
an advocate of the blueprint approach because it is fashionable to talk about concepts like 
participation, the acceptance of process planning should be regarded with skepticism. The 
general philosophy that underlies process planning may be lost while designing and 
implementing development activities. The main feature of process planning is that 
environment is not controlled, it is unpredictable; therefore, a flexible approach is needed for 
adapting to the new emerging situations that occur during implementation. Howes (1992) 
highlighted the basic differences between blueprint and process planning. These differences 
are shown in Table 1. 
The process plarming approach may be seen as one of evolutionary progression. Non-
Govemmental Organizations (NGOs) have played a key role in developing or incorporating 
new procedures that were aimed at expanding participation of the audience and their different 
perspectives to the all phases of the program planning process. During the 1980s, Rapid 
Rural Appraisal (RRA) became an effective methodology for obtaining rapidly the existing 
information about the problems that people face (Chambers, 1983). Projects are conceived as 
a trial an error process whereby failures are ways of learning. The objective is to avoid the 
'quick' of rural development tourism and the 'long' of some questionnaire surveys. RRA is 
useful in the first stages of the program planning process in order to determine a course of 
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Table 1. Differences between blueprint and process planning (Howes, 1992) 
Blueprint Process 
Sequences 
Idea originates in Capital city Village 
Design Static, by experts Evolving, people involved 
Implementation Rapid, widespread Gradual, local, at people's pace 
Evaluation External, intermittent Internal, continuous 
Structures 
Main resources Central funds, technicians Local people, their assets 
Organization Existing, or built top-down Built bottom-up, lateral spread 
Communication Vertical Lateral 
Leadership Positional, changing Personal, sustained 
Management forms Spending budgets, 
completing projects on time 
Sustained improvement and 
performance 
Staff development Classroom, didactic Field-based, action learning 
action. Moving into the 1990s, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) was developed, as a 
continuation of RRA with advances in some areas. Basically, RRA developed a methodology 
in which rural people themselves elaborate the maps, diagrams, and charts that help to 
highlight their systems, the constraints and what needs to be done (Howes, 1992). 
Current pressures for short-term and quantifiable considerations that characterizes 
LDCs macropolicies may discourage this move towards process planning. In that case, rather 
than regarding process planning as being incompatible with the macro-context, the challenge 
is: "... what do we do, as development practitioners, if blueprint development is here to stay 
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for the time being? How can we make the best of a bad situation?" (Roe, 1991, p. 287). 
Assuming this, the question becomes one of how to improve blueprint planning rather than 
process planning. 
Evaluation 
As stated in Chapter 1, there is overwhelming evidence in LDCs that agricultural 
extension has not been overly successful. One of the perceived problems in relation to this 
situation is the neglect that agricultural extension has showed toward evaluating its activities. 
Too often, attempts to apply some kind of evaluation focused solely on macroprojects after 
their termination, and assessed the overall impact fi"om the economical perspective by 
benefit-cost or internal rate of return analyses. The assumptions upon of which these 
techniques are conducted; ". . . are often such as to vitiate the analysis" (Ellis, 1981, p. 251). 
Extension operations in LCDs might prove more successful if they implement and integrate 
evaluation as a current practice through projects. In addition, LDCs should apply an 
evaluation framework not biased towards the technological (generally fbrmative)/economical 
(generally summative) tradition. 
Since the 1970s, extension has been under considerable pressure to elicit reliable 
evidence about its results. Policy-makers wanted to know whether or not extension was 
working properly in terms of priorities and using an increasingly reduced budget adequately. 
This situation, induced by a process of structural adjustment related to excessive levels of 
public spending, has begun to take place with different levels of intensity all over the world. 
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Extension needs more focused evaluation so as to determine its real impact; otherwise, 
answers to why should extension be supported by public funding are becoming problematic. 
Evaluation is the act of determining the worth of something (Jones, 1990). By such a 
process evaluators compare certain evidence against predetermined criteria to make 
judgments. In this definition, evidence is considered the data which is relevant to the 
evaluation and criteria are the standards against which something can be judged. Criteria have 
also been called impact indicators. Bennett (1975) developed a useful model for creating 
impact indicators. This model is composed of seven levels of evidence by which to evaluate 
the impact of an extension program. These levels are; 1) inputs; 2) activities; 3) people 
involvement; 4) reactions; 5) KASA (Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, Aspirations) change; 6) 
practice change; and 7) end results. Generally, evaluation in extension has focused on the 
first three levels which represent the implementation of the program to attempt to answer 
these questions: a) how many resources did extension expend on the program; b) what kind 
of activities did extension use in the program, and c) how many people participated in the 
program. Although these levels are important, evaluation needs to be focused more from the 
perspective of the extension users as seen in levels four through seven (Chambers & Ghildyal, 
1985). These levels represent the outcomes of the program. Some questions that may be 
stated regarding these levels are: 1) how much did the program activities appeal to 
participants? 2) how much did the participants change in their knowledge level? 3) how much 
did the participants apply that knowledge in their setting? and 4) how much did the program 
help participants to improve their situation? 
In order to perform an evaluation using Bennett's model, one must select a level and 
quality of evidence. Quality of evidence refers to whether or not one is dealing with what 
Bennett refers to as hard or soft evidence. Hard evidence refers to data that reflects precise 
and veritable characteristics of individuals, groups, and situations. The more one moves up 
the hierarchy or tries to increase quality of evidence, the stronger the evidence; however, at 
the same time, the more difiBcult it is to obtain this evidence. 
As stated before, there are two main traditions in extension: TI and HRD. While TI is 
concerned with technology transfer, HRD focuses on developing rural people themselves and 
their social systems. Evaluation in extension under TI tradition has left its mark through levels 
one and two of Bennett's hierarchy of evidence. No doubt, this is much better than not 
evaluating extension projects, but leaves room for many questions regarding what happened 
as a result of these projects. Bennett's fi"amework emphasizes taking into account the user's 
perspective. TI tradition focuses on inputs (resources for extension work) and outputs 
(activities performed by extension) which are levels one and two of Bennett's hierarchy. The 
focus is placed on comparing inputs and outputs to determine the resource use efficiency 
(Roling, 1992; Warner & Christenson, 1984). 
Bennet's model redresses this imbalance by alerting that levels one and two of evidence 
tell little about the effects of extension projects. In order to know this, one should establish 
impact indicators that reflect the higher levels of Bennet's model. This does not mean that 
managers should not be concerned for extension expenditures; what it really means is that 
evaluating extension projects implies not only efficiency but also effectiveness (Prawl, Medlin 
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& Gross, 1984). Dealing with effectiveness is related with levels four through seven of 
Bennett's hierarchy, which are the projects' outcomes. Effectiveness is the degree to which a 
program is achieving its outcomes; one should compare outputs and outcomes to determine 
it. For the sake of clarity, a distinction between efBciency and effectiveness is needed. 
Efficiency can be used as an indicator of effectiveness, but evaluation becomes stronger as the 
hierarchy is ascended (Bennett, 1975). 
Patton (1983) emphasized that extension and evaluation have in common identical 
processes and principles aimed at obtaining usefiil information about people. These processes 
are: 1) determine who are the clients; 2) determine the needs of the clients; 3) gather the 
needed information; 4) deliver the information to clients; and 5) work with clients to apply the 
information. Additionally, extension and evaluation share similarities in relation to principles. 
These similarities are: 1) programs/designs should meet needs of specifically targeted 
audiences (utility); 2) programs/designs procedures should be selected with attention to 
constraints and limitations (feasibility); 3) extension workers/evaluators should show respect 
for the people they work with (propriety); and 4) extension/evaluation have to use the 
information, as accurately as possible, given the existing constraints. 
What does the impact of extension mean? According to Feder and Slade (1986) 
evaluation in extension became an imprecise term because people tend to use different levels 
of evidence without making explicit the level on which they are focusing. Does it mean the 
changes, direct and indirect, that resulted fi"om extension projects, or less deeply, the 
immediate effects on farmers of the activities that extension does. 
Assessment of extension impact is constrained by several factors (Birkhaeuer, 
Evenson, & Feder, 1991): 1) the period in the diffusion process in which the evaluation is 
carried out; 2) the government policies; 3) research efforts; and 4) type of farmers. The 
period in the diffusion process in which the evaluation is carried out is an important factor. In 
earlier stages of the diffusion process extension may have a great impact whereas in later 
stages the impact may be considered as small. Government policies affect agriculture through 
incentives and prices; consequently, it affects extension impact. If research efforts are not 
successful, extension will not have a high payoff, because there is no knowledge to convey. 
Type of farmers being analyzed affect evaluation in two ways. The first one, refers to 
endogeneity in extension-farmer interactions. This means that some farmers, innovators or 
first adopters in terms of diffiision theory (Rogers, 1983) are more willing to adopt 
technologies. Estimates of evaluation in the case of using these farmers are likely to be biased 
in favor of extension. 
The second potential problem refers to the extent of inter-farmer communications. 
Farmers received information fi-om different sources, not only extension. However, 
evaluation studies do not take into account this fact and assume that extension sources are the 
only ones being used. This is a risk that can bias the results in favor or against extension. In 
other words, the question that arises is: can outcomes be attributed to extension? According 
to Roling (1992), many evaluations in extension have faced this problem. 
Not only has evaluation in extension been biased towards levels one and two of 
Bennett's model, but also towards summative evaluations. Most efforts have been directed at 
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evaluating extension projects by assessing the extent to which the original objectives were 
achieved. This type of evaluation is practiced after projects terminate. Formative evaluation, 
which is conducted before and during the program, has not received attention, especially in 
LDCs (Barlow, Jayasuriya & Price, 1983). The importance of formative evaluation stems 
from the fact that extension needs to determine whether or not projects show weak points that 
should be corrected at once. There is evidence that establishing regular formative evaluation 
procedures constitutes a critical ingredient of successful projects (Mc Laughin, 1976). 
Evaluations taken soon after a program terminates are of scarce value from managers 
of extension projects, because they come too late to stop bad projects. Stufilebeam (1983) 
developed a model of evaluation, which is commonly called the CIPP model, that is concerned 
with providing useful information to those who are in positions to make decisions. Basically, 
the CIPP model attempts to answer the following questions: 1) which objectives should be 
established; 2) which procedures should be employed; 3) how adequate are these procedures 
working; and 4) how effective are the objectives being accomplished. According to these 
questions, there are four types of evaluation that can be performed. CIPP represents the first 
letters of these evaluations: context, input, process, and product. These four types of 
evaluation are related to each other; although it is possible to focus mainly on one aspect, a 
thorough evaluation of extension projects should include all four types. The CIPP model is 
based: .. on the view that the most important purpose of evaluation is not to prove but to 
improve" (Stufilebeam, 1983, p. 118). It was originally created in the late 1960s, as a move 
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against the predominant approaches at that time, which placed emphasis solely on whether or 
not objectives had been achieved. Later, during the 1980s, StufiElebeam updated his model. 
According to Stufflebeam (1983), context evaluation is concerned with identifying the 
target population, assessing their needs, diagnosing their problems, and to judging whether 
objectives fit the assessed needs. Input evaluation is related to selecting the most appropriate 
plan of action from different alternatives taking into account resources, strategies, budgets, 
and schedules. Process evaluation refers to identifying whether the project is going according 
to the plan, and to detect defects in procedures and implementation. Product evaluation 
judges outcomes in relation to the objectives so as to determine if the program has met the 
needs of the audience. 
Context and input levels of evaluation are performed before the program is 
implemented, process evaluation is undertaken after the program has been started, and 
product evaluation after the program terminated. Context evaluation provides a basis for 
judging outcomes by specifying the environment (type of social structure) in which the 
program is going to be carried out. Input evaluation provides a basis forjudging 
implementation by providing information related to how the plan of action was chosen among 
others alternatives. Process evaluation provides a basis forjudging outcomes by providing 
information related to what happened between inputs and products. Product evaluation 
provides a basis for decisions related to continuance, termination, or modification of the 
program being evaluated. 
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The Bennett and Stufflebeam models provide frameworks that help to plan evaluation 
in extension. No simple approach for evaluating extension projects is enough for all 
circumstances. It is important to draw upon different perspectives. Evaluation should not be 
restricted to assessing outcomes. The resulting picture of evaluating how closely outcomes 
approximate objectives may miss what really happened within the social system in which 
extension operates. These evaluations provide islands of certainty in a sea of uncertainty. The 
Bennett and Stufflebeam models emphasize a systemic perspective of evaluation, in which the 
different components of extension are treated equally in the wholeness of the situation. Levels 
one through three of Bennett's hierarchy of evidence are related to levels context, input and 
process of Stufflebeam's model. Levels four through seven of Bennet's approach fit with 
product evaluation in the CIPP model. What constitutes the evaluator task is to carefully 
identify levels and quality of evidence, taking into account the existing resources, and 
providing answers to the questions posed for the study. In doing so value judgements are 
unavoidable, because placing the worth of something is affected by the evaluator's beliefs and 
values. Making explicit these values, along with using a logical conceptual framework and 
empirical measurements are required for evaluating effectively (Fathy, 1980). 
Human Resource Development 
The realization that growth alone does not mean development, and that evaluating 
development by rate of growth does not convey the true picture in relation to the people's 
quality of life, is certainly not new. It was T. Shultz, an economist during the early 1960s, 
who showed the importance of such factors as education as a prerequisite for development. 
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In Shultz's (1964) point of view, these factors should be considered investments with returns, 
not consumption luxuries. After that, the economic perspective of development was 
abandoned in favor of a broader vision that took into account growth, distribution and 
recently participation. Nevertheless, economic difficulties of LDCs have been putting 
obstacles in the way to fully application of this vision. As a result, growth policies continue to 
be the driving forces which may lead to improvements in the people's quality of life (Emmerij, 
1985). 
Bryant and White (1982) defined development as a process of".. . increasing the 
capacity of people to influence their future" (p. 14). To achieve development, one needs to 
pay attention to: 1) increasing people's capacity to determine their future; 2) distributing 
benefits evenly; 3) empowering people to be able to receive benefits; and 4) considering 
long-term results of the activities. This is a sociological definition of development that takes 
into account HRD. 
Realizing the importance of the human elements in development presupposes taking 
into account the two sides of the coin: the human elements as means and ends of 
development. Too often the question of HRD turns out to be a question of means, but the 
human element is not only a resource but also the final objective of development (Nudler, 
1986). There is a complex interrelatedness of these aspects; an exclusive consideration of 
human elements as resources (e.g., augmentation of human resources via education) misleads 
the whole meaning of HRD. 
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From a macro-perspective, HRD has been considered as means, and it is restricted to 
the satisfaction of basic needs as education, health, and nutrition. HRD in rural extension, 
which is close to the micro-perspective, pays attention to: 1) promoting participation of rural 
people in projects; 2) developing the organizational base of rural people; 3) creating 
awareness among rural people of their problems and building up solidarity to face them; and 
4) encouraging self-determination and self-reliance to let rural people be able to influence their 
own future (Oakley, 1986). HRD is often ignored in extension (Molnar & Jolly, 1988; Roling, 
1986a). Although it is a required step to achieve TI, these two dimensions function in 
opposition to one another instead of being mutually reinforcing. 
At the present time, there is a consensus that, "... rural development theories 
emphasize the necessity for integrating decentralization, participation, and indigenous 
technological knowledge" (Sanford, 1988, p.64). A careful look at the task of integrating 
these three factors shows that this is a job for extension, understood from a wider perspective. 
Continuing an exclusively TI tradition in extension while neglecting HRD will exacerbate the 
problems that developing countries face, especially those related to small farmers such as 
expulsion of small producers from rural areas to urban ones. This is due to imperfections in 
the diffusion process when extension (TI) delivers technology to farmers. 
During the early 1970s, it became clear in LDCs that instead of a trickle down effect, 
the diffusion process was characterized by a trickle across effect. Rogers (1983) stated that 
the consequences of introducing irmovations to farmers often widen their socio-economic 
gaps. Farm size continues to grow because of the low returns per unit. New technology is 
slowly adopted in the beginning; those few who adopt earn large profits. But when others 
adopt in response to socioeconomic pressures, total production increases and prices go down. 
Technology then yields a low return and farmers are compelled to expand their farm-sizes to 
stay in business. The end of this process is that those who cannot afford the new technology 
and compete effectively in a rapidly changing world, find it increasingly hard to survive as 
farmers. There is agreement that in Latin America, one of the leading causes of rural poverty 
is the current inequality among farmers, basically land-control (Altieri, 1989; Fliegel, 1993; 
Rogers, 1983). 
Because poverty is on the rise in Latin America (Sandstrom, 1993), there is an urgent 
need for achieving a better balance between HRD and TI traditions in extension. A concern is 
growing recently that overemphasis on either 'technology' or 'people' lead to disappointment 
(Bennett, 1992; Lichtman, 1987; Maalouf, Contado & Adhikarya, 1991; Roling, 1986a; 
Ruttan, 1984 ). Investments in HRD or TI without integrating these two traditions are often 
wasted. Dewey (1939) envisioned this concern when stating that subject matter knowledge 
(TI), "... needs to be supplemented by a 'higher' type of subject matter and knowledge 
(HRD) in which value-categories are supreme over those of factual existence" (p. 3). 
Failures of the diffusion process in LDCs led people to question the current 
technology at that time, 'western' technology, as not appropriate for the socio-economic and 
cultural context of LDCs. It was proper, however, to say that all technologies are 
'appropriate'. But, as Dewey (1939) suggested, the question is: appropriate for what. 
Technology is not good in itself, it causes intended and unintended effects, both desirable and 
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undesirable (landlessness, unemployment, etc). Western technology was appropriate for 
following the western style of development. As a result of this situation, project 
implementation in LDCs began to focus on other technologies, which were termed in several 
ways, e.g., intermediate technology, appropriate technology, and/or later ecologically-based 
technology. Although there is an impressive terminology for the same subject, each one of the 
terms is grounded in the fact that the new emerging technology is based on, or mixed with, 
indigenous knowledge (IK). 
Indigenous knowledge is the local knowledge that people use to solve their problems. 
It is empirical, adapted to the whole environment, and transmitted by verbal tradition. This 
knowledge has proved to be useful for increasing agricultural production, at a time when there 
was no research stations or extension institutions, as the agricultural revolution in Britain 
showed (Pretty, 1991). Incorporating IK into agricultural extension projects has resulted in 
efficiency from an economic point of view and the results have been gratifying (Warren, 199 la; 
1992). It is crucial for extension to take IK into account because it is the best short-cut to 
establish a participatory program planning process (Tully,1981). For research, IK is the 
starting point, upon which new ways of improving problematic situations can be explored. 
Warren (1991b) summarized reasons for using IK, stating that; "... technical solutions to 
unperceived problems are not readily adopted, new technologies that duplicate indigenous 
ones are superfluous, and ignoring local approaches to local problems is wasteful" (p. 1). 
What really counts is the balance. A purist approach that excludes IK or the so called 
scientific knowledge is unlikely to solve all problems that may arise (Roling, 1988). 
There are basic differences in stating objectives under TI or HRD traditions, especially 
around the degree of specificity that an extension program can establish. In the TI tradition, 
it is easier to formulate objectives indicating closely where the program is intended to lead, the 
time involved, the degree of change intended, and how the change will be measured. This is 
certainly not the case under the HRD tradition. Oakley (1986) stated that HRD objectives are 
non-material. As a result, measurement of these objectives in quantifiable form may not be 
possible. In this case one is concerned more with processes rather than results. However, in 
order to evaluate non-material objectives, one needs to describe and then inteipret these 
processes. 
At the heart of these divergences are the assumptions that underlie extension, 
understood as TI or HRD. There is more specificity under TI because it is assumed that, "... 
the present is known, the future knowable and that one can control events sufficiently to 
achieve a knowable future" (Roling, 1986, p. 111). These assumptions do not fit HRD's 
tradition of extension. In this case flexibility and uncertainty go together due to the complex 
interaction between the program and the environment which is difficult to predict. 
The tradition of TI in extension is close to the reductionistic and/or hard systems 
methodology (HSM). Hard systems methodology means, "... the problems, goals, or end 
states addressed by inquiry are readily defined by the analyst, who then moves into stages of 
inquiry aimed at developing solutions" (Wilson & Morren, 1990, p. 355). In opposition to 
this, HRD tradition better reflects the soft systems methodology (SSM). Soft systems 
methodology means, "... the problems and goals are messy and complex and treated as not 
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easy to define because there is no general agreement on problems, goals, or purposes; the 
analyst is responsible for facilitating an inquiry process whereby the articulation of the 
complexity of the problematic situation and of improved future states is developed by and 
with the people involved" (p. 359). In the latter, the objective is more to improve situations, 
not to solve problems. The way of investigating the world (systems) becomes crucial; it is a 
participative process in which all the parts are active inquirers. This emerging paradigm will 
affect the whole program planning process of extension. 
Traditionally, extension relied on reductionistic assumptions to develop and evaluate 
projects. According to Patterson (1993) these assumptions are the following: 1) problems 
and objectives can be identified; 2) the defined problem can be solved by people with 
appropriate expertise; 3) problems and objectives are put into operational or quantitative 
terms and solutions are modeled to achieve optimal performance; 4) improvements come 
from the implementation of solutions; and 5) the analyst is independent of the problem, a 
consultant who makes recommendations to a client. These assumptions may be useful for the 
extension program plaiming process under TI perspective, e.g., to eradicate mastitis in daiiy 
cows, but will no longer work for problems that fall into the HRD tradition. 
The complex problems that face extension today, such as environmental degradation, 
require another paradigm. HSM was an important step, but not enough to deal with 
ill-defined problems where there is no agreement on the desired outcomes. In this case, the 
new paradigm assumptions are the following; 1) problems and solutions are constructs of the 
mind; 2) people have different views of the same situation; (3) people disagree on what's the 
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actual state and desired state; 4) improvements result from discussion and debate; and 5) the 
analyst becomes part of the problem situation (Patterson, 1993). 
There is agreement that non-material objectives are afifective objectives; if affective 
objectives are stated in terms of describing a measurable performance, they can be considered 
objectives (Dewey, 1939; Mager, 1972). Mager recognized that there are differences between 
cognitive (TI) and affective (HRD) objectives. The challenge to meet the latter case is to find 
a, "... visible behavior that might be used as an indicator of an afifective stage" (p. 117). 
However, given the qualitative nature of HRD objectives, it is appropriate to complement this 
approach with other alternatives that fall into naturalistic evaluation. Oakley (1986) indicated 
that evaluation is just beginning to know more about formulating, monitoring, and evaluating 
non-material objectives. This is a challenge that should not remain without response. 
When considering the roots of HRD concerns in extension, it is important to mention 
the humanistic position of Rogers (client-centered psychology), Maslow (third force), and 
Freire (liberating education) as relevant sources of conceptual support. Rogers (1983) stated 
that the goal of education should be the facilitation of change and learning. Only from an 
interpersonal relationship in which certain qualities are present, will this process of change 
arise. These qualities are: a) realness, or genuineness, of the facilitator of learning; b) 
acceptance of the learner as a trustworthy person; and c) empathetic understanding of the 
learner. As a result of this relationship, there will emerge, "... the kind of individuals who 
can live in a delicate but ever-changing balance between what is presently known and the 
flowing, moving, altering problems and facts of the friture" (Rogers, 1983, p. 121). 
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Maslow (1970) presented a hierarchy of basic needs which emphasizes that human 
beings are seeking fulfillment or self-actualization. Through this statement, Maslow wanted to 
react against psychoanalytic or behavioral theories and their views that human nature is driven 
by instinctual energy or environmental stimuli. In the order of simple to complex, the 
hierarchy of needs are comprised of; a) basic needs (physiological); b) safety needs 
(protection); c) belongingness and love needs (groupness); d) esteem needs (being valued); 
and e) the need for self-actualization (self-fulfillment). Maslow noted that most behavior is 
multi-motivated and that justification of needs plays an important role as a satisfied need is no 
longer a motivator. 
Freire (1981) pointed out the idea that HRD can be achieved when extension agents 
and their audience are both engaged in a subject-subject relationship as opposed to a 
subject-object relationship. This relationship is placed into a context in which both parts are 
critically aware of their situation in the world in order to act on it. Freire also stated that, "... 
from a truly humanistic point of view, it is not for them (extension agents) to extend, entrust, 
or dictate their technical capacities ... in their role as educators,.. . their task is 
communication" (p. 97). This communication arouses free, and non- restricted to facts. In 
terms of Freire' point of view, 'communication' rather than 'extension' describes HRD 
tradition. Freire understood the term 'extension' as close to the TI tradition. Freire stated as a 
foundational premise, that when educators and educatees are in communication, actions are 
started that add relevance and meaning to seeking solutions to problems. 
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Extension in Uruguay 
A great part of the historical information about extension in Uruguay is based on The 
agricultural development of Uruguay by R. H. Brannon. It is useful to begin this description 
alerting about the different meanings and terms that currently relate to this topic in Uruguay. 
Basically, there are two meanings, extension as TI or HRD. People have tended to use the 
term 'technical assistance' when they wanted to define extension in terms of the spread of new 
technologies in a social system (TI). The term 'extension' is employed for the cases in which 
the work is focused on organizing farmers, and participation is viewed not only as a means of 
achieving something but also as an end in itself (empowering). The latter describes HRD 
tradition. 
The history of agricultural extension in Uruguay began in 1926, when the Department 
of Extension and Technical Assistance (DETA) was created, under the Ministry of Livestock 
and Agriculture. Uruguay is organized around 19 local governments. Regional extension 
ofiBces were established in each of these local governments by DETA. Throughout this 
century DETA suffered several changes, reorganizations and name-changes. Nevertheless, 
the field staff of DETA have received scarce support to perform their duties. Most of the 
budget has been designated for salaries; consequently, there has been a shortage for 
operational funds which limited severely the ability of the extension field staff to have impact 
on the audience. Within this context, the evaluation of extension activities did not show a 
positive impact; there was no reason to suppose that it would succeed. Routine paper work 
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and regulatory activities coupled with low levels of salary, motivation, operational funds, and 
research to extend, inhibited field stafif performance and caused a desk-bound orientation. 
Due to this picture, several other extension services were created, generally one for 
each separate crop or livestock category, to improve extension performance. In this sense, the 
most important services created were The Comision Honoraria de Mejoramiento Ovino 
(CHMO) in 1934, and The Comision Honoraria del Plan Agropecuario (CHPA) in 1957, to 
support livestock ranchers. Extension was improved, because inhibiting factors were 
removed, but the price paid was that extension responsibilities were distributed among many 
different institutions, each one with a particular orientation as to how to approach extension. 
Because there was no coordination^ producers became confused by the different kind of 
advice given to them. To make things worse, these institutions began to compete for an 
increasingly reduced budget. Institutional hierarchies located in the capital had scarce 
guidelines to operate in a context of increasing short term pressures and decreasing resources. 
As a result, initiatives fi"om field staff fi"equently were ignored while institutions reinterpreted 
their mission according to the personal views of their administrators. Again, there was no 
other choice. 
A big feature of Uruguay's extension system was not only the lack of links between 
extension institutions but also with research. An important missing link within Uruguayan 
extension staff was the subject matter specialist. He/she can help to bridge the gap between 
the local extension agent and the researcher. As a result, access to information was not easy 
for extension agents; they expended much energy in locating sources of information. Due to 
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this, reorganization of state extension services was undertaken during the early 1960s, in order 
to achieve close coordination between research and extension. A Centro Nacional de 
Extension Agropecuaria (NAEC) was created, and its initial personnel housed in the same 
building as the researchers, trying to promote a better understanding. This extension staff was 
trained by the Instituto Interamericano de Cooperaciôn para la Agricultura (IICA); the 
philosophy that undergirded its work was close to the HRD tradition. The advance of the 
agrarian cooperative system was due largely to the NAEC's strategy. The story of NAEC 
ended up in 1967, when it was abruptly closed and its personnel fired. Behind the scenes, it 
was assumed that different views about how to approach extension between policy makers 
and NAEC's staff caused the dissolution of this institution. 
Since then, HRD tradition is continued by the work of a rich network of NGOs., 
basically the Centro Cooperativista Uruguayo (CCU), and The Instituto de Promocion y 
Desarrollo Economico Social del Uruguay (IPRU). These organizations are small-farmer 
oriented; they provide leadership and skills training, and technical assistance to grassroots 
organizations. More recently, the Asociaciôn de Colonos del Uruguay (ACU) for small rural 
settlers, and the Foro Juvenil (FJ) for young rural people, were created to provide specific 
services: technical assistance, credit and empowerment. 
Additionally, grassroots organizations (which include both cooperatives and small 
farmer development societies) are also performing activities that can be identified as close to 
HRD tradition. Basically these organizations provide agricultural supplies, credit, technical 
and extension assistance, and marketing support. In some cases, much of the production is in 
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cooperative hands, which gives more strength to small farmers to hold onto their lands. This 
is the case of the milk sector, whose extension system is currently a good example of adequate 
balance between TI and HRD traditions (Crawford, 1990). The Cooperativa Nacional de 
Productores de Leche (CONAPROLE) has around 5,000 members and accounts for about 80 
per cent of the Uruguayan milk production. Its extension service works not only providing 
technical advise to farmers, but also organizing them in groups to buy and use machinery 
together. 
The tradition of TI in extension is currently carried out, basically, by the CHPA, the 
CHMO and the Federaciôn Uruguaya de Grupos CREA (FUCREA). There has been a loaded 
debate around CHPA's effectiveness, because large livestock farmers have been reluctant to 
adopt technology, especially permanent artificial pastures. Despite the controversy, there can 
be no question that the CHPA has played a great role in disseminating innovations and making 
farmers more receptive to extension, both TI and HRD. Brennon (1968) described the CHPA 
as the most effective extension program operating during the 1960s. Large ranchers' rejection 
of introduction of technology was related to the fact that they earned profits by turning their 
cattle out to graze on natural pastureland. This implied lower risks as compared with 
adopting technology under uncertain conditions. 
Since the 1960s, public funding of extension began to decline in Uruguay. Also, the 
use of the word was avoided in some circles, not only because it conveyed more than one 
meaning, but also for political implications with land reform and social changes. The private 
sector, in the form of medium or large scale innovator farmers gathered in FUCREA, began to 
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play a key role in developing extension systems oriented to their needs. According to 
Nogueira (1990), these efiforts were highly elective. The reasons that contributed to this 
success were: a) the members' common social background; b) their economic resources; and 
c) their high level of technical competency. 
Uruguay has only one Agriculture College which is public. Traditionally, the college 
has performed activities in teaching and research; extension is recently beginning to acquire 
importance. Due to this, attempts to transfer the Land Grant System Model to Uruguay were 
never intended, as they were in other Latin countries. Research is currently under a 
decentralized, semi-autonomous arrangement, which should provide better services to farmers 
by avoiding bureaucratic procedures. This fact and the consolidation of the extension private 
sector (grassroots organizations, farmers' groups, NGOs, etc.) coupled with macropolicies 
that are oriented toward reduction of state expenditures, will challenge public extension. 
It is a reality, that the traditional model of a paternalistic-interventionist state has died 
in Latin America, and Uruguay. Excessive levels of public spending and the burden of the 
external debt have weakened the role of the state over the entire society. However, given the 
importance that agriculture has as a source of direct or indirect exports, there is enough 
evidence that macropolicies should concentrate on providing efficient public expenditures on 
research and extension (Ferrari, 1991; Janssen, 1991). Within this context, building 
interactive links with research, increasing decentralization, and recognizing the urgent need for 
a greater cooperation with the private sector, are among the major challenges that public 
extension needs to face in Uruguay during the 1990s (Nogueira, 1990). 
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Summaiy 
The limited success of development projects in LDCs can be attributed to a wide range 
of factors. Too often there was no attempt to analyze successes and failures of these projects 
during their implementation. Evaluation was restricted to compare inputs and outputs; 
thereby establishing the resource use efficiency. This approach fits with TI tradition. On the 
other hand, HRD tradition requires other perspectives. In this case, one is more concerned 
for comparing outputs (capacity building activities) and outcomes (HRD components). In this 
way, two sides of the coin are addressed: human elements as both a means and end of 
development. Extension needs to keep a balance between TI and HRD traditions; investments 
in TI or HRD without integrating these two traditions are often wasted. Because projects' 
implementation in LDCs has not been effective in achieving their objectives, it needs to be 
improved. In order to be successfial, projects' implementation should take into account several 
factors that may influence their success. These factors can be summarized in four key aspects: 
1) management; 2) capacity building; 3) planning approach; and 4) external factors. 
There has been no tradition of evaluating development projects fi-om HRD perspective 
in Uruguay. The growing importance of the private sector in Uruguay, composed of NGOs 
and grass roots organizations, which work closely to this tradition, magnifies the need for that 
evaluation. The results of this study may benefit also public agricultural extension, taking into 
account that a closer cooperation between the private and public sector is required to improve 
extension effectiveness in Uruguay. 
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CHAPTER m. METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This study belongs to the naturalistic inquiry paradigm. Guba and Lincoln (1983) 
defined paradigms as; "... axiomatic systems characterized by their differing sets of 
assumptions about the phenomena into which they are designed to inquire" (p. 311). The 
basic features of naturalistic inquiry are: 1) it is conducted in a natural setting; 2) it relies 
basically on qualitative rather than quantitative methods; and 3) it utilizes a case-study format 
which involves relatively few cases. 
Although these features are correct, in order to capture the full meaning of naturalistic 
inquiry one needs to consider its assumptions (Guba & Lincoln, 1983). There are five 
assumptions that characterize naturalistic inquiry. These assumptions refer to the nature of 
reality, the inquirer-objective relationship, the nature of truth statements, the 
attribution/explanation of action, and the role of values in inquiry. 
The nature of reality refers to the fact that there are multiple, intangible realities which 
can be studied only holistically. Individuals see their realities phenomenologically. In 
naturalistic inquiry there is interaction between the inquirer and the object of inquiry. The 
nature of truth statements in social sciences is highly influenced for time and context. 
Generalizations are temporal. The search for plausible cormections between phenomena 
characterizes naturalistic inquiry's way of explaining actions. Instead of causation, there is 
interaction among all the factors and conditions involved. The last assumption establishes that 
inquiry is value-bound. This means that the society value system—including the values of 
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inquirers and respondents—cannot be methodologically controlled and influences the course of 
inquiry. 
Although the naturalistic inquiry is being increasingly used in the evaluation of 
development projects, the predominant paradigm is still the rationalistic, which focuses on 
objectives and their intended outcomes (Lee & Shute, 1991). On the contrary, a naturalistic 
inquiry in evaluation takes into account a holistic view of the situation to be evaluated, to 
ensure that the context and all the interested parties are not excluded. As stated previously, 
the case-study format constitutes a feature of naturalistic inquiry. The next section discusses 
the case-study method as a research-design and as a tool for evaluation. 
The Case Study Method 
Defînition 
The case-study method may involve the analysis of relatively few specific cases so as 
to get an in-depth understanding of these cases (Casley & Yury, 1981; Patton, 1980; Piatt, 
1992; Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 1989). Cases generally focus on those aspects that the researcher 
views as most relevant to the inquiry, e.g., individuals, organizations, programs, groups, cities, 
a role. According to Yin (1989), the distinguishing characteristic of case studies as research 
designs is that they attempt to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and 
they use multiple sources of evidence. By this definition, case study is distinguished fi"om 
history, experiment or survey. 
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Yin (1981) stated that people tend to link research strategy (e.g., case study) with 
types of evidence (e.g., qualitative data) and types of data collection methods (e.g. qualitative 
methods). According to Smith and Lincoln (1984), qualitative data describe actions without 
losing the original views of the individual respondents; collection methods are basically 
interviewing, participant and non-participant observation and content analysis of reports, 
records and other pertinent documents. Although the case study has been the traditional 
format of naturalistic inquiry, Yin (1989) made a point that the tendency to see case study as 
relying exclusively on qualitative data and qualitative methods of data collection is a 
misleading representation of the reality. 
The case study is a suitable tool for conducting many evaluations (Yin, 1992). This 
suitability stems from the fact that a case study: 1) takes into account the context; 2) is not 
limited to either qualitative or quantitative data; 3) can assess outcomes and the 
implementation process; 4) can test hypothesis and develop new ones; 5) can test relationships 
between processes and outcomes; and 6) can develop ideas generalizable to the major 
substantive themes in a field. These features make the case-study valuable for evaluations that 
are based on the CIPP's model. For agriculture development problems in LDCs, experience 
suggests that case study findings are useful to improving development policies (Casley & 
Lury, 1981). 
Components of Research Design 
For case studies, Yin (1989) has identified five components of research design as 
being important. The first one is the study's questions. The case study approach is most likely 
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to be appropriate for 'how' and 'why' questions. The second one refers to the study 
propositions. If the study has propositions, each proposition directs attention to something 
that should be examined within the scope of study. However, case studies can be exploratory, 
in which there are no propositions; however there are still some purposes that help to collect 
information. This research was an exploratory case study. The purpose was to identify how 
management, capacity-building, planning and external factors (independent variables) might 
affect the implementation of projects (dependent variable) taking into account the HRD 
perspective. 
The third component is related to the definition of the unit of analysis. For instance, a 
case may be an individual or something less well defined, such as a program. As a general 
guide, the definition of the unit of analysis-and, therefore, of the case-is related to the way 
the initial research questions have been defined. According to Patton (1980), the key issue in 
defining the unit of analysis is to decide about what one wants to say about something at the 
end of the study. In this research the unit of analysis was the selected agricultural extension 
projects (multiple-case design). 
The last two components represent the data analysis steps. Analysis of data has been 
the least well developed in case studies. The fourth component refers to linking data to the 
study proposition, while the last one to criteria for interpreting the findings. The current state 
of the art does not provide detailed guidance in relation to these components. The definition 
of criteria for interpreting the findings has always been a major question in evaluation 
(Riecken, 1972). Nevertheless, in order for findings to provide insights in relation to the 
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purpose of the study, case studies should not be undertaken without a conceptual framework 
that helps to organize, compare, and accumulate the findings. 
Types of Case Studies 
Yin (1989) pointed out that there are two types of case study: a single-case design, 
and a multiple-case design. A single case design implies, as the name suggests, the use of a 
single case. The reasons for choosing this type are that it represents: a) the critical case in 
testing a theory; b) an extreme or unique case; and c) a revelatory case. 
Multiple case designs are those in which the study contains more than a single case. 
The evidence that emerges fi-om this type is often considered more compelling. This topic is 
related to sampling strategies. Patton (1980) stated a basic difference between random 
sampling and purposeful sampling. The latter is used "when one wants to learn something and 
come to understand something about certain select cases without needing to generalize to all 
such cases" (p. 100). If one wants to evaluate programs, with limited time and resources, the 
evaluation objective "becomes a question of understanding under what conditions programs 
get into trouble and under what conditions programs exemplify excellence" (p. 101). If this is 
the case, evaluators should select those cases from which they can learn the most. 
Purposeful sampling can be viewed as a question of trade-off between detailed information 
and generalizations. According to Patton (1980), this is the most typical problem that 
evaluators have to face when using qualitative methods. Yin (1989) stated that criteria for 
sample size are irrelevant, because they depend on the particular circumstances. Nevertheless, 
Yin considered that a number might be between six to ten cases, depending on the sense of the 
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evaluator about the complexity of the realm of external validity. In this research, the projects 
were selected through purposeful sampling. 
As stated previously, one should start research using case study with purposes 
grounded on the theoretical framework. Indeed, what constitutes the basic feature of case 
study method, as perceived by Yin, is that it is not conceived from an inductive perspective 
(cited in Piatt, 1992). The conclusion to be drawn from this is straightforward. Priority 
should be placed on the development of a theoretical framework. 
In the present study, decision makers and key informants were used to take advantage 
of their experience in knowing all phases of cases, from the average to the extreme. Criteria 
for choosing the agricultural projects were: 1) richness of information through documentation 
and/or key informants; 2) a component of extension; 3) some objectives related to HRD 
(stated or not); and 4) variation with respect to the type of organization in charge of 
implementing the project. 
Sources of Evidence 
Yin (1989) pointed out that case studies may be based on six different sources of 
evidence: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, and physical artifacts. Documentaiy information including letters, agendas, 
administrative documents, formal studies, and articles appearing in the mass media. Archival 
records can be survey data, maps and charts, personal records, etc. 
Interviews are one of the most important sources of evidence. Interviews may be 
structured or unstructured. In the latter the format is non-standardized and the respondents 
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answer in terms of their own frame of reference (Chambers et al., 1992). Some questions 
were used to begin the unstructured interviews. Direct observation means to observe some 
relevant behaviors or environmental conditions by making field visits. Direct observations can 
be made when conducting interviews. To increase reliability of observational evidence, a 
procedure is to include more than one observer. Participant observation occurs when the 
investigator takes different roles, apart from being an external observer. The investigator 
becomes involved in the situation by participating in the events being studied. A final source 
of evidence may be a physical or cultural artifacts collected during field work. 
The present study used basically two sources of evidence: documentary data and 
interviews. Interviews with project staff and beneficiaries were unstructured. Direct 
observations were also employed with the assistance of one of the researcher's major 
professors. The initial questions used by the researcher were submitted to the Human 
Subjects Committee at Iowa State University. A copy of the signed approval form and the 
initial questions are found in Appendix A. 
Guidelines for Establishing the Trustworthiness of the Study 
Guba and Lincoln (1983) have pointed out criteria for establishing the trustworthiness 
of findings under a naturalistic inquiry. Such criteria are equivalent to their counterpart in 
rationalistic inquiry: credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity), 
dependability (reliability), and confirmability (objectivity). 
Case studies have been questioned for being subjective and lacking rigor (Ary, Jacobs, 
& Razavieh, 1990; Piatt, 1992; Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 1981; 1989). One response to these 
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critics has focused on setting up procedures to meet those four major traditional criteria, while 
another focused on establishing weaknesses of the quantitative approach (Stoecker, 1991). 
The naturalistic concept of credibility (internal validity) implies to be confident with 
the researcher's analysis, formulations and interpretations because they adequately represent 
reality as it is perceived for the people involved in the study. Suggestions to increase 
credibility are: 1) prolonged engagement at a site; 2) persistent observation; 3) triangulation, 
which is the act of employing different methods or sources to gather and verify data; 4) 
referential adequacy materials; and 5) member checks. Transferability (external validity) is 
gained through providing sufficient description of the context that allows some degree of 
transferability to the particular conditions of the other researchers. A multiple case design 
increases transferability of the findings. 
To increase dependability (reliability) of the study, one needs to specify all 
methodological steps and provide access to all data in their raw and processed stages. The 
objective is to provide enough guides that allow other researchers to replicate the study. 
Finally, naturalistic inquiry is interested in data confirmability. This means that findings can be 
traced back to the original data to verify if the interpretations were subject to bias. 
This study used a variety of procedures to assure that these four criteria were met. To 
check credibility it used: prolonged engagement at the site (the researcher lives in Uruguay); 
triangulation (interviews were held with different informants so as to avoid having a one-sided 
picture of each project and get much more accurate results); and peer crosschecks (to receive 
feedback that interpretations are credible). The latter was achieved through interaction with 
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faculty members of Iowa State University (Agricultural Education and Technology and Social 
Change), the Agriculture College of Uruguay (Social Sciences Department), and staff from 
the Agriculture and Fishing Ministry of Uruguay, NGOs, and grass roots organizations. 
Methodologically, it was particularly relevant to this study that the present researcher's 
co-advisor was present in Uruguay during the last two weeks of November, 1993. Therefore, 
interviews and direct observations were conducted during that time with the assistance of one 
of the researcher's major professors. This period of time was adequate to provide the 
researcher with opportunities to receive feedback about the emergent design and test 
emerging insights about the study. Inclusion of a multiple case design was used to achieve 
transferability along with providing a thick description of each case. Dependability and 
confirmability were achieved by providing an audit trail that shows how the study was 
conducted, including the conceptual framework, matrix and other steps taken. In addition, 
documentary data used for the evaluation of has been retained by the researcher. 
Analysis of the Data 
It is difficult to specify in advance the very detailed procedures for data collection and 
analysis used in a case study. This is due to the fact that each case is unique, and sources of 
evidence are likely to vary, sometimes by chance. In order to analyze the data, Yin (1989) 
observed that a general framework is very important, not only for the purpose of the study, 
but also for facilitating the data collection process. After that, an analytic technique is needed 
for manipulating data evidence. One technique is to build a matrix of categories and place the 
evidence within such categories. The evidence obtained was compared against a standard 
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criteria (Table 2) to evaluate whether or not they coincided. Analysis of documentary data, 
interviews, and direct observation were the main sources of evidence used in this study. A 
letter was send to the Institutions from which projects were selected, asking for permission to 
collect data (see Appendices B and C). 
The conceptual framework that guided this study is depicted in Figure 2. For 
instrumentation, the collected evidence for each project was compared to a final standard 
matrix (Table 2). This matrix was grounded on the theoretical framework described in the 
literature review; and adapted from Rondinelli (1986) and Elliot (1989). The matrix takes into 
account: a) a set of four key factors (management, capacity building, planning approach and 
external factors) that the literature review indicates relevant for an appropriate project 
implementation in terms of HRD tradition; and b) the four stages of the CIPP model (context, 
input, process, product). 
Methodologically, this case study treated appropriate project implementation 
(dependent variable) as a function of those four key factors (independent variables). It is 
recognized that the words appropriate, effective, or successful are open to different meanings 
depending on the tradition of extension used, TI or HRD. Effective implementation for the TI 
tradition may be interpreted as achieving the initially stated goals, whereas for HRD may be 
understood as achieving sustaining results on the target people, even if the implementation 
deviated from initial design. The purpose of the analysis was to identify how these factors 
affected the implementation of the project from HRD perspective. Nevertheless, 
consideration about how they influenced the results was also made. 
Table 2. Final standard matrix used for evaluation (adapted from Rondinelli, 1986; & Elliot, 1989) 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity 
building 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•What kind of goals did the 
project approach-TI or HRD? 
•How were goals and objectives 
described? 
•Was needs assessment 
conducted? 
•Were capacity building 
objectives defined with 
quantified goals, indicators, or 
time frames? 
•Were objectives expressed in a 
major framework? 
•Was project formulated in 
tenns of a logical frame? 
•What kind of external factors 
constrained the project during 
this stage? 
•What was the strategy of the 
project? 
•Was there an evaluation 
design? 
•Who was going to take an 
active role in implementation of 
capacity-building efforts? 
•Were there existing agencies 
or institutions with whom to 
work? 
•Was there a planning or 
blueprint approach of the project 
design (see Figure 2)? 
•What kind of external factors 
constrained the project during 
this stage? 
•How was process 
monitoring conducted? 
•How was formative 
evaluation conducted? 
•Was the project 
implemented through 
integration of local institutions 
and governments? 
•Did implementation involve 
all entities? 
•Did capacity building 
activities take place? 
•Did flexibility continue 
during this stage? 
•What kinds of factors 
constrained planning for 
project implementation? 
•What kinds of external 
factors constrained the project 
during this stage? 
•What were the main results of 
the project from a TI 
perspective? 
•What were the main results of 
the project from a HRD 
perspective? 
LA 
o\ 
•Were long-term plans 
included for project 
continuance? 
•Was sustainability of the 
results achieved? 
•Was learning made possible 
through the lessons? 
•What kinds of external factors 
constrained the project during 
this stage? 
MANAGEMENT 
-organizational 
structure.evaluation, 
needs assesment. 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
-individuals.groups. 
organizations. 
process or blueprint approach. 
APPROPRIATE 
PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
RESULTS: 
sustained 
improvements 
of HRD 
components 
LA 
-J 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
-governmental policies; 
environment, etc. 
Figure 3. Conceptual framework for the evaluation (adapted from Rondinelli, 1986; and Elliot, 1989) 
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The methodology used in this study does not imply that: a) these are all the factors to 
consider; b) all the factors have the same importance; and c) the factors always affect project's 
implementation and results in the same way. The findings drawn fi-om the analysis can 
provide operational guidelines to extension managers so as to improve fiiture projects. In 
addition, the findings can contribute to increasing the body of knowledge in relation to 
evaluation studies of extension or development projects in LDCs. 
The process of developing the standard matrix (specific objective 1) had three 
sequential steps; 1) reviewing evaluation models and literature related to the topic; 2) 
developing the standard matrix to be used; 3) refining through review by selected 
professionals. The latter was done by personal visits. Professionals were sent personalized 
letters asking for collaboration and thanking for their participation (see Appendices D and E). 
A list of the professionals interviewed is provided in Appendix F. The average-length of each 
interview was three hours. The development of the standard matrix occurred over a period of 
ten months. Two months out of ten took place in Uruguay. During that period, the 
researcher received the reactions of his advisory committee in the United States (January, 
1993-July, 1993) and fi"om six professionals in Uruguay (August, 1993- October, 1993). 
Reaction to the standard matrix referred to both format and content. The suggestions 
concerning the standard matrix were considered and later incorporated into a more refined 
matrix which is presented in Table 2. This final matrix can be considered as a valuable tool for 
extension managers in developing countries to take into account factors that may affect 
project implementation. 
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Summaiy 
The procedures followed to carry out this research were accomplished first by 
designing the evaluation fi-amework through a literature review and peer validation from ISU 
and colleagues from Uruguay. Second, the selection of the projects was accomplished 
through a purposefiil sample of six projects following the criteria as specified on page 51. 
According to the literature, a number between six and ten cases were found to be appropriate 
for a multiple case design. Key informants fi-om Uruguay were identified to assist in project 
selection because of their experience and familiarity with projects that would provide the 
maximum benefit to this study. Third, data collection in Uruguay consisted of two stages: 
a) collecting administrative documents and records of the projects; and b) conducting 
unstructured interviews. Finally, data analyses involved the use of the matrix in two aspects: 
a) as a guide for categorizing the information gathered in each project; and b) as the criteria 
against which to compare the evidence collected in each case. Findings fi"om all the projects 
were compared and synthesized in order to draw conclusions and guidelines. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS 
This chapter considered the results of the evaluation of six projects on rural 
development recently carried out in Uruguay. The conceptual framework and methodology 
described in previous chapters were taken into account. Each project evaluation was followed 
by a short annotation labeled introduction, intending to provide a general view of the project 
setting, a description of the project, a matrix describing the project development process, and 
key findings related to this process. 
Development Program for Small Livestock Producers of 
Cooperativa Agraria Minas de Corrales (COAMICOL) 
Agency in Charge: Institute de Promociôn Economico y Social del Uruguay (IPRU) 
Introduction 
Most of the information provided was obtained from internal materials of the Institute 
de Promociôn Economico y Social del Uruguay (IPRU). A non governmental organization 
(NGO), IPRU was created in 1966 to provide technical assistance, training and credit to the 
poor both urban and rural. Several aspects of life conditions were showing a highly 
unsatisfactory trend. The poor lacked decent shelter, access to health, education, and other 
basic services, including availability of food. Rural-urban migration exacerbated the need to 
provide basic services and infrastructure to the lower strata of society. 
To fulfill basic needs and foster social development, IPRU applies a participatory 
methodology based upon some principles: readiness to listen to the target people, respect for 
local culture, involvement of local people in the program plarming process, and the 
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encouragement of a 'critical consciousness' among the less advantaged population groups (see 
Freire, page 39). Action by IPRU attempts to provide guidance and direction without 
controlling in detail every aspect of the groups being supported. The relation between IPRU 
and the target population is initiated by the latter through informal requests. This generates a 
close and mutually beneficial interaction between both parties with the aim of meeting those 
requests. 
An analysis of IPRUs development actions can be done fi"om three perspectives: a) 
time; b) type of support; and c) participation of the promoter in the solutions. With reference 
to time, the actions may be punctual or continual; type of result may be related to technical 
assistance (TI) or wider than that, including helping people organize themselves (HRD). 
Finally, with respect to the participation of the beneficiaries in the solutions, there is a 
continuum with three situations: 1) expert mediation; 2) supervision; and 3) process 
intervention. The participation of the beneficiaries is minimal in the first case (expert 
mediation) and results are expected in a short term. As one moves in the continuum, the 
participation of the client gradually increases as well as the complexities of the process and the 
foresight of its results. 
The view of development by IPRU is centered around two key dimensions: a) equity, 
because the persistence of poverty compromises the effectiveness of any development action; 
and b) empowering people to make decisions and to satisfy their basic human needs. 
In order to reduce dispersion of funds, IPRU concentrated resources around a limited 
number of major geographical regions. These regions are: a) northwest part of the Country 
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(Salto and Artigas Departments); b) northeast (Rivera and Tacuarembô Departments); and c) 
the metropolitan area (Montevideo, Canelones, San José and Florida Departments). Within 
these areas there is a concentration of the greatest poverty index of the country. An indigent 
population is one whose family income level does not cover the cost of a subsistence food 
basket according to the needs estimated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Feres & Léon, 1990). This commission established a value for the line of 
indigence in rural areas of Uruguay in 19.3 U.S. dollars (per capita monthly budget at 1988 
prices). To attend the remote areas, the IPRU has initiated a decentralization process aimed 
at keeping the organization more responsive to the target population. 
The basic areas of the IPRU's action are: a) support programs to the small enterprise, 
rural and urban; b) support programs to the cooperative sector; c) agroecological and 
environmental programs; and d) women's programs. The institution is composed of 33 
members, 70% of them in a full-time arrangement. The activities developed by IPRU are 
financed basically by donor agencies. The annual operating budget of the IPRU totals 
approximately 400,000 American dollars. The NGO generates its operating capital through 
administrative fees charged within the proposals it helps to develop. In addition to the 
administrative fees, the IPRU attempts to establish longer term consultancy arrangements with 
the target population upon completion of the external project funding. 
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Project description 
Most of the information provided in the present study came from internal documents, 
as the project itself, and reports from the project beneficiaries (Journal Caminando, No. 32, 
1990 and No. 39,1992). The present researcher also studied all final IPRU project documents 
that were submitted to the external fiinding agency (The Belgium Foundation for External 
Missions), as well as annual IPRU reports for 1991, 1992, and 1993. In addition, the present 
researcher conducted individual interviews with Luis Murias (IPRU director), Alicia Canapale 
(IPRU administrative coordinator) and Gustavo Canedo (IPRU field coordinator in charge of 
this project). Complementary, similar interviews were held with Aldo Scattolini (Coamicol's 
member of the board) and Amilcar Acunha (Coamicol manager). 
The project period extended from May, 1990 to May, 1993. Funds were provided by 
a Belgium Agency, The Belgium Foundation for External Missions. The beneficiary 
organization was the Cooperativa Agraria Minas de Corrales (COAMICOL), located in the 
Department of Rivera, at the northeast of the country. 
The project goals were to: 1) increase the income of small sheep farmers as a result of 
technical assistance (TI tradition); and 2) increase farmers' involvement in the cooperative by 
forming groups (HRD tradition). This project commenced with a baseline survey that 
provided data and facts from which to identify problems and needs. This study identified the 
existence of a significant number of small livestock farmers, with farm sizes of less than 200 
hectares (449 acres). According to Uruguayan standards, this is a small scale of farm 
considering livestock production. The records of this study also indicated that small 
64 
subsistence farmers lacked an on-farm infrastructure needed to apply technology, for example, 
water supply. In addition, the farmers had very limited or no access to institutional credit. 
The scarce available supply of credit was skewed in favor of short-term credit. Lack of 
collateral security to obtain loans was one of the main reasons to explain this situation. 
A major component of this project was to establish a revolving credit system for the 
small subsistence farmers. This system intended to provide a comprehensive package for the 
target population to raise its output and enter into the commercial sector. The package 
encouraged adoption of new technology or other improvements, along with access to credit, 
extension and delivery systems of the inputs required. The interest rate was low when 
compared with other rates paid for those who depend on the informal market. In addition, the 
system did not require ownership of property by the farmers in order to qualify for a loan. In 
reality, small subsistence farmers did not have collateral, except scarce and poor land, against 
which banks could take possession and sell in case of default. This land was not valuable for a 
bank as a source of rapid cash income. 
Credit conditions were not the only feature of this system to consider. Small 
subsistence farmers were obligated to conform to farm projects elaborated jointly with 
extension agents. The delivery systems had to provide ready and timely availability of inputs, 
and market outlets on the products side. An important characteristic was that funds were not 
expected to be depleted. All the target people were expected to get their turn to receive the 
loan. The funds, if well managed, should be virtually self-sustaining. This meant the total 
volume of credit flowing into the target population was not expected to vary dramatically in 
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the medium run. Another feature was the way loans were repaid; it was in products rather 
than money. Small subsistence farmers perceived this way of repayment as well-adapted to 
their own frame of reference. Instead of money, they were accustomed to using quantities of 
product to borrow and return. 
The revolving credit system put emphasis on close control of farm production and 
supervision of credit. This was done to prevent a misuse of funds. It operated through a 
well-funded and well-stafiFed special unit whose authority was located outside the social 
system. Therefore, it could avoid facing local large landowners'power, who tend to be 
opposed to development actions that may threaten their power. Larger farmers have been 
using their influence to capture credit from the lending agency to buy additional land to 
displace small farmers. 
In order to put this credit system into practice, a committee was formed comprised of 
a representatives from each of three groups: a) the cooperative's board of directors; b) the 
target population; and c) IPRU. This committee was in charge of approving the loans which 
were given armually. Loans were granted after studying the farm projects developed by the 
extension agents. The credit conditions were: 1) the maximum loan amount was US $1,700 
per farmer; 2) the farmer debt was in outputs, not money; 3) the rate of interest was three 
percent per year on the balance; and 4) the term for paying back the loan was one year for 
crops and three years for investments and permanent pastures. 
The specific objectives of the project were to: 1) develop 25 farm projects on an 
annual basis until completing 75 in the third and final year; 2) form eight cooperative groups in 
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which to give technical guidance through the project extension staff; 3) deliver technical 
messages from extension staff to small farmers through use of mass media; and 4) visit small 
farmers and other productive experiences (field days). The beneficiaries of this project were 
all cooperative members who met the following conditions: 1) a farm size less than 200 
hectares (449 acres); 2) a location of not more than 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Minas de 
Corrales (headquarters of the cooperative); 3) residence on the farm; and 4) reliance on 
farming operations as the principal source of income. 
From IPRU's point of view, meeting these objectives would help to increase 
agricultural production and to strengthen cooperative. This, in turn, would contribute to 
raising standards of living and to making a reversal from rural-urban migration. 
Project development process 
The project development process is represented in Table 3. The overall goal was to 
increase agricultural production (TI) and strengthen the local cooperative (HRD). This goal 
was to be achieved through a strategy based upon: 1) the provision of loans using a revolving 
credit system for the building of the infrastructure on-farm and the providing of inputs; and 2) 
the provision of technical assistance from the project's extension staff. All development 
operations were to be carried by a semi-autonomous unit which, at the end of the project, was 
supposed to be incorporated to the cooperative. The cooperative would assume the 
responsibility for the continuation of this project after its end. A needs-assessment study 
carried out for a previous project and implemented in that cooperative, was used to provide a 
baseline picture of the reality before implementing the project. The objectives were clearly 
Table 3. Evaluation of the project IPRU/small farmers of COAMICOL 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity 
building 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•Goals included to enhance living 
standards of small subsistence 
farmers by increasing agricultural 
production (TI) and strengthening 
the local cooperative (HRD) 
•A recently conducted needs 
assessment study was used. 
•Training activities were planned 
for small producers as an objective 
to achieve. 
•HRD objectives were clearly stated 
in operational terms. 
•Objectives were expressed in a 
causal chain: logical framework. 
•Remote area from capital of 
department & country. 
•Boundary effect (near Brazil). 
•Lack of government support to 
small farmers. 
•Strategy based on revolving 
credit system involving provision 
of loans and technical assistance. 
•Evaluation design included 
impact indicators against which to 
measure progress toward 
objectives. 
•Cooperative was to take an active 
role in implementation of project. 
•Project conceived as a joint effort 
between IPRU-th rough an ad hoc 
unit to be formed, an the 
cooperative. 
•No blueprint plan. 
•Flexibility to review the project 
each year according to the 
monitoring. 
•Remote area from capital of 
department & country. 
•Boundary effect (near Brazil). 
•Lack of government support to 
small farmers. 
•Evaluation design helped to monitor 
implementation from the unit. 
•Reporting systems of evaluation 
design allowed comparison over time, 
checking progress of objectives. 
•Adequate balance between 
monitoring TI and HRD aspects 
achieved due to clearly stated 
objectives. 
•Cooperative groups formed; training 
activities to farmers, including field 
days, were successfully carried out. 
•Emphasis on capacity building 
remained on small farmers. 
Cooperative staff not included. 
•Project redesigned during 
implementation. 
•Little coordination between unit and 
cooperative hindered planning and 
threatened sustainability. 
•Remote area from capital of 
department & country. 
•Boundary effect (near Brazil). 
•Lack of government support to 
small farmers. 
•Problems with donor agency in 
providing funds for the last year. 
•1993: 50/75 small farmers 
reached with credit (objective was 
75). 
•High loan repayment rate (>90%). 
•Data kept on technologies 
adopted. 
•Incomes for participants increased. 
•Supply of inputs not always timely 
from cooperative. 
•1993: 4 cooperative groups 
formed (objective was 8). 
•Failure to provide capacity 
building to cooperative staff 
hindered sustainability of outcomes 
to small farmers (credit system). 
•Permanence of project not 
achieved in original terms. 
•No final evaluation made to allow 
learning from experience & making 
suggestions for future plans. 
•Not possible to replicate 
experience not only in the area but 
also in other regions. 
•Remote area from capital of 
department & country. 
•Boundary effect (near Brazil). 
•Low prices for wool. 
•Lack of government support to 
small farmers. 
•Growing financial problems in 
cooperative became a heavy burden. 
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stated in operational terms and timeframe, for both TI and HRD. They were expressed within 
a logical framework approach which was discussed on pages 21 and 22. 
An evaluation-design was developed with the help of the donor agency. It included an 
extensive record of project implementation, and impact indicators against which to measure 
progress toward objectives being sought. This, as well as the initially clearly stated objectives, 
helped greatly to monitor the project. Impact indicators reflected both TI and HRD 
traditions; this meant there was a proper balance. The indicators of impact were: 1) number 
of producers reached; 2) number of producers reached that adopt technology, specifying 
which; 3) number of visits to the demonstration area; 4) number of formed groups and 5) how 
much use was given to credit and rate of repayment. 
The revolving credit system functioned well; there was no reluctance on the part of the 
target population to borrow funds and adopt technology. The progress reports confirmed 
this. In addition, a planning process approach was employed. This meant that flexibility in the 
implementation allowed for modifications in response to changing circumstances. There were 
some examples that certified this. First, when the project was written for the donor agency 
seeking its approval, the market for wool was encouraging, but when the project was 
approved and implemented, wool prices declined significantly. The lack of wool profitability 
made it necessary to introduce livestock innovations as an alternative for small farmers. 
Second, loans were given to items that were not originally programmed in the project, but 
were requested by the target people. Sometimes these loans were more related to financing 
consumption rather than production. Failure to recognize that small subsistence farmers need 
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not only credit for financing inputs, but also for consuming, may jeopardize their capacity to 
perform well in the credit program. Third, loans were given to the board of cooperative 
directors. Originally, the argument over which members of the cooperative board should not 
be allowed to ask for a loan was related to the fact that they were wealthier farmers, more 
able to exert pressures in favor of their interests. It would have been difficult for the 
committee to resist and not succumb to such influences. On the other hand, the project 
sought to increase participation of small farmers in the cooperative, and eventually on its 
board of directors. Small subsistence farmers were reluctant to serve in the cooperative as 
directors because they could not be eligible borrowers within the program. 
During project implementation, there was a very poor linkage between IPRU, through 
the created semi-autonomous unit, and the cooperative. This caused serious difficulties to the 
implementation of the project and the sustainability of results. Different views and hidden 
agendas about the role of extension and the project objectives may be argued to explain this 
situation. Extension should be an important part of a project which expects to tie revolving 
credit to technological innovations for small subsistence farmers. If the cooperative board 
understands this, but at the same time it considers it too costly to implement as originally 
planned, problems will arise from the very beginning. Credit becomes important to small 
farmers only after technology is available to, and understood by, the potential borrowers. The 
small subsistence farmers needed to perceive technology as profitable and not risky. The 
application of a revolving credit system weakening extension components would lead the 
project far fi-om reaching its intended population. 
An analysis was necessary to determine the nature of the observed hidden agenda. 
The cooperative board viewed this project much as a gift of free money from which to 
reallocate resources to other needs, than as a way for helping the poorer strata of farmers to 
gain access to credit and extension services. The latter implies that capacity building was 
needed for cooperative employees. Cooperatives are run by those farmers with enough 
resources of their own, so that they can afford to direct them from the board without receiving 
a salary. Their intentions may be the best, but their interests work in the opposite direction of 
those of the target population. Those who possess more resources are in a better position to 
benefit from development interventions. 
On the other hand, IPRU saw this project as a way by which new technology would be 
translated to small subsistence livestock farmers in coordination with the provision of credit. 
Their vision was more concerned with equity (HRD), whereas the cooperative board's vision 
was concerned with efficiency (TI). As a result more exploration was needed to find a middle 
point between the two extremes, where the two goals might be found to conflict less; 
therefore, certmn losses in one goal could be seen as a reasonable cost to pay for gains in the 
other goal. Extension managers have a lot to play in this tradeoff. 
Under these circumstances controversies arose as to who was in charge of making 
budgetary decisions. When the cooperative board recognized that reallocating resources 
elsewhere was not possible, it withdrew its active support to the project. This affected the 
newly created unit, controlled initially by the central direction of IPRU. As stated previously, 
the strategy for this unit was to achieve the needed support from the cooperative without 
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generating too much dependence at the beginning. Later, as the unit acquired experience, 
IPRU gradually withdrew from its directive role. 
At the end of the project cycle, it was expected that the cooperative would assume 
control. Far from this scheme, the unit was forced to act by itself, because of its frustration in 
trying to work through the cooperative. Little cooperation was established between these two 
entities. An arrangement emerged in which the cooperative was in charge of delivering inputs 
while the unit covered extension and credit activities. Obviously, this arrangement was 
anything but perfect. Experience was disappointing in the timeliness of input delivery from 
the cooperative. In addition, the target people could not understand who was directing the 
project, whether IPRU, COAMICOL, or the unit. Had this problem been grappled with 
seriously at the beginning by IPRU (input or context stage, not process), the unit might have 
planned a different strategy for project implementation. 
For the cooperative, to assume the control of the project after the end of the cycle 
project implied a more active participation in the handling of credits, marketing of products, 
purchasing of inputs, and providing of extension services. The capacity of the cooperative to 
perform such a role was strongly limited due to the fact that capacity-building activities were 
not performed within it. The cooperative's board of directors did not show an interest in 
assuming control. It was clear that skills were required that were unfamiliar to the 
cooperative staff: bookkeeping and accounting methods, knowledge of distant and volatile 
markets, technical knowledge, ability to plan, judgments of creditworthiness and how to deal 
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with defaults. Employees were poorly trained in these areas. As a result, the potential of the 
cooperative to sustain this project after its end was seriously questioned. 
Evaluation of the program revealed that ; a) capacity-building activities were 
performed successfully for the small farmers who were exposed to new experiences; and b) a 
community development process had been started because new cooperative groups were 
formed. This was due mostly to the high rapport established with the extension agents in this 
project. Sustaining these improvements as well as the credit system for the original target 
population became the issue after the departure of IPRU occurred in November, 1993. 
Lack of a final summative internal evaluation to leam fi-om the lessons must be 
mentioned, along with no long-term plans after the end of the project cycle. Non 
governmental organizations and donor agencies appear to be reluctant to tie up scarce human 
and financial resources in what might be regarded for them as not practical work. This also 
includes needs assessment studies. There is an urgent need to change this perception. 
There were constraining external factors that must be borne in mind when considering 
the evaluation of this project. First, a recent financial problem in the cooperative that created 
a high debt. In addition, there was a "boundary efifect' that hindered the cooperative. Farmers 
tended to buy inputs in Brazil because they were cheaper. A further external problem is that 
government efforts to help small subsistence farmers have been scarce and considered lately 
undesirable welfarism. This was very much a function of their insignificant political 
importance to government leaders. The last external problem was a delay on the part of the 
donor agency in providing fijnds for the last year. These funds were never granted. 
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Rural Development Program for Pueblo Ansina (Ansina Village) 
Agency in Charge: Grupo de Promociôn del Desarrollo (GPDR) 
Introduction 
Most of the information presented came from the Grupo de Promociôn del Desarrollo 
Regional (GPDR). The GPDR is aNGO established in Uruguay in 1987, and supported by 
donor agencies from Canada. The GPDR's original goals were to: 1) promote cooperation 
South-South and North-South; 2) support institutional development of other NGOs and 
cooperatives; 3) promote regional development; and 4) create awareness about women's and 
youth's conditions. In 1990 these goals were reviewed and the GPDR found it necessary to 
concentrate efforts to reduce dispersion of funds. The GPDR embarked on a strategy to 
promote regional development in the poorest region of the country. This region was 
composed of four departments: Tacuarembo, Rivera, Cerro Largo and Artigas. Even though 
Uruguay is a small and homogeneous country with only minor ethnic/income disparities as 
compared to other countries in Latin America, there are definite regional differences. 
According to data gathered by national censuses, within this region (especially in rural 
areas) the provision of minimum standards of food, clothing, shelter, health, and education 
was minimal. The lowest-income rural groups, basically smallholders, tenants, and the 
landless, did not have access to services such as domestic water supply, electricity, waste 
disposal, etc. Even where such services were available, the poorer rural strata tended to 
benefit less from them than do other groups. The socioeconomic system operating in these 
areas was often hostile to development actions. The system tried to reinforce rural poverty 
instead of alleviating it. 
The density of the rural population in this region was very low (1 inhabitant per square 
kilometer) due to the migration toward urban areas. The lack of rural work opportunities 
created this problem, but the urban areas presented a similar situation. Rural young and 
women were within the categories more exposed to migration. Moving to the cities or 
villages could provide some chance to escape from poverty. Some informal activities such as 
reduced scale smuggling (over the border with Brazil), seasonal agricultural employment or 
housekeeping were the only activities available. As a result, the wage rates were extremely 
low, often less than 50 dollars a month. 
Livestock dominated agriculture in the four mentioned departments. Farmers grazed 
livestock on natural pastures with a few quality grasses. While grazing lands in common was 
not employed, there was, nevertheless, an important presence in this region of small livestock 
farmers, and an increasing process of land concentration. Moreover, those departments were 
lacking cooperative organizations. As a result, many local needs relating to the marketing of 
agricultural products, the purchase of farm supplies and equipment, and the provision of credit 
were not met. 
Compared with other NGOs, the GPDR is a relatively small one. Its staff is composed 
of 10 members, the majority of them under a part-time arrangement. The headquarters is 
located in Montevideo, the capital of the country, from where the programs are coordinated, 
guided and controlled. There is a regional office in Tacuarembo but no GPDR staff is 
allocated there. There are weekly or monthly contacts between the general coordination and 
those responsible for each program as well as with the technicians affected by the programs. 
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Due to the scarce resources and the multiplicity of problems, it was virtually 
impossible for the GPDR to meet all the demands of the people involved in the target region. 
The current general strategy adopted by GPDR emphasizes: 1) helping local people select a 
project and organize to carry it out, providing skilled assistance when needed; and 2) bringing 
political pressure on the govenmient and political forces to act on matters affecting the poorer 
rural strata. 
Project description 
The information provided in the present study came primarily from written internal 
documents of the institution, as reports and the project itself In addition, the researcher 
conducted individual interviews with Gustavo Dans (GPDR director), José Pedro Nunez 
(GPDR extension agent) and Norberto Rodriguez (GPDR extension agent). Complementary, 
similar interviews were held with two farmers who were involved in this project: Mr. Carlos 
Viera and Mrs. Miriam Rivero. The analysis was derived heavily from these interviews. 
The evaluated project was called 'Ansina village rural development program.' Ansina 
village is located in Tacuarembo department, 60 km from the department capital. It was 
started in 1992 with a completion date of March, 1996. This program was a continuing 
activity to the GPDR projects that began in 1988 by the support of the local cooperative. A 
needs-assessment study was conducted within the project during 1992. According to the 
results of that study, the project objectives were to: 1) strengthen the poorest rural family 
capabilities to generate income; and 2) institutionalize a process of rural development through 
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the establishment of self-managed village organizations capable of assisting the poorest strata 
of rural families. 
The reports from the needs-assessment study revealed that the local institution 
(cooperative of Ansina village) was not responsive to the requests of the poorer people. 
Experience showed that previous projects supported by the GPDR also failed to attain their 
original goals. The GPDR was then pacified with claims of a 'trickle down' effect which did 
not take place. The intended target population, composed of the poorest rural people that 
lived around Ansina village—landless and small subsistence farmers, was never reached. A 
parallel organization to overcome that constraint was created in 1993. 
Project development process 
The project development process is represented in Table 4. Although the program had 
overall goals derived from a needs-assessment study, it did not commence with quantified 
objectives, impact indicators or time-frames. Context heavily affects project implementation, 
and often changes violently in LDCs. Due to this, project objectives are established in a very 
broad way. As a result, managers and organizations actions are not restricted during project 
implementation. This project showed a lack of objectives, presenting just broad goals. 
To build a degree of flexibility into a project so that modifications can be made later, 
requires an active involvement of development managers during implementation. They must 
set general directions that can be followed by those responsible at the local level. That was not 
the case here. Lack of clear guidelines led to uncertainty about the way to implement this 
program on the part of extension staff. 
Table 4. Evaluation of project GPDR-Ansina village 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity 
building 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•Program had only overall goals 
stated very broadly and vaguely. 
•A needs assessment was 
conducted especially for this project. 
•Objectives for capacity building 
activities were never defined. 
•Goals were expressed without 
reference to a general frame, as the 
logical framework. 
•Tension between local institution 
operating in area (Ansina 
cooperative) and the goals of the 
project. 
•Project strategy based on a 
revolving credit system. 
•No evaluation design was 
established. 
•A new target people organization 
was to be created which would be 
more responsive to local needs and 
would work with local 
governments. 
•A process planning approach was 
attempted to be put into practice. 
•Poor monitoring of process. 
•High expectation raised at 
beginning among principal parties. 
•Poor linkages between GPDR high-
level management located in 
Montevideo and the regional staff. 
•Scarce involvement of GPDR high 
level management in the 
implementation generated absence of 
leadership and confusion. 
•Failure to achieve coordination with 
local government. 
•Little capacity building activities 
created in the new organization. 
•Planning approach highly flexible, 
explained by a lack of guidelines 
about the focus. 
•Planning constrained by a 
contradiction between the local 
approach of the project and the 
organization structure highly 
centralized in Montevideo. 
•Tension between local institution "Lack of local government support. 
operating in area (Ansina 
cooperative) and the goals of the 
program. 
•Tension between local institution 
operating in area (Ansina 
cooperative) and the goals of the 
project. 
•Lack of government support to 
small farmers. 
•Project recently started with a 
good rapport between extension 
team and the target people. 
•Trend for rate of loan repayment 
appeared to be good. 
•Limited resources were a 
bottleneck 
•Crisis management affected 
process 
•Some leadership emerging; 
however, more capacity building is 
needed for transferring 
responsibilities to the new 
organization. 
•Role of the GDPR regional agency 
needs to be clarified. 
•Sustainability of expected results is 
in danger after 1996. 
•No long-term planning evolved as 
well as process evaluation to 
improve implementation and allow 
for replications in other areas. 
•Lack of local government support. 
•Tension between local institution 
operating in area (Ansina 
cooperative) and the goals of the 
program. 
•Reactions from donor agencies are 
unknown related to future funding 
afler 1996. 
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The new organization created in 1993 was not strong enough in decision-making, 
allocating and using resources effectively, and managing its own development activities. 
Although that was expected, taking into account the program began in 1992 with a needs 
assessment study, the created organization must be able to sustain benefits as the life of the 
program come to close in March, 1996. This means a lot of work is still needed to increase its 
institutional capacity to negotiate with other organizations and lobby the local government. 
The strategy followed by this project was to combine the revolving credit system with 
extension so that the same visit to target people served both purposes. As it was suggested 
earlier in the IPRU project, the advantage for the borrower that uses the revolving credit 
system is a relief from uncertainty about the price a farmer can receive to repay the loan in 
cash. The repayment is made in a given number of physical units of product, regardless of 
market prices, and the borrower knows in advance how much it will cost to repay the loan. 
Therefore, the borrower is less likely to feel that he/she is being exploited by the lender. The 
extension team established a good rapport with the target people. However, the modest size 
of the amount of credit available was a weak component of this adopted strategy. 
The figure of 5,000 dollars a year appears clearly modest when viewed in the light of 
attacking global poverty in the region by narrowing the gap between rich and poor and 
meeting the basic social needs. Other factors that constrained the implementation stage were: 
a) the lack of transportation for extension purposes; and b) the scarce time allotted for 
extension work, just one week per month. Nevertheless, because of the extension team's 
good rapport, there was a trend toward a satisfactory repayment rate. 
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Other problems were encountered in the project. Objectives were not defined and 
there were poor linkages between GPDR regional staff, and the GPDR high-level management 
located in Montevideo; therefore, confusion arose over how to implement the project. In 
addition, there was a failure in the GPDR institutional &amework. Center-local 
communications and coordination were a bottleneck. Sharing responsibility with local staff 
did not function because they were not knowledgeable about the total project. This was 
related to the fact that objectives were not defined. The GPDR high-level management did 
not provide a sense of direction for the regional staff, and beneficiaries of the program. 
Inadequate management and supervision produced a 'make-work' approach. Management 
style also had a critical influence in generating low motivation of the personnel toward the 
project. 
The future of the program faces a danger in the sense that it concentrates resources on 
providing benefits to a small group (10 persons) in relation to the overall size of the region. 
Hence, it is a small-scale project and should be considered as being experimental in nature. 
Nevertheless, the smaller the project, the easier it may be to control it for ensuring high quality 
in its operation. The GDPR should define criteria for quality. Unless this project can be 
replicated more widely in the region, GPDR strategy will be unable to contribute significantly 
to reduce the region's problems. A corollary of this is that replication should be carried out 
cautiously, with attentive monitoring of the process itself Continuing to the present time, 
GPDR's management style seems to be an obstacle to these purposes. 
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A new institutional arrangement must be found to resolve these issues. Experience 
shows that the implementation of rural development programs calls for an adequate 
institutional framework. This means a balance between central leadership and coordination 
with decentralization and participation. Development managers should provide leadership and 
must have a coordinating role during the different stages of program plaiming process. They 
need to be involved in monitoring ongoing programs. 
The creation of a GPDR regional development agency in the outskirts of Tacuarembo 
city with a good infrastructure is a clear example of the situation described above. Although it 
was built in 1991, there is no indication of its purposes from the high management level; a 
center for training local people, a center for conducting research on appropriate technologies 
for smallholdings, a center for gathering and providing information for the rural poor, or a 
center for generating local incomes to supplement GPDR central funds. An institutional 
framework in which authority is concentrated at the top, and little attention is paid to local 
level staff produces little incentives for their initiative and motivation. The goals of this 
project ran counter to the GPDR's institutional framework. A real doubt can be raised 
concerning its sustainability after 1996, if the institutional framework does not change. Also, 
reactions from donor agencies to continuing funding are unknown yet. 
In addition to this picture, coordination with local government of Tacuarembo was not 
achieved. The GDPR began to work raising high expectations about project resources in a 
move to induce local government support. Because expectations were not met, GPDR 
suffered a lack of credibility on the part of local government. Working with local 
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governments is not easy but necessary. Local governments filter demands of cooperation in 
terms of their own agendas. Too often local politicians are afraid of NGOs development 
actions because they threaten their own power. But local governments perform intermediary 
functions which make it possible or not for NGOs to achieve their goals (for example, to build 
internal roads). It is hard to establish the right balance in this relationship between local 
governments and NGOs; nevertheless, it should be done. 
The lack of objectives induced the absence of evaluation systems in order to monitor 
the fit between program activities in relation to the pre-specified objectives. The lack of 
gathering information and making observations about the ongoing project should be 
overcome. Again, this requires a change in the observed management style; otherwise, it 
would not be too greatly exaggerated to affirm that this program will have little effects on the 
target people. 
Credit Program for Small Farmers of San José 
Agency in Charge-Asociaciôn de Colonos del Uruguay (ACU) 
Introduction 
Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from internal 
materials of the Asociaciôn de Colonos del Uruguay (ACU). The ACU came about due to a 
series of historical events. The 1950s brought forth a heated debate on the necessity for land 
reform in Latin American countries. In this context, land reform was generally driven by 
agrarian movements. It was an issue associated v^th revolutionary changes in the existing 
order. In Uruguay, colonization and settlement were considered an alternative to land reform. 
Precisely, the Uruguayan Land Reform Institute is called the Instituto Nacional de 
Colonizacion (INC). It was created in 1948 by Law 11,029 in order to induce the settlement of 
very small farmers who possessed few resources. The idea was that small farmers who were 
granted land were able to raise their incomes and general welfare by increasing their 
production. The government agreed to pay for land through the INC, which, in turn, would 
split that into small parcels, all of very nearly to less than 100 hectares (224.5 acres). 
The beneficiaries of these small parcels, for which they must pay rent to the INC, are 
called colonists (colonos). Beneficiaries do not have the possibility of renting their parcels to 
others. The term colono refers to an individual who is a beneficiary of a small parcel in 
accordance with the INC rules. The total number of colonos that receive land, together with 
their families, constitutes a colony (colonia). It must be noted that these land parcels 
contained no land improvements such as fences, drainage ditches, granaries, shelters, roads, 
etc. In this sense, the new occupants faced great problems aggravated by their lack of 
financial resources. The INC was supposed to help settling colonists by providing extension 
agencies on the settlements. There are currently 30 extension agents located in these agencies 
to work with a total of4,600 colonists distributed around 195 colonies throughout the 
country. The colonized surface represents approximately three percent of the total surface of 
the country. 
The original selection of new colonists was made according to their work aptitude. 
Because the colonists did not have properties, credit was not available for them. In addition, 
they were generally not fi-ee of debt to the INC which originated because of unpaid rents. The 
convergence of these factors, coupled with the small holdings, accounted for the current bad 
situation of colonists. The colonists actually represent the poorer rural strata of Uruguay. 
Investment in their parcels in durable farm capital goods such as livestock, buildings, and 
equipment, is very low. Dependence on hand tools coupled with low level use of nondurable 
capital such as seed and fertilizers, explain why colonists continue to have low-incomes. 
The INC has failed to incorporate as many colonists as possible into a commercial and 
modestly productive agriculture. To some extent, this is not a fault of the INC. Except for a 
few privileged elite, the great majority of parcels had no economical viability. Also, colonists 
receiving small parcels decided to operate their land individually and there was no tradition of 
working in common through a collective management system. Colonies could have played a 
more active role if expanding the participation of small farmers in total national agricultural 
production were a real concern. They remain well situated as an instrument through which a 
development program might be structured. For these reasons, there has been little helpful 
advice extension agents could provide to colonists. In addition, government commitment to 
allocate funds to INC was never been considered important. There have been scarce financial 
resources to buy land, support extension agencies, and help colonists build not only on-farm 
but also ofF-farm, a minimal infrastructure required to raise productivity. 
In a sense, there was never a peasant call for land in Uruguay, as in other Latin 
American countries. The INC was created more for political reasons. Small farmers who are 
given land tend to become government supporters. The political party that created the INC 
(traditionally strong in urban areas) was interested in rebuilding its rural political base of 
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support in preparation for national elections. Central to explain INC failure was also the 
active involvement of large farmer organizations against government aids to INC. This 
prevented society from discussing issues surrounding land reform. 
During the 1970s, when deplorable living conditions became even worse, a growing 
concern emerged among the colonists to found an association for defending their rights and 
lobbying for the need to formulate a national land policy. There was also a deep lack of 
confidence on the part of colonists as to where they might fit into the picture of Uruguay's 
modem agriculture. The nascent organization was called the ACU. Through the years the 
ACU has evolved from an organization that focused on raising demands to one that became a 
vehicle through which development programs were channelized. By 1994, of the 4,600 
colonists, 1,200 joined the organization which is located in Montevideo. The principal 
limiting factor for ACU's strategy was economical. For most colonists, incomes have been 
very low. Because of this, savings were limited and the capacity to support ACU was 
severely curtailed. The degree of interaction between ACUs headquarter and its members 
located in colonies was also low. This meant there was little interaction between both parts. 
As stated previously, the ACU has been currently functioning as a channel for 
administering development programs to colonists. The ACU has also been active in 
mobilizing foreign aid from donor agencies. Credit was always an important component of 
the developed programs. Since colonists had very little collateral, commercial institutions 
including governmental agencies, had not been willing to consider giving rural credit to the 
colonists. Credit was closely supervised by extension field workers. Inputs were delivered 
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promptly to colonies by truckloads avoiding failures by arriving on time. The ACU rapidly 
drew checks for the colonists to pay for machinery rental, land preparation, paying day labor 
and subsistence payments. These checks had to be signed by an extension agent. This 
strategy appeared to work successfully. The ACU also used these programs to reward its 
leaders, support its growing infrastructure, and gain new members. 
Some of the basic demands required by ACU were to: 1) provide economic support 
from the government to INC to buy more land; 2) provide additional land for settlers to retain 
family members and make individual plots profitable; 3) provide an adequate credit system for 
colonists; and 4) obtain a place in the INC's board of directors in representation of colonists. 
Working through development programs was a way for the ACU to show that 
programs tailored to small-farm conditions were feasible to implement. These programs had 
four characteristics in common; 1) promote the organization of the colonists through groups; 
2) increase the flow of communication between the colony and the ACU; 3) impart training 
for colonists in both, social and productive subjects; and 4) develop credit systems adapted to 
colonists situation. In summation, these programs included a revolving credit system with 
input supply and extension. 
Project description 
This information in this section originated from written internal documents which 
included ACU annual reports and the project itself The researcher also studied the final 
evaluation that was submitted to the external fiinding agency (BED/ Interamerican Bank of 
Development). In addition, the researcher conducted individual interviews with the persons 
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who were in charge of elaborating the final evaluation (Leonardo Mesa and Cecilia Gandolfo). 
Complementary, similar interviews were held with the field coordinator of this project (Mr. 
Fernando Battegazore), and the ACU directors (Mr. Alvaro Ferreira and Mr. Alberto Queijo). 
The project to be evaluated was 'the credit program for colonists of San José 
Department.' It began in January, 1987, and finished in December, 1989. This US $713,000 
project, fiinded in part by a US $450,000 grant fi-om BID, was designed to increase 
agricultural production of colonies located in San José Department through a revolving credit 
system. The project attempted to improve input delivery and extension services. It followed 
the pattern described previously (see the four characteristics). The beneficiaries of this project 
were 250 families who had an average farm size of 50 hectares (123 acres) with an average 
family annual income of 900 dollars. 
The revolving credit was used to finance: a) individual credits for farm machinery and 
equipment; 2) individual credits for land improvements; and 3) group credits to buy machinery 
for its use in common, such as equipment for forage conservation. This source of credit was 
also used for colony's infi^astructure development. Finally, another use for these funds was the 
acquisition of two vehicles for ACU extension staff in charge of this project. This staff was 
composed of four field extension agents, and one administrative agent with expertise in 
dealing with credit. 
Project development process 
The project development process is represented in Table 5. The overall goal was to 
increase agricultural production (milk) and to help organize colonists in their colonies. 
Table 5. Evaluation of the project ACU/small farmers of San José 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity 
building 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•Goals to increase milk 
production and enhance living 
standards of colonists. 
•Objectives not well 
documented, making analysis 
difficult. 
•No needs assessment study 
conducted. 
•There were CB objectives 
related to the organization of 
colonies through groups. 
•Objectives were not expressed 
in a causal chain, as the logical 
framework. 
•Lack of national policy 
regarding land issues due to 
powerful vested interests. 
•Poor linkages between ACU 
and INC. 
•Project strategy based on revolving 
credit system. 
•No evaluation design. 
•Implementation started focusing 
on spread of loans without paying 
attention to HRD aspects. 
•Final external evaluation requested "Maintenance of accurate 
by the donor agency. 
•Coordination with the Instituto 
Nacional de Colonizaciôn (INC) 
and the colonies. 
•Blueprint approach was to be 
evolved. 
•Lack of national policy regarding 
land issues due to powerful vested 
interests. 
•Poor linkages and tension between 
ACU and INC. 
repayment records and selection of 
borrowers were ignored. 
•Monitoring was biased against TI 
objectives. 
•Capacity build activities by-passed, 
not only for the target people but 
also for the credit agency (ACU). 
•INC and other agencies were not 
involved in project implementation. 
•Blueprint approach to planning 
involved rapid coverage to spend 
budget. 
•Target people were not involved. 
•Lack of national policy regarding 
land issues due to powerful vested 
interests. 
•Poor linkages and tension between 
ACU and INC. 
•TI objectives were accomplished; 
139/250 colonists reached with credits. 
•Production capacity and income 
increased. 
•Many colonists could have access to 
conventional lines of credit after this 
project. 
•Misuse of funds and reallocation 
•Ex-post external evaluation was well 
designed and conducted for donor 
agency. 
•Emphasis on TI overshadowed 
capacity building activities and results. 
•Strategy to create sustainable 
revolving credit system failed due to 
weakness of ACU to administer funds. 
•No process evaluation made to allow 
learning from experience, hindering 
attempts to replicate this experience in 
other colonies. 
•Lack of national policy regarding land 
issues due to powerful vested interests. 
•Poor linkages and tension between 
ACU and INC. 
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Objectives were not clearly developed, nor were they incorporated into a general jframework. 
The project sought to facilitate the development of a viable small farming sector that could 
serve as a model for other regions. Therefore, if the project worked and failures could be 
avoided, it was intended to be undertaken in different areas. In this sense it was a. pilot 
project, from which replication was going to be made. This was a call for systematic and 
formalized procedures of evaluation. Nevertheless, no such procedures were included in the 
project design. A final external evaluation was requested by the BID. 
Colonies selected for the project had a much broader mandate to participate than that 
of merely handling farm credit for their members. The colonies were supposed to be, in 
effect, production units that constituted the administrative structure of each parcel belonging 
to them. An administrative commission had to be elected by the colony membership to be 
responsible for the management of the colony. This commission, in turn, was in charge of 
electing from its membership a chief delegate who was the principal administrative officer of 
the colony. This person would play an active role as a liaison officer between the colony and 
the ACU extension staff. 
The overall goal was to be achieved through an strategy based on the revolving credit 
system. The project had to face numerous problems in its beginning. It had to develop a new 
organization for small farmers traditionally accustomed to working individually; to involve 
members of widely varied backgrounds and capacities as productive members, and to set up 
new relationships with other farming interests, political pressure groups, governmental 
agencies, and the ACU. These tasks, under a HRD tradition, provided a serious challenge to 
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the ACU extension stafif. In addition, there were those responsibilities that came from 
supervising credit operations to colonists. 
Although capacity-building activities appeared to be very necessary in order to 
consolidate a cooperative farming structure within the colony, they were almost nonexistent. 
Attention was given to allocating credit rapidly to colonists instead of stressing colony 
organization. Those small farmers who wanted to be involved in the project were more 
tempted to work in the traditional individual way. From the initial impetus to a rapid 
completion of credit-coverage there was a misconception about the intent of the original 
project. This was aborted before it could prove itself in action. 
Whether by choice or by necessity, extension agents discussed farming alternatives 
with each farmer, and the whole plan with its associated inputs before approval for credit. 
There were some efforts to organize groups around common machinery use. Although 
extension agents fully gained the confidence of the colony members, the methodology used 
(short visits on the farm) was not appropriate for consolidation of these groups. More time 
was spent covering those aspects related strictly to lending operations than those related to 
HRD components. The ACU, as the credit agency, was interested in making credit available 
to the target people without paying attention to the creditworthiness of individual members, 
accountable management, and how to use credit in conjunction with other services. The main 
focus of the ACU was to use the project as a way to introduce itself within the colony rather 
than as an instrument for developing small producers on a sustainable basis. 
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Behind the scenes, building a political base of support became a relevant consideration 
in the ACU leaders' mind (hidden agenda). The ACU devoted part of the original budget to 
building up a bureaucracy that quickly became a costly burden. To overcome this problem, 
resources were reallocated from the original purposes. The managerial incompetence of the 
ACU to administer the project aggravated this situation. Although this was a bottleneck from 
the very beginning, it was never improved during project implementation. The ACU's 
administrative staff was poorly trained and overburdened by too many functions so that loan 
supervision aspects were given little attention. For example, efforts in the selection of 
borrowers and maintenance of accurate repayment records were weak. Political incentives 
guided the ACU leaders to spread the project's credit program resources widely and flexibly. 
This could be seen in the fact that lending costs did not include extension services. 
The impact of'soft' tactic applications was that the credit system could not be 
sustained after project termination. The extension team was fired because revenues did not 
cover their costs. The lack of records and the way project was handled in the accounts of 
ACU were so weak that measuring defaults or misallocations turned out to be difficult. The 
pressure for maintaining infrastructure made the ACU develop new proposals in hopes of 
getting more funds from which reallocate resources. 
For the ACU's future, it appears to be important to differentiate political functions 
from developmental ones. An organization with a solid base in political bargaining 
(approximating a union) may be dysfunctional as the requirements change. A different type of 
leadership is needed for the administrative tasks that managing development projects requires. 
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When leaders who utilize bases of power through political connections and charisma are 
chosen to administer development projects, the results may reflect inefficiency, favoritism, and 
paternalism as seen in this case. The political roles performed by the leaders discourage 
emergencies of managerial capacities. Doubtless, the unit in charge of implementing 
development projects should be kept outside of this type of organization. A cooperative 
structure fits much more closely with development actions. This process usually takes a 
number of years, so that partial steps could be taken in that direction, with the creation of a 
semi-autonomous unit. 
Local Development Program for Colonia Lavalleja 
Agency in Charge: Centro Cooperativista Uruguayo (CCU) 
Introduction 
Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained fi-om: EI sistema 
de transferencia de tecmlogia agraria en el Uruguay, by M. Vassallo (1987), Chapter 22: 
The agricultural technology transfer system of Uruguay. The Centro Cooperativista 
Uruguayo (CCU) was created in 1961, with the overall mission of developing cooperativism 
within Uruguayan society. The cooperative organization was found to be an adequate self-
sustaining instrument aimed at helping 'the poor' by reducing existing inequalities. Since the 
late 1950s, Uruguay's economy began to unravel; per capita income rates declined so that 
people became poorer than they were previously. The country was beginning to show the 
first symptoms of the threat that economical stagnation posed to political stability. That 
process ended abruptly in the 1970s with the collapse of the democratic system. 
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Initially, the CCU's development interventions were related to the agricultural sector 
to support an important network of cooperatives that already existed. These efforts were 
crucial for establishing the CCU's credibility. Later, as the demands from other sectors 
expanded, the CCU redirected its focus to consider them. It was a fact that the urban poor 
were badly housed, clothed and underfed with access to housing as the most pressing need 
expressed. The CCU designed a system which provided housing through cooperatives that 
used their members' labor capacity for building. 
Originally, CCU programs were based upon concerns expressed by the target people. 
The CCU refrained from suggesting a project unless the people first requested help. Broadly, 
the CCU's way of operating in relation to the agricultural sector was as follows: 1) identify 
relevant projects based on a careful understanding of what people feel they need through 
genuine dialogue; 2) organize local consultation meetings between intended beneficiaries, 
related supporting organization members and external donor agencies; and 3) develop a 
proposal, solicit funds, and implement the project. An important feature of the CCU's rural 
development strategy was to organize macro cooperative entities (second grade cooperatives) 
that pooled meager resources to create effective purchasing power. These entities have 
played a critical role in policing the markets and combating market distortions. Another 
feature was the strong dependence of these programs upon the funding of foreign donor 
agencies. 
The CCU is a self-managed organization that follows the cooperative organizational 
structure. The key decisions regarding strategic planning are the prerogative of the general 
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assembly which is composed of all the CCU employees with more than two years in the 
organization. The CCU is divided into functional departments such as production 
(agriculture), marketing, financial, human resources, and others. Each department develops 
its own managerial planning combining resources to fulfill the overall mission of the 
organization. The agriculture department specific objectives are to: 1) take an active part in 
fostering creation of agrarian cooperatives that can supply critical agricultural inputs and 
extension services; 2) give special consideration to the poorer strata so that they can enjoy an 
equitable sharing of project benefits; and 3) increase members' participation in their 
cooperatives. The agricultural department consists of four interrelated units responsible for; 
a) maintaining relationships with the whole cooperative movement; b) implementing HRD 
field programs; c) implementing TI field programs; and d) designing projects and needs-
assessment studies. The department is composed of 13 members, 12 of whom are technicians 
with expertise in agriculture. The CCU has also played a great role in developing 
appropriated forms of profitable dairy small-farm technology. 
The global experience of the CCU in the promotion of rural cooperatives has been 
successful. It is a fact that some projects have failed and ceased to operate. In other cases, 
cooperatives continued to exist but produced less than was expected of them. However, in an 
important number of cases on a national scale, second grade cooperatives have performed an 
overlooked function by governments, that of creating and policing markets. On the whole, 
there was consensus that the impact of the CCU was found to be significant. 
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Project description 
Most of the information provided to the researcher was obtained from written internal 
documents which included CCU annual reports and the project itself In addition, the 
researcher conducted individual interviews with Jorge Artageveytia (CCU manager) and 
Eduardo Maldini (CCU field coordinator in charge of this project). Complementary, a similar 
interview was held with the representative of the donor agency (NCOS/Belgium) in Uruguay 
and responsible for project's final evaluation (Mrs. Kristin Minne). The analysis draws heavily 
on documents obtained from the institution. 
The project evaluated was the "Local development program for Lavalleja Colony.' The 
Lavalleja Colony is located in the northwest of the country. Department of S alto. As stated 
earlier, a colony is a type of agrarian community whose members (colonists) received and held 
land under conditions established by the INC. Lavalleja colony belonged to a region that 
illustrated many aspects of Uruguay's traditional agricultural structure. In this respect, the 
zone had a low rural population density as a consequence of an outdated structure, with a few 
of the farms well above 1,000 hectares (2,245 acres) and the majority of small farms with less 
than 100 hectares (224.5 acres) surrounding these big ranches. Livestock production was the 
main activity. Large-scale livestock ranchers have tended not to raise crops on any of their 
land, allowing livestock to graze openly on natural pasture. This provided enough earnings, 
but with less than 100 hectares, the system was not eCBcient in providing colonists a minimal 
welfare. Land was the major impeding factor. As a result, colonists' families could not hold 
their children to continue on the farm. 
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In addition, colonists were forced to turn to ofif-farm sources to supplement their 
scarce incomes. 09-farm occupations were largely confined to traditional activities, as 
seasonal employment in big livestock ranches. Modem activities come as a result of improved 
communication and the development of large cities, commercial firms, and governmental 
offices. General conditions in that region have remained unchanged for at least several 
decades, impeding the emerging of modem activities. Because of Lavalleja Colony's 
isolation and distance fi'om the department capital, the zone lacked public sector services 
operating within it. Normally, public administration rationality is guided by heavy political 
influence on the determination of delivering services to remote areas. 
Project development process 
The project development process is represented in Table 6. The overall goal of this 
project was to achieve an improvement of living standards of the men, women, and children of 
the Lavalleja Colony. To reach this overall goal, a community development strategy was 
designed based upon the formation of two local organizations in the colony. These 
organizations were in charge of coordinating development actions to different audiences 
within the zone: the urban population (an ad hoc local council) and the small-farm 
population(a cooperative). The local council was conceived to act as catalyst of local 
development. The cooperative was to provide delivery inputs and extension services with the 
intention of consolidating these local stmctures by developing their institutional capacity. In 
addition, there was another program whose goal was a widespread replication of the project 
to other surrounding regions. This project was started in 1989 with three sectoral programs 
Table 6. Evaluation of the project CCU-Lavalleja colony 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity building 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•Overall goal was to develop self-
sustaining community councils 
capable of implementing programs 
in sheep production, infrastructure 
& basic services, and to replicate the 
project. 
•A recently conducted needs 
assessment study was used. 
•Capacity-building objectives 
included development of two 
organizational structures needed to 
undertake the project: a local 
council and a cooperative. 
•Objectives were expressed within 
a general causal chain. 
•Constraining factors included 
traditional leadership in the zone 
and remoteness of the area. 
•Project strategy was based on a 
community development approach. 
•Guidelines for conducting 
evaluation were annual reports to 
the donor agency. 
•Training activities were specified 
in 2 levels; a) formal- for increasing 
productivity in sheep raising; & b) 
informal-for better management of 
the local council and cooperative. 
•Flexibility was granted because 
objectives were stated only for the 
first year. Future planning was to be 
evolved by the local people. 
•Constraining factors included 
traditional leadership in the zone 
and remoteness of the area. 
•Project started by providing 
development actions for the local 
council and cooperative. Later, 
the emphasis changed to the 
program which focused on the 
local council. 
•Formative evaluations were not 
carried out. 
•Project follow-up became 
constrained when extension agent 
moved away from the colony. 
•Local council was legitimized 
for the local people but lacked a 
sense of ownership and wes not 
given many training activities. 
•Groups were formed with an 
emphasis on youth and women. 
•Poor linkage with local 
government affected capacity-
building activities. 
•Process approach wherein local 
council and cooperative board 
gave information on perceived 
needs to help planning final 2 
years of project implementation. 
•Field staff enjoyed relative 
independence in project decisions 
at local level. 
•Constraining factors included 
low prices for wool, traditional 
leadership, and tension between 
project staff and local 
government. 
•No effect were seen in relation to 
strengthening cooperative for 
small sheep farmers, his program 
failed to achieve results. No 
available technology was found to 
be conveyed to the farmers. 
•Some infrastructure and services 
provided to the community: 
electricity, new water system built, 
housing, health services 
(ambulance). 
•Results could have been 
increased with more support from 
the local government. 
•No process evaluation was made 
to allow learning from experience, 
hindering replication in other areas 
(a stated goal of the project) 
•No long-term planning evolved. 
(The local council's role would be 
crucial in this.) 
•Constraining factors included 
low prices for wool, traditional 
leadership, and tension between 
project staff and local government. 
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aimed at: a) supporting the local council; b) supporting the cooperative; and c) replicating the 
project. There was no evaluation design added to the project. 
The project was designed with flexibility from the very beginning. Specific objectives 
and eflfects were only established for the first year, and expressed in a logical framework 
approach. No blueprint planning approach was employed. This left managers some discretion 
to make modifications later when factors affecting project implementation may change. Most 
of these changes, especially contextual factors, cannot be predicted accurately during the early 
stages of the design phase. The flexible design led to increasing participation of the people 
involved in the local organizations, especially women and youth. 
There was a loose coordination with the CCU headquarters in Montevideo which also 
permitted flexibility among extension field staff, allowing them to respond to local conditions. 
The agricultural department manager of CCU delegated daily operations and managerial 
decisions to the staff located in the region. This staff was not subject to constraining external 
regulations which left the unit in charge of implementing the project for all practical purposes, 
allowing it to operate as an independent organization. A lack of distractions in the region 
provided the extension staff with the motivation to work far longer than usual (similar to the 
first project evaluated in this chapter). Due to the fact that the department capital was too far 
from the implementation site to commute daily, a resident village level extension agent was 
allocated in Colonia Lavalleja. This facilitated acceptance of the extension staff by the target 
people. 
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Experience shows that project interventions accurately address the real constraints on 
intended beneficiaries if project personnel live in the same communities as the target people. 
This project provided clear evidence of that. During the first year of project implementation, 
the extension agent worked hard, talking over problems, listening to grievances, and urging 
villagers to do more about satisfying their perceived needs. He developed knowledge about 
local conditions and was sensitive to local needs. Consequently, he got the community 
support to the project. The agent later married and moved to the department capital which 
was located at a distance of 100 km (62 miles). After that, for many people, the project was 
better described in terms of'pre this' and 'post that.' The change produced tangible results in 
terms of hindering an effective rapport with the target people. Therefore, it affected project 
implementation. 
This project also showed that contextual factors influence project implementation. 
Program activities to support the cooperative were affected by the declining world prices for 
wool. During project design the prices were highly favorable; nevertheless, during the 
implementation phase, the sheep breeding enterprise was much less profitable than before. 
The crisis weakened efforts to increase productivity in sheep raising among small farmers of 
Lavalleja Colony. These problems were exacerbated by the absence of other technologies 
appropriated for small farmers in the colony. These factors, coupled with the absence of local 
extension staff living on-colony, severely limited the implementation of the program that 
supported the local cooperative. As the project progressed, there was a shift to emphasize 
program activities aimed at supporting the local committee. These activities were small in 
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scale and more related to perceived needs in the areas of health, education, nutrition, and 
infrastructure. As stated earlier, the lack of government services present made this area poor 
in terms of infrastructure and basic services. 
Program activities did not involve local Government services. It was a real problem to 
elicit cooperation and coordination of activities between local Government and the CCU. Too 
often, local governments do not perceive the NGO's actions as theirs, or they perceive them as 
a part of a continuing effort to erode their power. On the other hand, the NGOs still look to 
governments more as an obstacle to by-pass, rather than as a collaborating partner. Local 
governments can provide services that far exceed the NGO's possibilities, for example in road 
construction. Had the local government and the CCU been working closer, the project could 
have been implemented with greater success. It is also important to institutionalize the degree 
of linkage between both parts so that the beneficiaries can continue to be served after external 
aid ceases. This is an issue related to sustainability of benefits. 
Political context was also critical. A project aimed at promoting community 
development in a remote zone is likely to be constrained by local traditional political 
leadership. The leadership functions in accordance with the regional and national political 
systems. Leaders can block a project or delay decisions on urgent issues affecting its 
implementation. Project management strategy to this situation was to play a very low profile 
in the region during the period of elections. Normally, during campaign-time political 
conflicts arise rapidly, interfering or slowing the decision-making process regarding project 
implementation. 
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Integral Development Program for the Zone of Cuchilla del Ombu 
Agency in Charge - Direcciôn de Agronomias Regionales/Instituto Interamericano 
para la Cooperacion en Agricultura (RAA/nCA) 
Introduction 
Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from chapter 5 of 
El sistema de transferencia de tecnologia agraria en el Uruguay, (Vassallo, 1987). Extension 
as a function became institutionalized within the Ministerio de Agricultura (MOA) in 1925. 
At that time, the DETA was the original agency in charge of executing extension programs 
(see page 39). Since then, there have been several name changes reconstituting the existing 
institution. The list of names included Direcciôn de Agronomias Régionales (RAA), and 
Direcciôn de Extensiôn (EA). The Direcciôn de Promociôn y Desarrollo Local (DIPRODEL) 
was the last name-change throughout this process, created in 1990. The emphasis of the 
DIPRODEL has been placed on promoting and supporting local development actions. 
Extension agents are now supposed to investigate possible community projects and prepare 
communities for acceptance of their financial obligations. There has been a conflict between 
this new mission and the traditional task of conveying technology. The identification on the 
part extension agents must perform if DIPRODEL is to fiilfill its new mission has remained as 
a challenge. 
Throughout this century, from DETA to DIPRODEL, extension agencies have carried 
out their fiinctions without paying close attention to timely and flexible coordination with 
other public or private extension organizations. Extension activities were performed as 
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separate activities not embodied in a unified lasting effort of extension and/or research. 
Recently, there has also been a proliferation of ad hoc units in the MOA whose tasks overlap 
and bypass those of DIPRODEL and other extension agencies. These units can sometimes 
show surprisingly fast results under heavy financial support, but results often become diluted 
and the initially good performances fall off after the financial support leaves. This approach 
raises serious questions in terms of sustainability of results. These events have implied that 
duplication of efiforts was encouraged, thus, wasting scarce public available resources. At the 
same time, public extension organizations had found their operational resources shrunk to pay 
costs of personnel, travel, materials, and equipment. 
The internal structure of DIPRODEL was similar to its predecessors. It has been a 
centralized organization in which the key authority and decision-making role about the ftiture 
directions of the organization was focused on the MOA headquarters located in the capital of 
the country. The external linkages of DIPRODEL included a network that extends nationally 
and is composed of thirty-two local extension agencies. Although manifest power was 
concentrated in the hierarchies, local offices had a potential power to undertake their program 
planning process. This was due, in part, to the fact that they were isolated fi"om the national 
headquarters. Nevertheless, a firm commitment on the part of local offices was needed. 
Capability to fire incompetent staff from the state did not exist in Uruguay. However, a lack 
of resources was evident at the local level through the infrequency with which extension staff 
visited farmers on-farm. This undermined motivation among extension agents, thus, 
skepticism emerged. 
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The methodology used by the organization to establish relationships with the target 
people was based upon two features: 1) emphasis on the need for planning extension activities 
annually on a project basis; and 2) emphasis on the need for implementing projects through 
group methods. Projects can be annual or pluriannual, and may be a vehicle for TI or HRD 
purposes. Generally, projects were designed without conducting needs-assessment studies. 
Along with this, evaluation of the results and/or process was almost never carried out. 
Establishing clear objectives and listing impact indicators were two bottlenecks for 
introducing the evaluation part in the program planning process. 
Project description 
Most of the information provided in this section came from written internal documents 
which included the extension organization annual reports and the project itself In addition, 
the researcher conducted individual interviews with Mrs. Beatriz Sales (RAA field coordinator 
in charge of this project), Mrs. Alicia Cabrai (RAA social worker), Mr Pedro Bergeret 
(DIPRODEL manager), and Mr. Domingo Quintans (RAA manager). 
The project to be evaluated was the Integral Development Program for the zone of 
Cuchilla del Ombù. This zone is located in the northern part of the country. Department of 
Tacuarembô, close to its capital. The area is characterized by predominantly small size farms, 
significant quantities of subsistence production, little enterprise diversification, use of low 
levels of technology, and a lack of infrastructure and basic services. Adjacent areas 
surrounding the zone are composed of larger livestock farms. Physical determinants of the 
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zone brought about a cropping pattern in which the majority of the total cultivated acreage 
was devoted to growing potatoes. 
This project began in 1983 and finished abruptly in 1986. The overall goal was to 
promote the integral development of the area through a community development approach. 
The project was formulated during a period in which the country was in the midst of a 
transition fi-om dictatorship to democracy. As a result, uncertainties created by the changing 
environment were fi-equent and policies lacked coherence and direction. People were 
accustomed to following orders rather than taking their own initiative. The agency in charge 
of the project was the MOA, through the RAA and its local office located in Tacuarembo. 
Subsequently, the RAA evolved to become the DIPRODEL. 
It is important to mention that Tacuarembo had, during that time, a very active 
extension department within the local Government. This department worked in conjunction 
with the Instituto Interamericano para la Cooperacion en Agricultura (IICA). An idealistic 
spirit and motivation coupled with good personal capabilities were combined to an attentive 
supervision from the IICA to produce high standards of performance. There was a general 
atmosphere in Tacuarembo that reinforced a consideration for rural development projects. 
This factor, the strong commitment of the MOA s local office toward extension, understood 
as HRD, along with an important informal network of cooperation and interaction among 
different extension agents in that area, set a favorable framework within which the project was 
started. 
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The nCA is a specialized organization of the Organization of American States (OEA), 
working for agricultural development on the continent to improve the living conditions of the 
farmers and the rural population as a whole. It was founded in 1942 by the countries of the 
Americas, and it is headquartered in San José, Costa Rica. The nCA's work around the 
hemisphere is funded with resources from a number of different sources. First, quota funds 
are paid annually by the member countries. In addition, the Institute sustains agreements, 
contracts, contributions and donations with other international organizations. With these 
resources member countries implement specific projects through the IICA ofiBces located in all 
the countries of the Americas. 
Project development process 
The project development process is represented in Table 7. The overall goal of this 
project was to speed up an effective rural development process for the small farmers of 
Cuchilla del Ombu. To reach this goal, a community development approach was employed. 
The project aimed to increase the income of small farmers by improving their ability to 
produce potatoes and develop a cooperative that could help small landholders to purchase 
inputs and sell products in the market. Additionally, this cooperative intended to provide 
storage facilities. The project also sought to provide an infrastructure for village living and 
meet basic needs of the people involved. The idea behind the local community 
development approach was to combine the resources of the department government and the 
local community so that a more rapid development could be achieved than could be 
accomplished by either set of resources alone. Because Cuchilla del Ombu was closest to the 
Table 7. Evaluation of the project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity 
building 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•Overall goal was to achieve 
integrated rural development in the 
zone (HRD). 
•Needs and objectives were to be 
evolved from a participatory needs 
assessment. 
•Capacity-building objectives were 
to be evolved from a participatory 
needs assessment. 
•Objectives were to be evolved 
without reference to a general 
frame. 
•National policies were not 
conducive to the project. 
•Strategy was based on a 
community development 
approach. 
•No evaluation design was 
included. 
•Provision was made to work with 
other local institutions through 
informal network of technicians. 
•Planning process approach 
consisted of an evolving design 
with a high involvement of 
beneficiaries. 
•National policies were not 
conducive to the project. 
•Project staff were two temporarily 
hired professional headed by a 
supervisor. 
•Funds to pay salaries for hirees 
came from the EGA. 
•Permanent monitoring of the project 
with staff acting as facilitators. 
•Poor linkages with the MOA's 
national headquarters in the capital. 
•During the 2nd stage, short-term 
reachable capacity-building activities 
were implemented to obtain 
credibility among the target people. 
•Participatory methodology 
composed of three stages: data 
assembly, analysis, and discussion 
with target people. 
•From the last stage, plans were 
developed annually by the involved 
people. 
•National policies were not 
conducive to the project. 
•Tension between MOA's local level 
management and national level for 
retaining trained personnel. 
•Lack of government support to 
small farmers. 
•Much of major infrastructural 
work was completed: road network 
& water supply systems were built, 
and machinery groups were formed 
for their common use. 
•New leadership emerged which 
became sustained. 
•Stronger involvement of the 
community during and after 
project's termination. 
•Methodology used was rich in 
implications but no evaluation was 
made to allow learning from 
experience., hindering attempts to 
replicate this experience in other 
local offices of the MOA. 
•No deadline established for project 
completion. Project expected to 
continue, but MOA's headquarters 
decision rejecting to absorb 
temporarily hired personnel caused 
the project to end in 1986. 
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department capital, the government placed the bulk of its resources into that region first. 
The MOA was particularly affected at that time by the loss of competent professional 
staff necessary for the project. In addition, there was a personnel shortage within the 
Tacuarembo office. Due to this, the project received the IICA's support for hiring two 
temporary professionals, an agronomist and a social worker. They were allocated in the RAA 
local office under supervision of the local chief 
From the beginning, the project used a participator methodology for the whole 
program planning process. The needs assessment stage was composed of three phases: 1) 
data assembly to provide general background information necessary to help design the project; 
2) analysis of assembled information to detect main problems and their solutions; and 3) 
sharing the results with the target people to improve tentative solutions. The extension team 
played a great role in facilitating the community process of establishing their needs by a 
problem-solving approach. They encouraged people to look into the fiiture \na short term 
reachable actions to win confidence and obtain credibility while withholding the true 
objectives of the project. It was crucial for the success of the project to quickly gain support 
fi"om the target population. Short-term actions, beginning in phase two, that show visible 
results may be a necessary first step in community development projects. Project extension 
staff performed remarkably well in implementing the project by close monitoring. Actions 
were carried out through the formation of groups and their monitoring by regular site visits. 
These actions were geared toward building roads and meeting the basic needs of the 
community. 
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As stated previously, the country environment during that time was not favorable for a 
project aimed at promoting self-help and participation of the target people. To overcome this 
constraint project managers who were located at the local level and belonged to the MOA, 
had to consider a tradeoff between relying on more safety (at the local level) or on more 
resources (at the national level). The latter meant to establish supportive linkages with the 
MOA's headquarters located in the capital of the countiy. However, this would also facilitate 
the involvement of MOA officials in the project. 
It would have been extremely difficult for the officials to support a project whose 
conceptual framework did not fit within government policies. Given this situation, project 
managers realized that project could only proceed by remaining isolated from the national 
headquarters. Some formal procedures and channels were used for the project staff to interact 
subtly at the national level, attempting to get the IICA's cooperation and satisfying its 
reporting requirements. The IICA contributed largely to the legitimacy of and support for the 
project. Project performance was vulnerable to backsliding if this support slackened. 
Attempts to work jointly with other institutions, although successful, remained highly 
dependent upon informal connections. Certainly, if the project were to continue with this 
arrangement, it would be ill-prepared for the problems to come in the medium run. 
During 1985, when democracy in Uruguay was re-established, a new administration 
began to rule the country following elections which were held the year before. The IICA's 
commitment to the project slowed as its resources became more limited. The local office 
chief of the MOA wanted to retain both trained professionals. These people began to divert 
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their attention to finding other work positions long before the project was finished as they 
knew they could be out of work. The remoteness of the area and project's weak linkages with 
national headquarters gave it an unfavorable image among the MOA's new policy makers. 
They did not see the project as their own; consequently, they rejected to absorb the staff 
The orientation of the national government was a constraint to the continuation of the 
project. However, some efforts were made through the local extension agency of the MOA to 
continue supporting that village after 1985, but project performance could not be maintained 
at the levels demonstrated in the past. Certainly, the intent to by-pass national headquarters 
raised a resistance to the project that should have been anticipated by the project managers. 
Looking at the results of the project fi-om the standpoint of its objectives, there can be 
no doubt that it has contributed substantially to organizing the community around new 
leadership and organizations. The project did not transform that society, but it led to 
incremental and sustained participation of its members as was not seen before. This allowed 
for a change in attitude within the community toward joint action which resulted tangible 
successes witnessed in a road network and water systems which were built. The fact that the 
project was implemented by a public office, instead of a NGO, made this experience unique. 
Traditionally, the MOA has focused mainly on rich resource farmers. Formative or summative 
evaluations were not conducted nor was there any long-term planning; thus, it was not 
possible to learn fi-om the experience and transfer lessons to other agencies of the RAA and 
MOA. 
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Agrarian Cooperatives Youth Program 
Agency in Charge - Foro Juvenil/Cooperativas Agrarias Federadas (FJ/CAF) 
Introduction 
Most of the information provided in this introduction was obtained from internal 
materials from Foro Juvenil (FJ). In the case of Cooperativas Agrarias Federadas (CAF), 
information came from El sistema de tramferencia de tecnologia agraria en el Uruguay, 
(Vassallo, 1987), chapter 21. Also used ^NOXQ Entre muchos (Among many), (CAF/FJ, 1991) 
and CAF's bulletins (1986-1993), entitled Cooperative Youth. 
The FJ was an NGO which originated in 1981 for the purpose of improving living 
conditions of youth in the country. Its unique feature was that personnel were trained young 
people. Working through peers turned out to be key to the task of developing youths' skills 
and abilities needed to become responsible members of society. Only young people had the 
enthusiasm required for that job. Although urban youth were the major component of the FJ 
programs, an emphasis on rural youth has been placed since 1985. In that year, the FJ began 
to design a strategy to meet needs of the rural youth. 
It was understood that the FJ should take the lead in development of programs, 
working jointly with other institutions, to meet those needs with high degree of priority among 
the rural youth. The task to choose the organization to work with was too important to be 
left to chance. It became clear for the FJ, that the agrarian cooperative movement and its 
organizations could assist in meeting that challenge. Cooperatives were well distributed in the 
country, and they could also provide some inputs for the project. 
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The agrarian cooperative movement started on a modest scale in Uruguay during the 
first decades of this centuiy. Later, it grew larger, not only in number of cooperatives but also 
in the range of the activities they could undertake as their experience increased. Thus, the 
need for some kind of national federation to deal with government and exercise overall 
supervision arose. The CAF, a second-grade organization, was created in 1984 to fulfill that 
goal. From the begirming, the CAF understood that its mission was much broader than that of 
merely lobbying in favor of cooperativism interests. The CAF was, in effect, an organization 
with concerns for issues such as technology generation and transference, sustainable 
agriculture, rural women and youth situations, management innovations, etc. Its membership 
was composed of 60 primary agrarian cooperatives and it operated following the democratic 
principles that characterized the cooperativism ideology. Nevertheless, as the scale and 
complexity of the operations performed by the cooperatives increased, a pragmatic approach 
was indicated. 
The basic choice to make implied a tradeoff between the issue of efficiency and of 
equity. Ultimate authority for decisions rested in the board of directors that ruled CAF, where 
actions were taken by majority vote with each member having one vote. The CAF 
represented those interests coming fi-om the middle rural strata. These sectors had enough 
background to understand the advantages of cooperative action, especially in commercial 
areas. The CAF has placed great importance on achieving results in two areas: a) competent 
management of primary cooperatives locating qualified managers for the job to give better 
service to members; and b) an increase in membership participation in the management of the 
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cooperative. Both results are related; it cannot be taken for granted that, just because 
members are involved in the administration of the cooperative, it would be easy for them to 
improve services. 
The members often have little or no knowledge of how to lead the cooperatives as 
enterprises. While trained managers have a role in leading, members alone will not accomplish 
it. However, members should control managers through the board and assembly. This is 
seldom done. Consequently, assets of cooperatives were exposed to be taken over by their 
administrators. Sometimes, cooperatives served their administrators as a stepping-stone to 
better opportunities in other private firms. 
Since 1990, with the creation of a major fi-ee market with Brazil, Argentina, and 
Paraguay, agrarian cooperatives were exposed to an overwhelming competition outside that 
severely injured their performance. Due to this, sooner or later cooperatives would stand or 
fall as a business organization. If cooperatives were to survive and flourish, the quality of 
services given to members would become a key point. This also was thought to increase 
participation, a traditional bottleneck in Uruguay. 
During 1985, designated Youth International Year by the United Nations, the CAF and 
FJ started to design a program to organize groups of rural youth within the agrarian 
cooperatives. The originality of the program lay among its target people as there were few 
former experiences aimed at reaching the rural youth. Although extension agents recognized 
that youth may be used as avenues to introduce technology to farmers, it was seldom 
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practiced. A major impediment of previous programs was that the promoters were older than 
the intended beneficiaries and they worked for the rural youth rather than with the youth. 
Project description 
The majority of the information provided in this section came fi-om written internal 
documents which included annual reports and the project itself In addition, the researcher 
conducted individual interviews with Mr. Pablo Scremini (CAP president), Mr. Gaston Rico 
(CAF manager), Mrs. Silvia Rivero (CAF technician), Mr. Hugo Espindola (FJ technician), 
Mr. Anibal Nunez (FJ former technician), Mrs. Pierina German (cooperative extension agent) 
and Ms. Laura Rossi (cooperative extension agent). In addition interviews were held with 
several young people who participated in this project at the cooperative level: Freddy Fripp, 
Gianella Fonte, Adrian Ruiz, Juan Pablo Parrachon, Wilde Raimondo, and Eduardo Pastre. 
The project evaluated was the 'Youth Cooperative Members Program'. It was started 
in 1986 and was to run for several years. The overall goal of the program was to promote the 
development of rural youth who belonged to the agrarian cooperatives by fostering leadership 
skills. Groups were to be developed and emerging leaders identified to replace old 
cooperative board members. The lack of trained members to run the cooperatives was 
continually a severe obstacle that undermined efforts to develop agrarian cooperativism in 
Uruguay. Taking into account the increasing external competition, fiiture projections 
suggested this lack would become even more important. When current board members did 
receive training it was usually due to a trial and error approach. This was considered by the 
CAF to be an expensive and dangerous system that did not fialfill its expectations. For the FJ, 
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an urban NGO, the program presented a great opportunity to expand its coverage by 
integrating rural youth into its programs. 
The specific objectives of the program were to: 1) develop a new effective relationship 
between the rural youth and the cooperative boards of directors; 2) broaden the vision of the 
cooperative's boards of directors in relation to the roles that rural youth can play within 
cooperatives; 3) provide rural youth social skills; 4) help rural youth with self development; 
and 5) provide specific training in agriculture, management, and other topics such as drugs 
and AIDS awareness, early pregnancy, etc. 
The program intended to provide the means through which these objectives could be 
enhanced. Formal training courses, recreational activities, competitions, site visits, 
workshops, and internships were the most fi-equently used techniques. In all cases, groups 
were encouraged to be formed within cooperatives. Some assistance to these groups was 
planned through mass media (under CAF/FJ responsibility) and the use of cooperative 
extension agents (under the responsibility of cooperative's board of directors). The range of 
ages within groups were fi'om 14 to 25 years. A concern of this program was to avoid 
reverting to the traditional programs of formal education that tended to induce rural youth to 
leave the countryside. 
Project development process 
The project development process is represented in Table 8. The goal of the program 
was to change the capacity of the rural youth to enable them to take a leadership role within 
cooperatives and local communities. This goal was to be achieved through an intensive 
Table 8. Evaluation of the project CAF-FJ/agrarian youth cooperatives 
Perspective Context (Objectives) Input (Project) Process (Implementation) Product (Results) 
Management 
Capacity 
building 
•Overall goal was to 
provide educative 
experiences for rural youth 
enabling them to fill places 
in the cooperative boards 
of directors (HRD). 
•Also encouraged was 
incorporating the rural 
youth issue into public 
consideration (HRD). 
•Although capacity 
building was the main 
component of the project, 
objectives were not stated 
in this area. 
•Program strategy was based on the 
generation of centrally-planned 
experiences (meetings, courses, etc.) 
able to stimulate the formation of 
groups within the cooperatives. 
•Guidelines for establishing annual 
evaluation were incorporated in the 
project. 
•Training activities were to focus 
on general topics and specific 
subjects raised at the group level. 
•Activities were to be coordinated 
with the primary agrarian 
cooperatives. 
•Centrally-planned activities were 
implemented by CAF-FJ. 
•Youth groups were formed and 
monitored by extension agents from the 
cooperatives. 
•Extension agent involvement was the 
key for the project performance in the 
west where there was a network of 
groups created within a centralized 
system controlled by the CAF-FJ. 
•Little GPDR high level management in 
the implementation generated absence of 
leadership and confusion. 
•A wide variety of techniques were used: 
national meetings, formal courses, 
internships, encampments, plays, 
competitions, etc. 
•Supportive bulletins were published at 
the central level. 
•There were 14 youth groups in 
function and 10 inactive groups in the 
west of the country. 
•New young people served in the 
cooperatives' boards of directors (new 
leadership). 
•Issue of rural youth was incorporated 
into public consideration. 
•Efficient use of scarce available 
resources. 
•Positive effects in west cooperatives of 
country with new, emerging leadership. 
•There is an urgent need to begin 
economic activities within the groups. 
Future training should focus on 
supporting that role. 
Planning 
approach 
External 
factors 
•No general frame was 
devised to link objectives in 
operative terms. 
•Lack of awareness of 
rural youth problems by 
different social participants. 
•Close to a blueprint approach. 
•Centralized planning from the 
headquarters ofCAF/FJ in the 
capital of the countiy. 
•An annual plenaiy with the 
presence of rural youth group 
delegates to advise on planning. 
•Lack of awareness of rural youth 
problems by different social 
participants. 
•1986-1990/First Period: centralized 
planning with CAF/FJ controlling the 
program. 
•Later, it evolved to a decentralized 
structure, with CAF/FJ acting as advisors 
as a result of demands made by the target 
population. Planning process approach 
underway. 
•Lack of awareness of rural youth 
problems by organizational leaders. 
•Increasing difficulties of the agrarian 
cooperative system due to external 
competition. 
•New structure showed evidence of 
evaluation by beneficiaries, thus, as 
more sustainable structure. 
•New challenges to face were to 
nationally expand the program and 
generate income within groups in order 
to have an impact. 
•A lack of evaluation hindered learning 
from experience and national 
replication. 
•Lack of awareness of rural youth 
problems among organizational leaders. 
•Increasing difliculties of the agrarian 
cooperative system due to external 
competition. 
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educational program under a HRD tradition. The CAF/FJ strategy was to promote the 
formation of cooperative youth groups; cooperative extension agents were to act as 
facilitators in the follow-up activities. The effectiveness of this strategy depended in the end, 
on how well these extension agents could monitor the activities. 
The extension agents were subjected to pressures from cooperative boards to pay 
attention to cooperative affairs and keep administrative costs down. Resources for 
monitoring young groups would come from the primaiy cooperatives. One obvious way to 
reduce costs was to limit the range of cooperative services supplied. This meant that little 
could be accomplished by promoting groups in situations where the cooperatives' boards of 
directors where not oriented toward youth. 
A lack of orientation toward youth was the case in the traditional rural areas where 
agriculture was dominated by livestock extensive production. Such areas were located in the 
central and eastern regions of the country, where local communities were the poorest. Here, 
the possibility of community action on a minimum scale to succeed was hindered by difficult 
barriers. Cooperatives even did not exist and the community system often had a highly 
authoritarian structure that militated against development actions. 
An analysis of project implementation showed there were basically three periods: 1) 
1986-1990; 2) 1990-1992; and 3) 1993 to present day. During the first period, the program 
was capable of reaching cooperatives located in the west of the country. Twenty- four locally 
initiated groups were formed. Numerous meetings and training activities were conducted 
covering a wide range of subjects, and a replacement of old cooperative board members by 
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younger people took place. It should also be noted that the issue of rural youth was 
incorporated into the consideration of several cooperatives, government offices, and NGOs. 
In general, the program operated better when the cooperatives were already 'tuned in', and/or 
if their extension oflBces could influence them favorably. 
The role played by the cooperative extension agents was crucial, not only in lobbying 
within cooperatives but also in supporting and monitoring the groups. Apart from two 
isolated success stories (Minas de Corrales in the North-East and Aigua in the East), the 
program failed to achieve results in the other regions of the country. The structure of the 
program relied heavily on the central direction of CAF/FJ. There was scarce autonomy for 
the young who were too often told what to do. The FJ's role was to provide a sense of 
direction to the program while the CAF legitimized that role to the different actors involved 
and exerted pressures over the cooperatives' boards of directors to change their attitudes 
toward the program, if opposed to it. 
In the second period, the program shifted toward favoring a decentralized structure 
with youth acquiring more responsibility over the program. The creation of an ad hoc youth 
council with project managerial functions began to be considered. The CAF/FJ would assume 
more of a support fiinction of this council rather than the former control. What made this 
course of action relevant was the fact that it came as a demand from 'below'. The youth were 
not forced to follow this course of action. It came about as a part of an informal evaluation of 
the program where the youth gave their input. 
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This process represented one of the best arguments to make in favor of the program. 
A program is performing well when its target people are actively involved. There is no 
universal formula that prescribes the success or failure in development projects. It is a 
complex matter which requires knowledge of both relevant facts of the program's 
performance and the use of a set of criteria against which the facts can be judged. An 
important criteria is suggested here: organizational changes demanded by the target people in 
order to assume more responsibilities for directing the program. The last period is currently 
taking place. The new organizational structure has been functioning since March, 1993. 
An evaluation of the program to date showed that the program faced two problems: 
1) efforts to replicate it widely continued to fail; and 2) conflicting intra-group interests 
surfaced and some initial groups ceased to operate. These problems magnified the need for an 
evaluation design which allowed one to learn from experience, evolve guidelines, and replicate 
the project. The annual evaluation focused mainly on the number of activities performed both 
at central and local level. The intra-group conflict was related to the fact that some group 
members tended to lose motivation in recreational activities as they became older. These 
members who were usually the group leaders, needed economic activities to earn incomes and 
become independent from parents. Therefore, they abandoned their groups (turnover). How 
could income-raising activities be attained through youth groups? This is a current challenge 
which remains unsolved. 
Some tension between the two agencies arose during implementation. The CAF's 
mission was related to cooperativism development whereas the FJ's mission to youth 
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development. It appeared natural that different hidden agendas evolved jfrom these missions. 
But they never reached a point of becoming divergent for one another. The F J argued that the 
CAF's board of directors was not very involved in the handling of the project. This fact could 
not be denied as the CAF's board was overburdened with so many problems that they could 
not pay attention to this program, at least with the intensity expected by both parties. 
Summary 
Six projects were evaluated using a matrix consisting of four key factors considered 
relevant in facilitating or constraining successflil implementation of development projects, and 
the CIPP model of evaluation. The four key factors were management, capacity-building, 
planning approach and external factors. 
A naturalistic, qualitative documentary analysis of the administrative records of the six 
projects was performed. To gain additional information, several interviews were also 
conducted with the staff related to the project, beneficiaries and other qualified informants. 
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CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of a 
sample of six agricultural extension projects recently conducted in Uruguay. The evaluation 
method employed a conceptual framework that took into account four key factors considered 
relevant from an HRD perspective: management, capacity-building, planning approach, and 
external factors. Methodologically, effective project implementation was the dependent 
variable, and the four key factors became the independent variables. These factors formed a 
dynamic system, interacting with each other and with the project in ways that were difficult to 
anticipate. Too often, the factors become intertwined during project implementation. For 
these reasons, the importance of having a conceptual framework was evident. 
The findmgs from the selected projects could be more than individual insights on 
unique experiences if there were a conceptual framework that helped to organize, compare, 
and cumulate the findings. This chapter presents a summary of the results of the six projects 
selected. These results represent judgements synthesized from the diverse types of evidence 
employed. The evaluator gathered information from project documents and conducted 
interviews with project staff, beneficiaries, and other informants to gain a greater depth of 
information. A list of the persons who were interviewed is found in Appendix H. 
When performing evaluations, value judgments were inevitable because judgement is 
at the heart of the evaluation process. This may encourage controversies because worth was 
assigned. It would appear that the need to leam from experience is increasingly recognized as 
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an important concern. If such controversies may help academics and practitioners find 
solutions to problems, this study will prove usefiil. Project failures are far more costly than 
value judgements; the latter are easier to correct. The study is to be read with this in mind. 
A comparison of the six projects' development processes is provided in Tables 9 and 
10. Emphasis was placed on several key points as follows. The use of a matrix tool enabled a 
comparison of different implementations and their relationship to one another. In the analysis 
the stages of context, input, process, and product were used to guide the discussion. Rather 
than giving "bad' or 'good' marks to the projects, the evaluation process carried out focused on 
implications for future projects. In particular, the concern was; How could future programs 
be improved? All programs provided useful insights for approaching some of the problems 
related to the management of development projects. The following general discussion ties 
together a number of important points which have implications for fiiture project 
implementations. 
In this chapter no attempt was made to raise all the issues or to resolve all the issues 
that were raised; some aspects will need more research before conclusions can be drawn. 
However, enough information was available on many of the issues to generate operational 
guidelines for future activities. These guidelines should not be considered as universal rules 
that fit in all cases. For example, some of them may be more appropriated for Uruguay but 
not for other countries, or they may have opposite effects in different regions of the same 
country. A corollary of this is that replication should be taken cautiously and will require 
additional attention to new variables which need to be carefiilly considered. 
Table 9. Main characteristics of the selected projects 
Project Objective Strategy Output 
IPRU/Small farmers of 
COAMICOL—a development 
program for small livestock 
producers 
GPDR-Ansina village—a rural 
development program 
ACU-Small farmers of San Jose—a 
credit program for small farmers 
CCU-Lavalleja colony-a local 
development program 
RRA/IICA-Cuchilla del Ombu—an 
integral development program 
CAF/FJ-Agrarian youth 
cooperatives 
•Increase livestock production (TI). 
•Strengthen the local cooperative 
(HRD). 
•Improve family incomes of the 
zone (TI). 
•Consolidate communal 
organization (HRD). 
•Increase milk production (TI). 
•Enhance the organization of the 
colony (HRD). 
•Develop local councils capable of 
implementing development 
programs (HRD). 
•Integrate rural development in the 
zone (HRD). 
•Provide experiences for rural youth 
to enable them to fill places in the 
cooperative boards of directors 
(HRD). 
•Revolving credit system. 
•Revolving credit system. 
•Revolving credit ^stem. 
•Community development 
approach. 
•Community development 
approach. 
•Youth education program. 
•50/75 small farmers were reached 
(TI). 
•Project recently started. 
• 139/250 small fanners were 
reached (TI). 
•Local council was formed (HRD). 
•Some infrastructure was provided 
(HRD). 
•Achieved a sustaining community 
participation. 
• 14 rural youth groups formed. 
•Increased access to cooperative 
boards. 
Table 10. Summary of the evaluation of the projects 
Project/Source of Funds Evaluation Insight 
IPRU/COAMICOL 
External donor agency from 
Belgium 
GPDR/Ansina village 
External donor agency from 
Canada 
ACU/San Jose colonists 
External donor was the BID 
CCU/Lavalleja colony 
External donor agency from 
Belgium 
RAA-HCA/Cuchilla del Ombu 
nCA and the local government 
FJ-CAF/Agrarian cooperatives 
youth program 
A mixture of local sources 
(cooperatives) and external 
donor agencies 
•TI components were achieved. 
•Capacity-building (CB) activities to COAMICOL were never performed due 
to poor linkages between the IPRU and COAMICOL; thus, a lack of trained 
COAMICOL staff affected sustaining benefits of revolving credit system. 
•Project was small in scale, aimed at reaching a restricted area. This invited a 
high quality management; however the GPDR defined quality. That was not 
the case here. There was a management crisis, with poor involvement in the 
zone and no leadership given to the local staff. 
•TI components were achieved. 
•CB activities to ACU were never performed. The managerial incompetence 
of the ACU to administer the project led to failures in its sustainability. 
•TI components were not achieved basically due to external factors (wool 
prices). 
•CB activities were performed; as a result, a local council was formed and 
some infrastructure and services were provided. 
•Project well-initiated in 1983, having positive effects in TI and HRD 
components but abruptly ended in 1986. Project was expected to continue, but 
tension arose between the local staff of RAA and national government, 
terminating the project. 
•In view of the intended objectives, the project had positive effects. The main 
obstacles to having an impact were: a) it was not expanded throughout the 
country (only to the west); b) it did not generate economical benefits to the 
youth who were involved. 
•Evaluation design was well-planned toward achieving 
TI & HRD objectives. It used quantified goals, impact 
indicators and timeframes. Reporting systems allowed 
for comparisons over time to check progress toward 
objectives. 
•A new organization was created to bypass the existing 
one which proved to be unresponsive to the requests of 
the poorer people. 
•The revolving credit system was used as an 
introduction of the ACU to the target population rather 
than as an instrument for developing small farmers on a 
sustainable basis. 
•Project's broadly stated objectives, activities and some 
outputs for the first year. After that. The community 
councils developed by the project provided information 
for the ongoing program planning process. 
•A participatory planning approach was immediately 
implemented. It had 3 stages: (1) data assembly; (2) 
analysis; & (3) discussion with target population. 
During the 2nd stage, short-term, reachable activities 
were successfully implemented to gain credibility 
among the target population. 
•The project itself evolved to a decentralized structure 
through demands of the target population. The fact 
that the youth (target population) requested 
organizational changes represented a good indicator of 
success. 
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Context Evaluation 
Almost all the projects involved the pairing of TI (efiBciency) and HRD (equity) goals. 
Combining these two goals may be easy at the design stage but not at a latter stage of the 
program planning process. Although the interdependence of both goals (TI and HRD) is 
academically recognized, one reason for pairing them stems from the fact that development 
projects need to be presented in clear and comprehensive way to gain support (marketing). In 
addition, the majority of cases showed objectives stated very broadly, especially HRD. They 
were defined as 'improvement objectives'. This can be explained as a way to prevent 
manipulation of contextual factors. Otherwise, development managers may have found 
themselves very restricted to specific objectives, without enough room to maneuver. 
Project IPRU/COAMICOL was a remarkable exception. The stated goals and 
objectives were clearly defined for both HRD and TI. This helped to devise an evaluation 
design, coupled with expressing the objectives into a general frame (logical framework). The 
shortcoming of stating objectives broadly was that it hindered the evaluation design from the 
very beginning. An interesting approach was observed in project CCU/Ansina Village. It 
established ample objectives only for the first year; later, community councils were in charge 
of channeling people needs and reformulating program. 
Needs-assessment studies were conducted in several cases. In general, these studies 
gave the impression of follow-up activities to projects that began before. Perhaps this may be 
related to the diminishing of funds from donor agencies. From the very beginning, the project 
RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu showed a participatory approach to needs assessment. The 
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methodology was composed of three stages: 1) data assembly, which took just three months; 
2) analysis of the assembled data; and 3) sharing conclusions and interaction with the target 
people so as to jointly determine the needs. During the second stage, short-term reachable 
capacity-building activities were implemented to quickly gain credibility in the target people. 
That proved to be particularly successful in terms of: a) achieving early sustained 
participation of the community; b) establishing a healthy balance between extension stafifs' 
perceptions of needs and those from the target people; and c) developing an internal capacity 
to generate, process, and present information. 
Development projects are aimed at alleviation or reduction of rural poverty by 
sustained increases in TI/HRD objectives. The emphasis is placed on sustained increases. 
Results from a project must extend beyond its termination. In order for the project to become 
self-sustaining, it is of special importance that end-users participate in the program planning 
process from the very beginning. This happened in project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu. 
Logical framework was not used as a planning-tool except in project 
IPRU/COAMICOL. Thus, evaluation designs have been inadequate, non-existing, or less 
than they could have been. Logical framework helps to evaluate by emphasizing the 
identification and quantification of indicators which measure achievement of the different parts 
that make up a project, basically, inputs, outputs, and effects. Too often, enough output is 
considered as a measure of project success without really knowing what were the effects. In 
addition, logical framework takes into account assumptions about things that may or may not 
occur while the project is being conducted. They are important because of the influence they 
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can exert over the project; the project ultimately will depend on assumptions for achieving 
effects. 
Broad capacity-building activities were included in the project design but not as 
objectives. When the project design implied a revolving credit system, its implementation 
rested heavily on the credit agency in charge of administering it. Limiting the scope of 
capacity-building activities to the target people or extension staff without including all 
represented agencies was counterproductive. Sustamability of development efforts was, thus, 
severely injured. Projects IPRU/COAMICOL and ACU/San José colonists were examples in 
this regard. 
External factors affected available options for projects throughout the four stages, 
from process to product. When selected projects were designed, the country was on the path 
towards a democracy (1983: project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu) or in a democracy (after 
1985: projects IPRU/COAMICOL; GPDR/Ansina Village; ACU/San Jose Colonists; 
CCU/Lavalleja Colony; and FJ-CAF/Agrarian Cooperatives Youth Program). 
Linkages between government and the NGOs were very weak before 1985. However, 
the re-democratization process has done little to resolve that weakness and the lack of support 
to NGO activities. The government and NGOs continued to regard each other as a threat, 
rather than as a partner to work with. The highly centralized structure of the state, in the 
capital of the country and big cities of the countryside, posed serious problems for projects 
aimed at strengthening local development. The latter was observed in all the stages, not only 
context. 
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Input Evaluation 
Basic strategies of the selected projects involved two types: a) revolving credit 
system; and b) community development approach. The purpose of revolving credit system 
was to provide available credit and extension for small farmers, using simple application 
procedures with no hidden charges. The extension component should be approached from 
HRD perspective due to the characteristics of the target people. The value of the product 
received was the market price. The common practice of undervaluing farmers' commodities 
did not apply here. The farmer asked for credit directly, and the lender accepted or rejected 
the request immediately, depending on the extension agent's opinion. Loans were to be repaid 
in product rather than money. All the target people should get their turn to receive a loan 
because the funds, if well managed, are almost self-sustaining. 
Community development approaches followed the HRD tradition. They paid attention 
to the development of human competence and social organizations within a community-
oriented process. This process was based on the premise that for the solution of development 
problems, a project had to tackle them in their true complexity, promoting a more integrated 
effort in coping with those problems. Empowering people and their organizations were 
understood as a goal in itself, and as a conditio sine qua non to put TI programs into practice. 
Locating resident village level extension agents was implied in this approach, to investigate 
possible community projects and prepare communities for action by self-help methods. The 
target people, in the case of the revolving credit system, were composed of small farmers 
while in community development programs it involved also villagers. Project FJ-
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CAF/Agrarian Cooperative Youth Program can be defined as a youth education program 
close to the HRD tradition. 
Project IPRU/COAMICOL showed a specific design for evaluation. The remaining 
projects included vague references toward evaluation, but very distant fi-om specific designs. 
The cited project included reporting systems to allow comparisons over time to check 
progress toward objectives. This significantly helped to monitor the project. Nevertheless, 
there is a further consideration. Evaluation designs should also contribute to the providing of 
information in relation to the weaknesses and strengths of the implementation process (the 
learning fi-om the experience). This becomes crucial for replication of projects, an objective 
formally stated in project CCU/Lavalleja Colony, but underlying all the cases. This aspect was 
lacking in all six of the projects evaluated. The first four projects depended exclusively on 
foreign fimding. It was surprising that donor agencies did not stress those missing evaluative 
activities. The lack of concern in this sense leaves much to be desired. 
Project designs included the commitment to work jointly with other institutions to 
reach the target people. It was to the advantage of different agencies to develop a close 
collaboration scheme. This is due to the fact that budgets declined and projects fell in an area 
in where there was a convergence of the agencies mandates. To make commitments feasible 
and enduring, it is of vital importance that cooperation linkages be established formally, before 
project implementation. This reflected the fact that relying on informal networks did not 
assure sustainability of the cooperation, as it happened in project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del 
Ombu. It is wise to work through the existing organizations and avoid the so-common by­
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passing. However, a conflict may be found between the local institution which will undertake 
the project and the objectives being pursued for the project, as it is showed in project 
GPDR/Ansina Village. In a large number of cases, local organizations have been taken over 
by a few rich members for their own purposes. Under such circumstances, using these 
organizations as a vehicle for reaching the target people, will end up in more privileges for 
prominent farmers over service to a wider group. To overcome this, new organizations 
should be devised before the execution of the project. Vested interests may grow up against 
this idea. If a strong capacity-building process is undertaken the skills imparted to people 
from the new created organization will have a pay-off. 
Process Evaluation 
What started out as broad and rather ambiguous objectives in previous stages, needed 
to be redefined into more usable guides to activity. The most important functions of managers 
emerged here. They must be skilled in giving leadership, judgement, experience, and 
creativity to minimize ambiguity during implementation process. They should provide 
extension field staff a sense of direction of movement, indicating where they were (present 
situation) and where they wanted to go (improved situation). If managers failed to exhibit 
these behaviors as was evident in project GPDR/Ansina Village, extension staff became 
frustrated because no one knew which directions to follow. The monitoring of the project 
needed not only an evaluation design but also involvement of managers. Administrative 
systems highly centralized (project GPDR/ANsina Village), operated as a barrier for managers 
to be involved in the implementation. In this case, authority flow from the top down, and 
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there was no delegation of power to staff who were in touch with the target people. This staff 
developed informal means of circumventing the requirements of managers. 
The more remote was the zone where the project was being implemented, the greater 
the call for a decentralized structure. For example, a unit was created in project CCU to 
implement it, highly independent from its headquarters. The unit with its manager was located 
close to the project area. The extension agent was a resident in the project area during the 
first year and this facilitated first hand knowledge gathering and stimulated community 
actions. The withdrawal of the extension agent after the first year severely injured project 
implementation. To address accurately the real constraints on intended beneficiaries, and to 
reach stated objectives community development projects need their staff to live in the same 
conmiunities as the target people. 
Not only remoteness but also the lack of local organizations capable of implementing a 
project, obliged to make provisions for creating a unit for coordinating the project at the local 
level. The emphasis should be placed on coordinating efforts, rather than undertaking the 
project. The project IPRU/COAMICOL illustrated this dichotomy. The IPRU created a unit 
to operate at local level by supporting the existing cooperative. For different reasons this unit 
undertook control of the project. That was the fastest way to implement the project, but 
interfered with the improvement of capabilities in the cooperative to administer the revolving 
credit system by its own. As a result, currently institutions to handle this project either do not 
exist, since the unit ceased to operate when project ended, or do not have the administrative 
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capability to manage the project. All of this has raised difficult questions related to the 
maintenance of the project and future allocation of the available funds. 
The majority of the projects were conceived in terms of TI and HRD objectives, but 
their implementation showed a diversion from original goals. In general, the emphasis was put 
on providing TI activities; losses in HRD were the cost to pay for gains in TI. The principal 
weakness of TI rapid gains was that they did not last even in the medium-run perspective (as 
the ACU/San José project illustrated). To reach a better balance between TI and HRD during 
implementation of the project was difficult to achieve. Care should be taken, especially in 
projects involving credit, that the short-run purpose of pushing out loans to the maximum 
number of target people in the minimum time, did not obscure HRD objectives. The 
ACU/San José colonists project showed, that such a strategy invited financial losses as well as 
prevented the establishment of a sustainable credit system. Emphasizing the HRD 
components in this project should result in a durable structure that could extend beyond the 
project life. Instead of using the credit system as a tool for gaining political support, ACU 
needed to gain banking-capacity to be able to deal with its clients. A look at credit programs 
through rapid coverage 'lenses', without considering the institutional viability of the 
organization through which funds are administered, must be avoided at all costs. 
A program can be stated in TI/HRD or TI terms, but the way to reach it is through 
capacity-building activities. The question of how much HRD or TI can be put aside, is, in 
part, not answerable for managers. What should be avoided is the total absence of HRD 
components. The kind of balance that may work better is unpredictable and dependent upon 
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the particular circumstances of the setting. Managers are obliged to face these tradeoffs. 
The tension between TI and HRD objectives during implementation was requiring of 
experienced managers, to explore different alternatives where TI and HRD might be found to 
conflict less. However, project organizations were quite often managed by people with very 
little management skills. For example, whenever original program goals were being laid out, 
managers should have been able to alter the chronological sequence of the program design to 
work out the reconciliation of the two objectives. They lacked expertise because their 
background came from other disciplines (agronomy). The way to increase their income was 
to fill higher administrative positions. Additionally, they soon became overburdened by 
bureaucratic procedures, regulations, and routine desk tasks. This is rapidly becoming a 
problem in Uruguay that limits the efSciency with which scarce resources are allocated and 
managed, as well as the effectiveness with which those organizations reach their goals. 
It is important to point out that goal displacement occurred, generally against HRD. 
In addition, réévaluation of initially stated objectives was observed. This occurred when 
implementation was hindered by excessive adherence to them. Project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja 
was originally designed for improving sheep performance among small farmers. The shift to 
cattle grazing due to the external low prices of wool, could not be looked on as a step 
backward. In the midstream of project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja, it was realized there were not 
clear opportunities for economic gain from adoption of suitable technology; thus, emphasis 
was changed toward more HRD activities. Modifications in the implementation due to 
unexpected variations must be made frequently. 
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Adoption of technology should be given a first priority in projects based upon credit, 
but that concern was not observed. The reason is straightfbrvyard. Adoption of technology 
leads to income generation for repaying the loans. Otherwise, a project is inducing its target 
people to use credit ignoring that people need to pay back principal and interests, regardless 
of the credit conditions. Under these circumstances, projects force small farmers to get into 
debt, and lenders to have high rates of delinquency. Credit must be readily available after the 
technology becomes accessible for the target people. Controversy still exists as to whether or 
not available technology exists for small farmers. Although not at all conclusive, the evidence 
fi'om projects based upon revolving credit system implied that: 1) technology was conceived 
as the innovations not previously used in a given area; 2) extension was understood as any 
program directly tied to introducing that technology in the area in question. 
There is much to be gained by understanding that technology also means the local 
practices (IK) that may be adapted or supported before prescribing the dissemination of 
technologies fi'om outside. Too often, technology is assumed to mean just the output 
increasing techniques without really testing availability and profitability to the target people's 
conditions. Extension services should focus on whether or not profitable traditional 
technology (IK) exists. If that is not the case, technologies fi'om outside the local area need to 
be identified or developed, carried and adapted to meet the local conditions. The latter 
implies testing technology, physically and socio-economically, under plots similar to those of 
the audience. Obviously, if all of this is to be done, it requires sufficient extension trained 
staff. However, projects faced problems resulting from low salaries received by extension 
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agents as well as their poor training in subject-matter areas and extension methodologies. 
Serious attention should be given to providing adequate training to extension agents to ensure 
that DC is not by-passed, and that they are understood and trusted by small farmers. In 
addition, performance incentives for extension agents should be set up to increase salaries tied 
to their work effectiveness. 
In all cases, the project designs included references of working jointly with other 
institutions to achieve objectives. Nevertheless, when projects were implemented the intended 
coordination did not work. To some extent, public rhetoric did not transfer into action. 
Managers, planners, and policy-makers from public or private organizations, strongly 
defended the need of coordination among different agencies as an essential feature of 
development projects. Actual implementation turned out to be a quite different issue. Hidden 
agendas appeared, especially in community development projects. If local governments and 
political systems perceived their own interests were threatened by the project, cooperation did 
not take place as was the case in project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja. 
Despite numerous efforts given to the ways in which development programs could be 
evaluated, the estimation of success or failure remains a complex matter. Standard criteria by 
which these programs are judged play an important part in evaluation of whatever approach is 
used. The criteria to judge TI components have been more developed. This is a consequence 
of giving the first priority to the pursuit of production increases over other concerns in 
development programs. For example, production gains, farmer profits, percent-covered of the 
target people, default rate, were some of the criteria used to evaluate TI components. They 
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covered three aspects: 1) the impact on small farm productivity or income; 2) the outreach-
capacity of the program; and 3) the institutional viability of the organization that administered 
the funds. Usually, program goals and objectives are to be used as criteria for doing 
evaluation. They form the basis of which programs are to be evaluated. Those aspects of the 
process and/or product not related to the stated purposes are neglected. 
The criteria to judge HRD components have been less developed because project 
designs either do not include HRD objectives or define them rather vaguely. In addition, ifrom 
the HRD perspective, it may be possible to find results that are goal-unrelated achievements 
which deserve recognition. Project FJ/CAF gave usefiil insights in relation to criteria for 
evaluating fi-om HRD perspective. One can assume that organizational changes demanded by 
the target people, in the sense of acquiring more responsibilities over the implementation of 
the project, constitute an impact indicator of great relevance. In essence, three major phases 
were found in this project. In phase 1, the project began under close supervision of the NGOs 
in charge of its implementation. Participation of the target people was low, because they were 
still evaluating the project. There was little reason for them to become involved and 
participate in greater scale. Somewhere during this phase, the intended beneficiaries 
informally and not systematically explored probable implications of the project. The 
proposition here is that this kind of'hidden' internal evaluation of the audience became a good 
impact indicator of the project success. The indicator that this evaluation really took place was 
the existence of phases 2 and 3. 
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In phase 2, increases in the participation of the beneficiaries brought forth substantial 
demands for new organizational arrangements and the role of the NGOs became less directive. 
In phase 3, the preceding demands on new organizational changes were put into practice 
which were a desirable change in terms of bringing about a more enduring organization. An 
advisory-role for the NGOs emerged while the project was driven by its beneficiaries. The 
planning approach evolved fi"om blueprint to process. Shifts fi'om one phase to another were 
signalled by the changes in the participation of the beneficiaries and phase 3 might be regarded 
as representing a rather advanced stage of participation. In this example, the time period 
covered by the first phase was five years, and two years by the second. The third phase began 
in 1993 and was supposed to run a very long time period. 
Of course, this three-phase process may vary depending on the particular setting, 
resulting in reactions which are difficult to anticipate. What should be kept in mind is that the 
lack of participation of target people in a project, commonly considered a tradition-bound 
decision, may be a rational decision based upon a 'hidden' negative evaluation of that project. 
Product Evaluation 
Projects based upon revolving credit systems failed to achieve enduring results for 
their TI components because the HRD perspective through capacity-building activities was 
overlooked. Basically, efforts to impart training to the credit agency were not taken into 
account, neither in the design stage nor in the implementation. As a result, problems arose in 
the operations of the credit bureaucracy and the monitoring system, which, in turn, led to 
misuse of fimds (project ACU/San José colonists) and the risk that the fiands are going to be 
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absorbed by a few rural elite (project IPRU/COAMICOL). The basic constraint was the 
weakness of the credit agency which affected its viability to manage the credit system after the 
departure of the donor agencies. In other words, projects provided temporary services; TI 
gains at the end were nullified by a lack of project permanence. 
Projects based upon a community development approach showed a pattern in which 
capacity building activities were performed to create ad hoc local councils. Although TI 
components were focused on the designs, external factors such as the international market 
price for wool, left them aside during implementation (project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja). 
Project RAA-IICA/Cuchilla del Ombu had a lasting impact. Although it was terminated 
abruptly in 1986, its results in terms of organizing community to increase its participation in 
the public affairs can be seen currently. Project CCU/Colonia Lavalleja ended in November, 
1993. It created a local council which now has to articulate and channel community demands. 
The results were significant in terms of improved infi-astructure. However, there was reason 
to believe that these results could have accomplished a great deal more if cooperation between 
local government and agencies in charge of the projects could have been induced. 
The community development projects and their implementation processes revealed the 
basic tension between local governments interests and project purposes. Attempts to tackle 
community problems met considerable resistance owing to the local government and political 
structure. Resistance would have been even more pronounced in an electoral situation where 
efforts to entice the votes of community members and small farmers compete dangerously 
with the NGOs' development actions. For example, the project GPDR/Ansina village will 
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show a very low profile after July, 1994, due to the national elections that will be held in 
November, 1994. 
Doubtless, community development projects urgently needed to develop deep linkages 
vkdth local governments. Meeting basic needs and infi-astructure demands of local, 
communities on a sustainable basis went beyond the NGOs' possibilities. There has been a 
long history of distrust between the NGOs and government agencies in Uruguay, often rooted 
in political differences that must be put aside. The NGOs have placed a great value in their 
autonomy fi-om the government. Local governments were opposed to NGOs actions because 
they threatened their power. Although both parts endorsed the need for collaboration, it did 
not emerge. Clearly, what was needed here was an educative process in which both parts 
dialogue empathically with one another; otherwise, projects will continue to fail at achieving 
better and more enduring results. 
Project FJ-CAF, whose goal was to provide educational experiences to rural youth 
belonging to cooperatives, yielded important effects. They were two-fold. First, a new 
organizational structure that represented an advanced stage of participation of the target 
people. The evolution of this process, described earlier, was highly satisfying and continuing 
participation was envisaged in a better self-sustaining arrangement. Second, the development 
of a significant number of cooperative youth groups in the west of the country. Groups were 
understood to be a catalyst for bringing peers together and introducing new attitudes in the 
cooperatives and communities. 
138 
In social/economic terms, although important these effects have not yet significantly 
impacted the target population. That is a crucial distinction in evaluation. Bennett's 
fi-amework (see page 25) may help to explain the difference. Bennett developed a model 
composed of seven levels of evidence which can be used to evaluate projects. Level six of this 
model refers to 'practice change', which means adoption. The last level, which is called 'end 
results', refers to the consequences of the adoption in the target people. To have an impact 
this project needed to be replicated in a wider scale, covering the main regions of the country. 
Until now, it is a project concentrated only in the west. After spreading nationally (level 6), 
the project should be able to generate incomes to youth within the groups (level 7). Were 
there ways that could stimulate youth involvement in agriculture activities? That was a 
significant question, sufiBciently complex to challenge some of the better minds among those 
who could take an interest in the subject. 
There was an urgent need to learn more about the dynamics of each project's process 
implementation. Systematic observations need to be conducted during and after project 
completion to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies. A critical look at the 
past performance of extension merits more serious consideration for evaluation in Uruguay 
than it has received. Allowing extension managers and agents to learn fi-om different 
experiences through comparisons will help to detect the conditions in which particular tactics 
can be expected to work better. It will yield useful findings for practitioners and 
academicians. In addition, it is a required step for any widespread project replications as 
shown in the projects GPDR/Ansina village and FJ-CAF/rural youth. 
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It is more diflBcult to conduct evaluation procedures than merely to acknowledge their 
importance. The experience of these six projects, though not lacking in successes, has been 
characterized by disappointments and bafflements as to their causes and probable cures. The 
latter suggests the value of evaluation in extension. In fact, evaluation is the cornerstone to 
improve agricultural extension and development projects. Guidelines emerging from 
successful experiences may be incorporated in different settings so as to check their validity 
under different circumstances. Widespread discussion among practitioners and rigorous 
research among academicians will be the most effective means. Practices to attempt may 
include the so-called scientific knowledge as well as local knowledge (IK). 
The objective of such practices is to build an extension methodology appropriate for 
Uruguay. As a result, foreseeing problems and cures will be easier for development managers. 
However, the exact results will not come about in different settings. Rural development 
implies people interacting and this process is harder to identify in advance. Efforts to put into 
practice development actions set in motion many social processes, only some of which are 
foreseen by managers. It is important to remember that the complexities of this process 
should not mean rural development is a hopeless cause. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, GUTOELD^S, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate how effective the implementation of a 
sample of agricultural extension projects recently carried out in Uruguay have been. The 
researcher designed a evaluation framework (specific objective 1) that took into account four 
key factors considered relevant from the body of literature related to agricuhural extension 
and evaluation. These factors were: management, capacity building (specific objective 2), 
planning approach and external factors. In addition, these factors were considered through 
Stufiflebeam's CIPP model of evaluation, consisting of context, input, process, and product. A 
matrix was formed combining the four key factors and the CIPP model of evaluation. The 
matrix was refined by consultation with the researcher's peers. This matrix became the 
standard criteria for evaluating the selected projects. 
The study used qualitative methods to collect and analyze the data. As a result, 
concepts emerged that may have been missed using strictly quantitative research 
methodology. A naturalistic, qualitative documentary analysis of the administrative records of 
the six projects was performed. Interviews and direct observation were conducted to gain a 
greater depth of information. In all cases there were goals related to the Human Resource 
Development (HRD) tradition. The contents of the records (projects and related documents) 
were analyzed and categorized using the cited matrix. The literature review in Chapter 2 
identified the practices that facilitated or hindered the program-planning process of 
development projects from the HRD perspective (specific objective 3). These practices were 
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placed within each cell of the matrix. The evaluation was performed by comparing evidence 
from the selected projects to the criteria standards of the matrix. The matrix proved to be a 
valuable tool in order to achieve the objectives of the study. Such a matrix is relevant for 
extension managers in order to ensure that important factors affecting project successful 
implementation are not to be ignored at any stage in the program planning process. 
Consequently, managers should use the matrix before the implementation process. 
Although this research was of a naturalistic nature, steps were taken to guarantee its 
authenticity. To enhance credibility (internal validity) the study employed triangulation. 
Transferability (external validity) was provided by including a multiple case design, and 
providing sufiBcient description of the context. Dependability (reliability) was ensured by the 
use of an 'audit trail' in the form of the conceptual framework, the matrix, the initial questions, 
and other steps taken. Finally, confirmability (objectivity) was achieved by analyzing 
documentary data which were in an unaltered form and, thus, less subject to bias. 
The units of analysis were the selected projects, which were selected on purpose, 
rather than at random . It must be borne in mind that deriving universal rules from these cases 
can be dangerous. Implementation of development projects is as much an art as a science. 
For example, some practices may achieve better results for some settings but could be 
inappropriate for another ones. Extension managers must determine how their own projects 
differ from these cases, and decide the more suitable way to meet the goals of the project. 
Findings play the role of propositions that are aids to the decision making process for 
extension managers. Careful attention should be given by extension managers and field agents 
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to the four factors that affect project implementation (management, capacity-building, 
planning approach, and external factors). 
Guidelines 
The last specific objective of this study was to establish guidelines for future 
agricultural extension projects. These guidelines will be helpful for development managers as 
well as for planners and evaluators in LDCs. The guidelines, which are in accordance with the 
solutions identified in Chapter 2, are as follows: 
1. Managers should build a degree offlexibility into project design for its successful 
implementation because contextual factors tend to change drastically in LDCs. 
This is due to the fact that managers deal with unknown and unstable environments. 
Establishing broad goals and objectives is a way to provide flexibility. 
2. Managers must be involved on site during implementation, especially when objectives 
are broadly stated, to set general directions and orientations. 
Otherwise, extension stafiT become frustrated because a project degenerates into ill-
defined vagueness and directionless trial and error. This, in turn, will lead to timing 
problems. Experience so far seems to indicate in Uruguay that managers designed 
projects but later they were not involved in their implementation. On the other hand, 
extension agents had responsibilities for projects without being present fairly early in 
the preparation stage. A good overlap between planners and implementers becomes 
relevant. 
143 
Managers need to devise formative and summative evaluation systems so that the 
people involved in the project can leam the lessons of the experience. 
Modifications during project implementation (capacity to redesign) can be made as 
experience is gained. But experience alone does not lead to spontaneous evaluation. 
Experience can aid evaluation activities, not on its own, but as a part of the evaluation 
design previously planned. Currently, the absence of evaluation systems implies that 
findings fi-om one project c^ot be imported and exported between projects 
(replication). 
Managers need to establish clearly stated objectives and goals in measurable terms 
that lead to an evaluation design, which, in turn, guides the successful 
implementation of the project. 
These factors are related to each other. If the HRD objectives are not stated or they 
are established in rather vague terms, implementation and evaluation of the HRD 
components is hindered. Managers must realize that the HRD components and their 
related capacity-building activities cannot be overlooked. 
Managers need to elicit active participation of the intended beneficiaries from the 
early stages of the program planning process. 
The project design should be flexible enough to allow such participation. To elicit 
participation some investment in reachable short-term actions, perceived as important 
for the local decision-makers and the people, may be a necessary first step. 
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When leading projects, managers should be aware of the size of resources available 
in relation to the magnitude of the problem. 
Resources to face all the problems are usually scarce. In this situation, rather than 
being concerned for difiiised results, projects may try things out on a limited scale to 
g^ experience. High quality management will be more likely to occur if the project is 
small in scale. After that, replication to other areas could be done so that improved 
practices can prove themselves in action. 
Managers should approach revolving credit systems avoiding a faster outreach 
attainable for the institution, which is less enduring, in the long term. 
If strategy from the beginning is clearly geared toward fast completion of coverage in 
a short period of time, attentive monitoring of the implementation process itself is less 
likely to happen. The latter will lead the process in directions that are highly 
vuherable to mistakes. 
Managers need to combine their expertise with the local feedback to come up with 
appropriate decisions. 
The organizational structure plays an important role in shaping or not shaping 
opportunities for managers to interact with local extension staff and people involved in 
project implementation. Centralized structures do not allow managers to receive local 
feedbacks, at least in a timely fashion. As a result, managers are faced with complex 
tradeoffs with little information in support. Expertise of managers is understood as 
their capacity to deal with the four sets of factors that were identified in affecting 
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project implementation (management, capacity building, planning approach, and 
external factors). Proper sequencing, timing and priorities to recognize when some 
factor is of more importance than another are related to managers expertise. 
9. Managers need to approach revolving credit systems with a focus on the intended 
beneficiaries. 
When the focus is to use the credit as a political tool to gain institutional support, the 
contribution of the system to the welfare of the target people is not enduring. For a 
credit revolving system to be self-sustaining it needs to be: 1) channeled through an 
organization adequate for the task; and 2) tied to suitable technology that becomes 
available for target people through extension services. The former implies that the 
organization knows how to deal with interest rates, lending costs including those from 
extension services (not only orthodox costs), defaults, keeping accurate records, and 
so on. The latter implies that technology generation and transference is a central 
concern which goes before lending credit. Otherwise, how could small farmer gain 
incomes to pay back the loan? Consequences of not paying attention to this are debt 
for farmers and default for credit organizations. 
10. Managers of development projects should blend the IK-based technologies and the 
output-increasing technology (TI). 
There was enough evidence from the projects to suggest that the technologies 
conveyed to small farmers were those so-termed output-increasing. Some small 
farmers adopted the technological package, but the high risk associated was an 
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impediment for massive adoption. As is widely known, this strata of farmers make 
decisions attempting to reduce risks and increase security, due to their family survival. 
The output increasing technology was designed for the medium and large-sized farms, 
not small holders. A purist approach that excludes IK or TI is unlikely to solve all the 
problems. This, in turn, will lead to the assumption that successful development 
programs may have to rely on more modest but sustainable production gains. 
11. Managers of community development projects should get public agencies involvement 
from the beginning. 
It is difBcult to imagine sustaining and significant improvements in the areas where 
projects are located if public and private resources are not mixed together well to meet 
local demands. The design of these projects should start from the premise that getting 
public agencies involvement is crucial. Long term planning should be incorporated in 
the project clarifying the government's role after withdrawal of donor agencies and 
NGOs. 
12. Managers should be aware of the existence of hidden agendas. 
It is expected that the principal actors in development projects have agendas of their 
own: local governments, NGOs, beneficiaries, cooperative's board of directors, and 
donor agencies. Hidden agendas can be managed by making them explicit from the 
beginning. But if those agendas become clearly divergent, they will affect adversely 
the whole process and its results. 
13. Managers should provide opportunities for training the local extension agents. 
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Training objectives should be determined by needs assessment studies and not by the 
managers alone. In addition, training should be regarded as a continuing process in 
which the major component is accomplished through on-the-job activities. Finally, 
training must be adapted to local conditions. This means, for example, the learning 
materials must be drawn from the local culture of the trainees to be relevant for them. 
Some areas wherein training activities for extension staff are suggested as important 
are: 1) indigenous knowledge (IK), basically techniques to identify, record and test 
IK; 2) evaluation, basically techniques to establish impact indicators; and 3) the use of 
modem technologies in extension, basically computers and information networks. 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions were made based on the research findings. They are related 
to the specific objectives that guided the study. 
1. Design an evaluation framework capable to serve the needs of this study. 
The evaluation framework used for conducting this study proved to be a valuable tool 
for ensuring that relevant factors affecting the implementation of the projects were not 
overlooked in the different phases of their development and implementation. The 
matrix provides basic points upon which planners, managers, evaluators and field 
agents should focus their attention to facilitate successfiil project implementation as 
well as ensure enduring results. 
2. Identify the degree of use of capacity building components in agricultural extension 
projects recently carried out in Uruguay. 
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The degree of use of capacity building components in the selected projects varied in 
accordance with the basic strategy used in their implementation. Results of projects 
based on the revolving credit system were not sustainable, because capacity building 
activities to the credit organization were by-passed. Community development projects 
tended to achieve results lasting beyond completion of the projects. They relied more 
on the process planning approach that allowed participation of the target population 
from the very beginning. 
3. Identify the practices that hinder or facilitate the program planning process of 
agricultural extension projects from the HRD perspective. 
Practices that hinder or facilitate the program planning process of development 
projects were identified from the literature review and incorporated into the matrix. 
Evaluation of the selected projects identified some practices which hindered the 
implementation of the projects: a) the communication gap between managers and 
field extension staff; b) the emergence of divergent hidden agendas; c) the lack of 
formative and summative evaluation. 
4. Establish guidelines for future agricultural extension projects. 
A set of 13 guidelines were proposed for utilization in developing viable and longer 
lasting projects. Managers should consider these guidelines taking into account that 
specific details may vary depending on the particular setting. Specifically, the three 
particular settings were: a) the local level (cooperatives, NGOs, government); b) the 
national level (headquarters); and c) the international (donor agencies). 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
Two recommendations are made for further study: 
1. A study should be conducted to examine application of the matrix to local, national and 
international settings, focusing on dififerent organizational and managerial levels within 
the settings. This study should identify and compare the perceptions of the people 
involved in those settings regarding the use of the matrix. 
2. A study should be conducted to identify strategically selected impact indicators of 
human resource development (HRD) objectives in development projects. This study 
should develop the most appropriate methods for collecting evidence in relation to those 
impact indicators. 
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Last  Name of  Principal  Invest igator  DeHegedus 
Checklist for Attachments and Time Schedule 
The following are attached (please check): 
12."^ Letter or wrioen statement to subjects indicating clearly: 
a) purpose of the research 
b) the use of any identifier codes (names. H's), how ihey will be used, and when they will be 
removed (sec Item 17) 
c) an esD;nate of time needed for participation in the research and the place 
d) if applicable, location of the research acdvity 
e) how you will ensure confidentiality 
0 in a longitudinal study, note when and how you will contact subjects later 
g) participation is voluntary; nonparticipadon will not affect evaluations of the subject 
13. • Consent form (if applicable) 
14.0 Letter of approval for research from cooperadng organizations or institutions (if applicable) 
15. g) Data-gathering instruments Interviewer is data-gai:hering instrument. 
16. Andcipated dates for contact with subjects: 
First Contact Last Contact 
October-December 1993 same 
MoniJi / Day / Yeir Monih/Djy/Year 
17. If applicable: anticipated date that identifiers will be removed from completed survey instruments and/or audio or visual 
lapes will be erased: 
N . A .  
Month / Day/Yeir 
18. Signature of Departmental Executive Officer Date Department or Administrative Unit 
Agricultural Education and Studies 
19. Decision of the University Human Subjects Review Committee: 
Project Approved Project Not Approved No Action Required 
P a t r i c i a  M .  K e i t h  
Date Sig Name of Committee Chairperson nature of Committee Chairperson 
GC:l/90 
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Questions 
1. Context (objectives) 
a) What kind of goals did the project approach? 
b) How were goals and objectives described? 
c) Was needs assesment conducted? 
d) Were capacity-building objectives defined with quantified goals, indicators, or time frames? 
e) Were objectives expressed in a major framework? 
f) Was project formulated in terms of the logical framework? 
g) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage? 
2. Input (project) 
a) What was the strategy of the project? 
b) Was there an evaluation design? 
c) Who was going to take an active role in implementation of capacity-building efforts? 
d) Were there existing agencies or institutions with whom to work? 
e) Was there a planning or blueprint approach of the project design? 
f) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage? 
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3. Process (implementation) 
a) How was process monitoring conducted? 
b) How was formative evaluation conducted? 
c) Was the project implemented through integration of local institutions and governments? 
d) Did implementation involve all entities? 
e) Did capacity-building activities take place? 
f) Did flexibility continue during this stage? 
g) What kind of external factors constrained planning for project implementation? 
h) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage? 
4. Product (results) 
a) What were the main results of the project from a TI perspective? 
b) What were the main results of the project from a HRD perspective? 
c) Were long-term plans included for project continuance? 
d) Was sustainability of the results achieved? 
e) Was learning made possible through the lessons? 
f) What kind of external factors constrained the project during this stage? 
165 
APPENDIX B. CORRESPONDENCE 
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Dear 
First of all let me introduce myself My name is Pedro de Hegedus and I am 
conducting a research whose topic is "Evaluation of agricultural extension projects in 
Uruguay: Implications for Agricultural Extension". This research is carried out thanks to a 
Research Assistantship given to me by Iowa State University (EEUU) in this year. The 
Agriculture College and the Ministry of Agriculture of Uruguay, and CEDESUR (NGO) are 
also supporting this research. 
Evaluating agricultural extension projects recently carried out in Uruguay will provide 
useful information to administrators, supervisors, and extension agents from the public and 
private sector so as to improve future extension activities. 
In order to accomplish this purpose I will need to collect data from your institution by 
means of interviewing technical staff and reviewing documentary data. Your, cooperation and 
assistance will be greatly appreciated. 
I thank you for your help. 
Sincerely, 
Ing. Agr. Pedro de Hegedus (M.Sc) 
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APPENDIX C. CORRESPONDENCE IN SPANISH 
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Estimado/a 
Antes de todo me gustaria presentarme. Mi nombre es Pedro de Hegedûs y estoy 
realizando una investigaciôn cuyo tema es "Evaluaciôn de proyectos de extension rural en 
Uruguay: Implicaciones para Extension Rural". Esta investigaciôn es apoyada por.la 
Universidad Estatal de lowa (EEUU), a través de una beca que me fue otorgada durante este 
ano. Colaboran también para la realizaciôn de este trabajo, la Facultad de Agronomia y el 
Ministerio de Ganaderia, Agricultura y Pesca del Uruguay, y CEDESUR, una organizaciôn no 
gubemamental. 
Evaluar recientes proyectos de extension rural en Uruguay va a proveer de 
informacion util para administradores y técnicos extensionistas, tanto del sector pùblico como 
privado, a los efectos de mejorar futuras actividades en extensiôn. 
Para lograr este propôsito es necesario recoger informaciôn de su instituciôn, a través 
de entrevistas al personal técnico y revisiôn de documentos relacionados. Su cooperaciôn y 
asistencia en esta tarea sera muy apreciada. 
Desde ya, agradezco por la ayuda y quedo a vuestras gratas ôrdenes. 
Ing.Agr.Pedro de Hegedus (M. Se) 
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Dear 
First of all let me introduce myself My name is Pedro de Hegedus and I am 
conducting a research whose topic is "Evaluation of agricultural extension projects in 
Uruguay: Implications for Agricultural Extension". This research is carried out thanks to a 
Research Assistantship given to me by Iowa State University (EEUU) in this year. The 
Agriculture College and the Ministry of Agriculture of Uruguay, and CEDESUR (NGO) are 
also supporting this research. 
Evaluating probable past weaknesses and strengths of agricultural extension projects 
will provide useful information to administrators, supervisors, and extension agents from the 
public and private sector so as to improve future extension activities. 
In order to accomplish this purpose it will be needed to design an evaluation 
framework able to serve the needs of this study. Would you consent to serve on a "panel of 
experts" to aid in establishing evaluative criteria and development of an evaluation 
framework? Your cooperation and assistance in providing information for this study will be 
greatly appreciated. 
I thank you for your help. 
Sincerely, 
Ing. Agr. Pedro de Hegedus (M.Sc) 
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APPENDIX E. LETTER ASKING ASSISTANCE IN SPANISH 
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Estimado/a 
Antes de todo me gustaria presentarme. Mi nombre es Pedro de Hegedus y estoy 
realizando una investigaciôn cuyo tema es "Evaluaciôn de proyectos de extension rural en 
Uruguay:Implicaciones para Extension Rural". Esta investigaciôn es apoyada por la 
Universidad Estatal de Iowa (EEUU) a través de una beca que me fue otorgada durante este 
ano. Colaboran también para la realizaciôn de este trabajo, la Facultad de Agronomia y el 
Ministerio de Ganaderia, Agricultura y Pesca del Uruguay, y CEDESUR, una organizaciôn no 
gubemamental. 
Evaluar recientes proyectos de extensiôn rural en Uruguay va a proveer de 
informaciôn util para administradores, y técnicos extensionistas, tanto del sector pùblico como 
privado, a los efectos de mejorar fiituras actividades en extensiôn. 
Para lograr este propôsito es necesario elaborar un marco conceptual con criterios de 
evaluaciôn que se ajusten al objetivo previamente estipulado. Dada su experiencia en la 
materia, su colaboraciôn para el diseno de este marco séria de gran valor. La idea es 
entrevistar a Ud. para obtener aportes ysugerencias que perrnitan desarrollar el citado marco. 
Su cooperaciôn y asistencia en esta tarea sera muy apreciada. 
Desde ya, agradezco por la ayuda y quedo a vuestras gratas ordenes. 
Ing. Agr. Pedro de Hegedus (M. Se) 
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APPENDIX F. LIST OF PROFESSIONALS INTERVIEWED 
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Mario Costa (Extension specialist, M. Sc. expected 1994, Agriculture College) 
Gustavo Olveyra (Extension specialist, former Head Extension Department of the Agriculture 
College) 
Norberto Rodriguez (Extension department member, Agriculture College) 
Miguel Vassallo (Rural development specialist. Dr., Agriculture College) 
Alicia Canapale (Extension manager, NGO) 
Gustavo Pardo (Extension field agent, NGO) 
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APPENDIX G. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
176 
ACU Colonists Organization of Uruguay/NGO 
AID International Development Agency 
BID Development Interamerican Bank 
CAP Agrarian Cooperatives Joined/NGO 
CB Capacity building 
CCU Uruguayan Cooperative Center/NGO 
CEDESUR Development studies centre-Uruguay/NGO 
CEPAL Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/UNO 
CHMO Honorary Commission for Sheep Improvement 
CHPA Honorary Commission for Cattle Improvement/MOA 
CIPP Context, input, process, product 
CONAPROLE National Cooperative of Milk Producers/NGO 
COAMICOL Agrarian Cooperative "Minas de Corrales'/NGO 
DETA Extension Department and Technical Assistance/MOA 
DIPRODEL Local Development and Promotion Agency/MOA 
EA Extension Agency/MOA 
FJ Youth Forum/NGO 
FUCREA Federation of Farmer Groups of Uruguay 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GPDR Promotion Group of Regional Development/NGO 
HRD Human resource development 
HSM Hard systems methodology 
ncA Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture/OEA 
IK Indigenous knowledge 
INC Land Reform Institute 
IPRU Economical and Social Promotion Institution of Uruguay/NGO 
KASA Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, Aspirations 
LDC Less developed country 
MERCOSUR Southern Cone Common Market 
MOA Ministry of Agriculture 
NAEC National Agricultural Extension Center/MOA 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OEA Organization of American States 
PRA Participatory rural appraisal 
RAA Regional Agronomies Agency 
RRA Rapid rural appraisal 
SSM Soft systems methodology 
TI Technical innovation 
TOT Transfer of technology 
UNO United Nations Organization 
177 
APPENDIX H. LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
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IPRU Project 
GPDR Project 
ACU Project 
CCU Project 
RAA-IICA Project 
CAF-FJ Project 
Luis Murias 
Alicia Canapale 
Gustavo Canedo 
Aldo Scattolini 
Amilcar Acunha 
Gustavo Dans 
José Pedro Nunez 
Norberto Rodriguez 
Carlos Viera 
Miriam Rivero 
Leonardo Mesa 
Cecilia Gondolfo 
Fernando Battegazore 
Alvaro Ferreira 
Alberto Queijo 
Jorge Artagaveytia 
Eduardo Maldini 
Kristin Minne 
Pedro Bergeret 
Domingo Quintans 
Beatriz Sales 
Alicia Cabrai 
Pablo Scremini 
Gaston Rico 
Silvia Rivero 
Hugo Espindola 
Anibal Nunez 
Pierina German 
Laura Rossi 
Freddy Fripp 
Gianella Fonte 
Adrian Ruiz 
Juan Pablo Parrachon 
Wilde Raimondo 
Eduardo Pastre 
